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INTRODUCTION

In 1972, at the Legislature's urging, the people of California used
the initiative process to add "privacy" to the list of "inalienable
rights" guaranteed by Article 1, Section 1 of the California Constitution.' The Supreme Court of California has relied upon the state
constitutional privacy clause to strike down state laws restricting
abortion funding;2 to prevent police officers from posing as college
students and gathering intelligence on what is said in the classroom
when the intelligence gathered bears no relation to any suspected illegal activity;3 to strike down a local zoning ordinance which prevented more than five unrelated people from living in the same
house;4 to limit discovery in civil litigation of confidential financial
1. The privacy amendment was originally proposed by Representative Kenneth
Cory in 1972 as Assembly Constitutional Amendment 51. The legislative initiative was
placed upon the November 1972 ballot and was approved by the people. Article 1, section 1 was subsequently amended and now provides in full: "All people are by nature
free and independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing
and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy." CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1 (amended 1972).
2. Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers, 625 P.2d 779 (Cal. 1981).
3. White v. Davis, 533 P.2d 222 (Cal. 1975).
4. City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson, 610 P.2d 436 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980).
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information held by banks;5 and to limit discovery of the sexual history and practices of the plaintiff in a sexual harassment suit.6
In many of these rulings, the Supreme Court of California has indicated that the scope of the protection granted by the state constitution's explicitly enumerated privacy right is sometimes greater than
the scope of the United States Constitution's unenumerated right of
privacy. 7 A comparison of the results reached by the California
Supreme Court with decisions by the Supreme Court of the United
States on many similar issues bears this out.8
One argument in support of this position is that although privacy is
implicitly guaranteed under the federal constitution, the explicit declaration of a state right to privacy somehow suggests that the right
should be broader than the corresponding federal right.9 Yet it is not
altogether obvious why an explicit right should necessarily be
broader in scope than an implicit right. Of course, to the extent that
an implicit right is closely connected to other textually explicit
rights, as is apparently true of the federal constitutional right of privacy, the implicit right will be limited by the scope of the textually
explicit rights.1O However, the same is not necessarily true of an exOn
plicitly declared right which stands upon its own foundation.'
the other hand, making explicit what has previously been implicit
may involve nothing more than codification of existing law, with no
12
intention to change the law one way or another.
5. Valley Bank of Nevada v. Superior Court, 542 P.2d 977 (Cal. 1975) (holding
that a litigant seeking confidential financial information about a non-party from a
bank must make reasonable efforts to locate and inform customer about discovery request in order to give customer opportunity to assert privilege pursuant to article 1,
section 1).
6. Vinson v. Superior Court, 740 P.2d 404 (Cal. 1987).
7. Adamson, 610 P.2d at 440 n.3 (noting that the federal right to privacy "appears
to be narrower than what the voters approved in 1972 when they added 'privacy' to the
California Constitution"); Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers, 625
P.2d 779, 784 (Cal. 1981).
8. Compare City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson, 610 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1980) with Village of Belle Terre v. Borass, 416 U.S. 1 (1974). Compare Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers, 625 P.2d 779 (Cal. 1981) with Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297
(1980). See infra notes 314-467 and accompanying text.
9. Committee to Deend Reproductive Rights, 625 P.2d at 784. "The federal constitutional right of privacy, by contrast, enjoys no such explicit constitutional status."
I& (emphasis in original).
10. See infra notes 329-33 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 334-36 and accompanying text.
12. For example, many provisions in California's Civil Code are merely declarative
of existing law. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 5 (Deering 1990) (stating that "[t]he provisions of this code, so far as they are substantially the same as existing statutes or the

Another argument in favor of a broader state right of privacy relates to the different functions of state and federal governments. It
may be appropriate for state government to protect rights to privacy
more vigorously than the federal government since the state government is primarily responsible for exercising its power to protect the
health, safety and welfare of its citizens (whereas the federal government has more limited functions and powers).1S State protections
usually come in the form of new common law actions or the enactment of state legislation to protect the right of privacy beyond those
protections guaranteed by the federal constitution; there has been a
long history of such state law developments.14 However, there is no
reason in principle, why such state law protections may not be found
in state constitutional provisions that are interpreted more broadly
than similar federal provisions. Moreover, the California Constitution explicitly declares that state constitutional rights are independent of corresponding federal constitutional rights,15 an independence
recently emphasized by the Supreme Court of California in striking
common law, must be construed as continuations thereof, and not as new enactments").
That a statutory or constitutional enactment is merely declarative of existing law
does not necessarily freeze the law as it stood at the time of enactment. For example,
in Li v. Yellow Cab Company of California, 532 P.2d 1226 (Cal. 1975), in which the
Supreme Court of California judicially adopted comparative fault principles seemingly
in the teeth of Civil Code section 1714, the court explained that "it was not the intention of the Legislature in enacting section 1714 of the Civil Code, as well as other sections of that code declarative of the common law, to insulate the matters therein
expressed from further judicial development; rather it was the intention of the Legislature to announce and formulate existing common law principles and definitions for
purposes of orderly and concise presentation and with a distinct view toward continuing judicial evolution." Li, 532 P.2d at 1233.
13. See, e.g., Hans A. Linde, Without "Due Process"--Unconstitutional Law in
Oregon, 49 OR. L. REV. 125 (1970) (reviewing and criticizing then-recent decisions by
the Oregon Supreme Court which relied upon "substantive due process" concepts in
reviewing state and local laws); William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the
States, 36 N.Y.U. L. REV. 761, 777 (1960) (stating "It is reason for deep satisfaction that
many of the states effectively enforce the counterparts in state constitutions of the
specifics of the Bill of Rights. Indeed, some have been applied by states to an extent
beyond that required of the national government by the corresponding federal
guarantee").
14. See infra notes 248-54 and accompanying text.
15. Article 1, section 24, which was added in 1974, provides in part that "Rights
guaranteed by this Constitution are not dependent on those guaranteed by the United
States Constitution." CAL. CONST. art. I, § 24 (amended 1974).
Not all rights guaranteed under the California Constitution are given an interpretation broader than that adopted by the Supreme Court of the United States, however.
For example, with respect to privacy claims by criminal defendants, the Supreme
Court of California held in People v. Crowson, 660 P.2d 389, 392 (Cal. 1983), that the
privacy clause guarantee is"coextensive" with federal protections under the Fourth
Amendment. In In re Lance W., 694 P.2d 744, 752 (Cal. 1985), the court upheld an initiative which required state courts to follow the federal exclusionary rule in search
and seizure cases. In People v. Frierson, 599 P.2d 587, 613-14 (Cal. 1979), the court upheld another initiative which required that California courts interpret the state cruel
and unusual punishment clause consistent with federal law.
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down a voter initiative that substantially altered the independent vi6
tality of many state constitutional rights.'
On the other hand, the mere possibility of greater state protection
of privacy should not be mechanically converted into a certainty of
greater state protection of privacy. The question that remains is
whether the state constitution's explicit reference to privacy was intended to mean anything more than the federal protection of
7
privacy.'
In the context of privacy claims by defendants in criminal trials,
the Supreme Court of California held that the right to privacy guaranteed by article 1, section 1 is "coextensive" with the federal right
guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment.' 8 Apart from the privacy
rights of defendants in criminal trials, the scope of privacy rights
under the state constitution ultimately becomes a question of interpreting the privacy clause now contained in article 1, section 1. Interpreting constitutional provisions is always a delicate task. The task is
complicated further here because there is only a sparse legislative
history for the privacy initiative. Moreover, the courts have ignored
the most important portions of the legislative history and have focused their sole attention upon a ballot argument that, with casual
reading, goes far beyond what the legislature intended in approving
the privacy amendment.' 9
The Supreme Court of California has long held that ballot arguments are an aid in interpreting initiatives. 20 The reliance on ballot
arguments has been based largely upon the premises that voters read
and understand the ballot arguments, and that the ballot arguments
are thus a good indication of the considerations that influenced a majority of the voters to approve a particular initiative. These premises
are purely fictional and speculative and in fact, contrary to recent
empirical studies which demonstrate that ballot arguments play a relatively minor role in influencing voters. 2 ' Moreover, reliance upon
ballot arguments is contrary to an equally settled rule that the personal statements of individual legislators or persons is ordinarily en16. Raven v. Deukmejian, 801 P.2d 1077 (Cal. 1990), discussed infra at notes 243-46
and accompanying text.
17. On the importance of intent to the proper interpretation of constitutional provisions, see infra notes 89-167 and accompanying text.
18. People v. Crowson, 660 P.2d 389 (Cal. 1983).
19. See infra notes 143-66 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 142-43 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 144-46 and accompanying text.

titled to almost no weight in the interpretive process. 22
In fact, although the Supreme Court of California pays lip service
to voter intent by its professed reliance upon ballot arguments, the
court's track record strongly suggests an opposite rule. Ballot arguments are ignored when convenient, and the court, more generally,
has strictly construed voter initiatives, evidencing a thinly-veiled hos23
tility towards direct voter participation in the law-making process.
As indicated above, the Supreme Court of California has already
given article 1, section 1 a broader construction in some areas than
has been given by the federal courts to the federal right of privacy.
So far, however, the Supreme Court of California has utilized article
1, section 1 only for the purpose of limiting state action. This is consistent with the federal right of privacy 24 and the notion that constitutions are designed primarily to organize government and define the
relationship between the government and the people, rather than between one person and another. 25 Several lower state courts, however, have extended article 1, section 1 to cover claims against purely
private actors. 26 The commentators are thus far in agreement with
this extension. 27 The California Supreme Court has not addressed itself to this issue under article 1, section 1, even in dicta, except by
way of noting the lower court decisions discussing the issue, 28 which
are poor indicators of what the high court may do.29
22. See infra note 137 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 167-88 and accompanying text.
24. The federal constitutional right to privacy is grounded in various provisions in
the Bill of Rights, which are made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, and in the Fourteenth Amendment itself. The Fourteenth Amendment has consistently been construed to require state action before its protections are triggered.
The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922
(1982). See infra notes 365-411 and accompanying text. Accordingly, a purely private
actor can not violate the federal right to privacy.
25. See infra notes 351-364 and accompanying text.
26. See, e.g., Luck v. Southern Pac. Trans. Co., 267 Cal. Rptr. 618 (Cal. Ct. App.
1990); Wilkinson v. Times Mirror Corp., 264 Cal. Rptr. 194 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989); Semore
v. Pool, 266 Cal. Rptr. 280 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990); Porten v. University of San Francisco,
134 Cal. Rptr. 839 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976).
27. KURT H. DECKER, EMPLOYEE PRIVACY LAW AND PRACTICE, §§ 3.10-3.11 at 13032 (1987); Deborah Holmes McBride, The NCAA Drug-Testing Program and the California Constitution: Has CaliforniaExpanded the Right of Privacy?,23 U.S.F. L. REV.
253 (1989); Patricia A. Hunter, Your Urine or Your Job: Is Private Employee Drug
Urinalysis Constitutional in California?, 19 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1451 (1986); Allison
Rose, Mandatory Drug Testing of College Athletes: Are Athletes Being Denied Their
ConstitutionalRights?, 16 PEPP. L. REV. 45 (1988); Lawrence M. Newman, Note, Rediscovering the CaliforniaDeclarationof Rights, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 481 (1974).
28. See Schmidt v. Superior Court, 769 P.2d 932, 945 n.14 (Cal. 1989).
29. Cf Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 392-93 (Cal. 1988) (retreating
from dicta in prior supreme court decision which had been widely interpreted by the
lower courts as approving the existence of a cause of action for wrongful termination).
See generally Lawrence C. Levine, JudicialBackpedaling: Putting the Brakes on California'sLaw of Wrongful Termination, 20 PAC. L.J. 993, 1021 n.108 (1989).
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The Seven Worthies have seized the opportunity to address this issue by granting review of a recent controversial decision by California's Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Hill v. NCAA, a drug testing
case.30 The court in Hill relied exclusively on article 1, section 1 in
upholding an injunction prohibiting Stanford from enforcing the
NCAA's drug testing programs, even where both the NCAA and
Stanford appeared to be private actors under federal state action
law.31

The Court will discover that its task will not be an easy one. On
the one hand, extending a right of privacy to purely private conduct
has exceedingly broad ramifications for virtually all aspects of civil
law and remedies. It seems likely that the presently-constituted
32
court would hope to restrain such a broad basis for civil liability.
On the other hand, the ballot arguments in support of the privacy initiative may suggest that it was intended to reach some purely private
conduct.
If the court's other decisions involving initiatives are any indication, 33 it is likely that the court in Hill will respect the enactment of
the privacy initiative, but simultaneously, interpret the initiative in a
way that minimizes any sweeping changes in California law.34 In
political terms, the court will save face publicly by proclaiming privacy to be a fundamental right, but will substantially limit that right
to minimize the privacy clause's effect upon California's organic law.
A principled basis for limiting the privacy clause can be found in
the fragments of legislative history that are stored in the state
archives. This legislative history, which includes committee reports
and a drafting history, has not been cited or discussed in the cases
arising under article 1, section 1, although it is clear that the material
has been available to both bar and bench. Because this material is
not easy to come by, a copy of the relevant materials appears in Appendix A, and an analysis of the material in Part IV of this Article.
Based upon an analysis of this material, this Article will conclude
that the privacy initiative was intended to put California's privacy
30. 273 Cal. Rptr. 402 (Cal. Ct. App.), cert. granted,801 P.2d 1070 (1990).
31. An analysis of Hill appears infra notes 672-684 and accompanying text.
32. See generally Bill Blum, Toward a Radical Middle, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1991, at 48,
50 ("In tort law.., the [California Supreme Court] has embarked on a clear course of
cutting back the principles of liability and the bases for relief").
33. See infra notes 167-88 and accompanying text.
34. Cf. Raven v. Deukmejian, 801 P.2d 1077 (Cal. 1990) (striking down Proposition
115 as an unconstitutional revision because it constituted a "fundamental change in our
preexisting governmental plan").

guarantee upon an independent foundation (which may support
broader state privacy rights than exist under the Federal Constitution), but that the privacy initiative was almost surely not intended to
limit purely private conduct. The decision in Hill should probably be
reversed and decisions from the courts of appeals extending the privacy clause to private employers should be disapproved.
Scholarly completeness demands careful attention to some preliminaries. The privacy clause was added by a legislative initiative,
and Part II proposes principles of interpretation for both voter and
legislative initiatives. Part III reviews privacy protections apart from
the privacy clause (i.e., the common law causes of action and constitutional doctrines), including a discussion of state action requirements under the federal and state constitutions. Part IV contains an
analysis of the legislative history of the privacy clause. Part V critically reviews the cases arising under the privacy clause in light of the
legislative history discussed in Part IV. Readers primarily interested
in the legislative history and the cases are encouraged to skip ahead
to Parts IV and V.
II.
A.

THE INITIATIVE PROCESS AND PRINCIPLES OF INTERPRETATION

Direct Voter Participationin California

To consider the initiative process in its proper context, we must
first review briefly the different ways of enacting law in California.35
Voters participate both directly and indirectly in the lawmaking process. The most common indirect participation in lawmaking is voting
for representatives to fill the legislative and executive branches, and
voting to confirm judges and other officers. 36 According to James
Madison in The Federalist No. 10, a representative form of government in which citizens participate only indirectly in the lawmaking
process is the most enduring form of government, primarily because
35. This discussion will be focused primarily upon California procedures and California law. California is obviously not alone in permitting direct voter participation,
although California has been recognized in literature as one of the states with the
greatest experience with direct voter participation through initiatives and referendums. THE REFERENDUM DEVICE, 51-53 (Austin Ranney ed., 1981); DAVID B. MAGLEBY,
DIRECT LEGISLATION (1984); REFERENDUMS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF PRACTICE AND
THEORY, 87-122 (David Butler & Austin Ranney eds., 1978) [hereinafter REFEREN-

DUMS]. Because California has had more experience with initiatives than other states,
California's experience may well be relevant to a proper interpretation of other initiative measures.
36. Historically, even our selection of certain important political positions at the
federal level was indirect. For example, members of the United States Senate were
originally chosen by state legislators and not by the people. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3.
One of the great victories of the Progressive movement in the early part of this century was to replace indirect selection of senators with direct selection. U.S. CONST.
amend. XVII (1917) (repealing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3).
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it avoids the evils of faction and tyranny of the majority. 3 7 Madison's
views represented the dominate view at the time. Consequently, the
United States Constitution provides that "[t]he United States shall
guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of
Government." 38
The history of our representative form of government at the local,
state, and federal levels confirms that even with only an indirect
voice in government affairs, public sentiment has a substantial influence over the actions of government. 39 At the federal level, citizen
participation is entirely indirect. It is only by exercising our constitutionally protected rights to vote, to speak, to petition, and to litigate
that the voters can influence the federal government.40
By contrast, at the state and local level, it is more common for vot37. From this view of the subject it may be concluded that a pure democracy,
by which I mean a society consisting of a small number of citizens, who assemble and administer the government in person, can admit of no cure for the
mischiefs of faction. A common passion or interest will, in almost every case,
be felt by a majority of the whole; a communication and concert result from
the form of government itself; and there is nothing to check the inducements
to sacrifice the weaker party or an obnoxious individual. Hence it is that such
democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention; have
ever been found incompatible with personal security or the rights of property;
and have in general been as short in their lives as they have been violent in
their deaths. Theoretic politicians, who have patronized this species of government, have erroneously supposed that by reducing mankind to a perfect
equality in their political rights, they would, at the same time be perfectly
equalized and assimilated in their possessions, their opinions, and their
passions.
THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison). See generally Cynthia L. Fountaine, Lousy
Lawmaking: Questioning the Desirabilityand Constitutionalityof Legislating by Initiative, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 733, 747-51 (1988) [hereinafter "Lousy Lawmaking"].
38. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. Arguably, a "Republican" form of government means

a purely representative form of government, and permitting direct voter participation
in government by way of initiatives may thus violate the Guaranty Clause. However,
in Pacific States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912), the Court
held that a challenge to Oregon's initiative process under the Guaranty Clause raised a
political question which the judiciary was not competent to answer. Id. at 133; Lousy
Lawmaking, supra note 37, at 759-76. On the political question doctrine, see generally
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 3-13, (2d ed. 1988).

39. Needless to say, many people may disagree with this broad generalization.
However, this Article is primarily about how courts should interpret legislation produced by the voter initiative process; it would serve no useful purpose to engage in an
extended discussion of the merits of representative government and the extent to
which it works in the United States. Accordingly, for purposes of this Article, we shall
adopt as an express premise that representative government in practice by and large
lives up to its theoretic promise.
40. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. 886 (1982); California Motor
Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972); United Mine Workers of
America v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961).

ers to participate directly in government affairs. Such participation
most often takes the form of voting to approve particular measures
proposed by local and state government. This is generally referred to
as the "power of referendum."41 Virtually all states, including California, permit voters to participate directly in approving legislatively
proposed amendments to the state constitution.42 That is how the
privacy amendment made its way into California's Constitution. In
California, a two-thirds vote by the legislature will place a proposed
constitutional amendment on the ballot, and a majority vote of the
electors then suffices to make the proposed amendment a part of the
constitution. 43 Voter approval is ordinarily not necessary for statutory changes by the legislature."
Only a few states have taken the next step towards pure democracy by permitting private persons to draft, and put before the people, "voter initiatives," which may propose changes either at the
statutory or constitutional level. In California, a solitary person can
propose both statutory and constitutional changes.45
Relatively few such proposals actually reach the ballot, because to
qualify a constitutional amendment, the proponent must first secure
signatures from eight percent of the electors eligible at the most recent election for governor, and to qualify a statutory initiative, the
41. Confusion exists over the terminology used in describing the different mechanisms of direct voter participation. The most widely accepted definitions of "referendum" and "initiative" are as follows:
In the United States.... the referendum is an arrangement whereby a measure that has been passed by a legislature does not go into force until it has
been approved by the voters (in some specified proportion) in an election.
The initiative, on the other hand, is an arrangement whereby any person or
group of persons may draft a proposed law or constitutional amendment and,
after satisfying certain requirements of numbers and form, have it referred directly to the voters for final approval or rejection. Thus, the referendum enables the voters to accept or reject the legislature's proposals, while the
initiative allows the voters both to make their own proposals and to pass upon
the proposals of other voters.
REFERENDUMS, supra note 35, at 67; see also MAGLEBY, supra note 35, at 1.
These scholarly definitions are not always followed in practice, however. In California, a legislatively proposed constitutional amendment is referred to as a "Legislative
Initiative." Yet under the definitions above, a "Legislative Initiative" actually involves
the referendum process. For purposes of discussing California law, this Article adopts
the California terminology and will use the label "Legislative Initiative" to describe
constitutional amendments proposed by the legislature and approved or disapproved
by the people.
42. REFERENDUMS, supra note 35, at 71-72, table 4-2.
43. CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, § 1.
44. A statutory initiative may not be amended or repealed without the prior or
subsequent approval of the people. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 10(c).
45. Article IV, section 1, of the constitution provides that, although the "legislative
power of this State is vested in the California Legislature . . . the people reserve to
themselves the powers of initiative and referendum." CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 1. Article
II, Section 8 provides, in pertinent part, that "[t]he initiative is the power of the electors to propose statutes and amendments to the Constitution and to adopt or reject
them." CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8.
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proponent must secure signatures from five percent of the eligible
electors.46 Increasingly, however, well-financed interest groups are
able to spend the money necessary to secure those signatures, and
electors in California have indicated their dissatisfaction with representative government by signing on.47 Once on the ballot, an initiative is approved if it secures a majority of the votes cast.
The political inspiration for permitting voter initiatives is found in
the popular notions that the power to govern emanates from the electors, and the government serves at the pleasure of the electors. Article 2, section 1 of the California Constitution sets forth this political
philosophy in providing that "[a]ll political power is inherent in the
people."

48

It is, however, a large step from acknowledging that government
exists to serve the people and that political power is inherent in the
people, to accepting that the people should have a voice in governing
themselves by directly adding statutory or constitutional provisions
(rather than by influencing legislation through voting for particular
representation or lobbying). The former principle may co-exist in a
purely republican and representational form of government. 49 The
initiative, by contrast, "is a nearly pure exercise of democracy."5 0
46. CAL. ELEc. CODE § 3524 (West Supp. 1991).
47. The process of qualifying measures for the ballot has become big business. Today, experienced consultants are available who know the best way to secure the necessary signatures for any particular proposal. See, e.g., REFERENDUMS, supra note 35, at
101-07; MAGLEBY, supra note 35, at 59-76.
48. Article II, section 1, of the constitution provides in full: "All political power is
inherent in the people. Government is instituted for their protection, security, and
benefit, and they have the right to alter it or reform it when the public good may require." CAL. CONST. art. II, § 1.
The power to amend the constitution by initiative does not include the broader
power of constitutional revision. See Raven v. Deukmejian, 801 P.2d 1077 (Cal. 1990)
(declaring a portion of Proposition 115 to be an unconstitutional revision); McFadden
v. Jordan, 196 P.2d 787, 790-96 (Cal. 1948) (invalidating proposition which added 21,000
words to the constitution and revised 15 of its 25 articles). See generally Douglas C.
Michaels, Note, Preelection Judicial Review: Taking the Initiative in Voter Protection, 71 CAL. L. REV. 1216, 1224 (1983).
49. The federal government is the prime example of a purely representational
form of government that, nevertheless, reserves non-delegated rights to the people.
The Ninth Amendment specifically provides that "[t]he enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people." U.S. CONST. amend. IX. The Tenth Amendment further provides that "[t]he
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to
the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST.
amend. X.
50. Joseph T. Henke & Miles A. Woodlief, The Effect of Proposition 13 Court Decisions on CaliforniaLocal Government & Revenue Sources, 22 U.S.F. L. REV. 251, 254
(1988).

The arguments in favor of and against the powers of referendum
and initiative have been well described in the political literature.
The arguments in favor of direct voter participation through referendum and initiative include the following:5 ' (1) in the case of referendums, legitimation of government decisions; (2) the ideal of pure
democracy; (3) distrust of organized interest groups in favor of the individual; (4) tough decisions not ignored; (5) public decisions arrived
at through the most accurate measure of public sentiment; and (6) increased voter awareness and participation in government. The arguments against direct voter participation include the following (1)
weakened power of elected officials and organized government; (2)
inability of ordinary voters to make wise and reasoned decisions concerning complex issues; (3) inability to negotiate consensus positions
through legislative compromise; and (4) danger to the rights of minorities through tyranny of the majority.
Although Hiram Johnson was a proud proponent of governmentby-the-people as an antidote to government-by-those-corrupt-electedofficials, it seems likely that he would be disappointed in the use of
the initiative process, especially in recent years.5 2 The historical use
of initiatives in California displays all of the short-comings of pure
democracy in action in a large society. In the case of voter initiatives,
there is often an inadequate opportunity for careful, negotiated drafting of the language which appears in the initiatives. Whether the initiative is drafted by private persons or proposed by the legislature,
empirical study suggests that electors remain relatively uneducated
about the details of the legislation they are approving. Special interest groups can capture or create attention for temporarily popular
causes largely because of their financial resources. Our recent experience in California includes massive media campaigns, most often involving slick television and radio commercials by famous
personalities. Because of the power of the media, particularly television, these campaigns may be particularly influential in swinging
public opinion. Unfortunately, most of the commercials provide little
in the way of education, and are dominated by mindless slogans and
51. REFERENDUMS, supra note 35, at 24-33; Howard Eastman, Squelching Vox
Populi: Judicial Review of the Initiative in California,25 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 529,
530-36 (1985); Kara Christenson, Note, Interpretingthe Purposes of Initiatives: Proposition 65, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1034-36 (1989).
52. Johnson's campaign for governor was centered on the proposition that state
government had become corrupted by powerful special interest groups (to wit, the railroads and large industry). BOYLE, THE STUDY OF AN ISOLATIONIST, 23-27 (U.C.L.A. dissertation 1970). The initiative, along with other progressive reforms during Johnson's
administration, such as the referendum, recall, woman's suffrage, presidential primary,
the enactment of a Blue Sky law, and so on, was intended to bring government back to
the people. The irony is that the expense of the initiative process has grown to the
point that its use has become united almost exclusively to well-financed interest
groups.
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half-truths, if not outright misrepresentations. If the initiative was to
be an antidote for government by the corrupt, then the result appears to have been government by the uninformed.
1.

Drafting Initiatives

The text of a statute is the end product of a rigorous drafting process in which substantive positions and compromises are reduced to
specific words and provisions with an appreciation of the critical role
which the executive, adminsitrative agencies, and courts will play in
implementing the policy expressed by the statute. The text of a legislatively proposed initiative, such as the privacy clause, goes through
this same legislative process.
The drafting of voter initiatives is much less formalized. Some
voter initiatives are based upon prior legislative acts which were not
approved by the legislature.5 3 The text of these initiatives has been
through at least part, and perhaps all, of the legislative drafting process. In a few cases, the text and substance of a voter initiative has
undergone public review, before being qualified for the ballot,
through a series of town-hall like meetings to which the public is invited.54 By far the largest number of California voter initiatives,
however, are the result of drafting by the private interest group that
is pushing the initiative. 55 The risk is that an interest group, focused
primarily upon its pet project, is less likely to consider all of the
ramifications of changing the law. There may be inadequate consideration of opposing and legitimate interests; there may be an inadequate understanding of how the initiative will affect other aspects of
California law; and, there may be an inadequate appreciation of
drafting errors that opponents would have pointed out in a more
open drafting process. 56 In addition, whereas legislators have a responsibility to consider the constitutionality of every act which is en53. MAGLEBY, supra note 35, at 60.

54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Proposition 13 has been regularly criticized for its many ambiguities. See INITIATIVE AND

REFERENDUM IN CALIFORNIA:

A

LEGACY LOST? 40 (LEAGUE OF WOMEN

VOTERS OF CALIFORNIA, 1984) [hereinafter LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS]. The proponents of Proposition 13 attempted to cure some of its ambiguities in 1986 with Proposition 62. Proposition 62 has its own difficulties, however, not the least of which is that
the lower courts have thus far declared Proposition 62 to be unconstitutional. See
Rider v. County of San Diego, 272 Cal. Rptr. 857 (Cal. Ct. App.), cert. granted and superseded, 799 P.2d 1280 (Cal. 1990). In 1990, the Howard Jarvis Taxpayers' Foundation
sponsored Proposition 136, which again was designed to clarify Proposition 13. The
proposition was not approved by the voters.

acted, a private interest group has no responsibility to make an
independent assessment of the constitutionality of a proposed initiative.5 7 The fact that the drafters of an initiative are well motivated is
no guarantee of quality.58
2.

Validation of the Process by Voter Participation

Ultimately, neither the interest group nor the legislature has final
say, the voters do. Direct voter participation is supposed to be the
key ingredient in what otherwise would appear to be a system
designed to produce government by and for special interest groups.
Voter participation is supposed to validate the process.
The early proponents of voter initiatives correctly recognized that
voter participation the mere act of people punching holes in ballot
cards would validate the process only if the voters were sufficiently
educated about the initiatives to make their votes something more
than a random walk through the ballot. Voter education and involvement has accordingly been stressed from the inception of the
process. 59
Voters are involved in two stages of the process. First, in the context of voter initiatives only, the proponent must secure a certain
number of voter signatures in order to qualify a measure for the ballot. Second, if a measure qualifies, all voters are given the opportunity to vote the initiative up or down. Unfortunately, both common
sense and empirical research suggest that voters remain relatively
uneducated about and uninterested in the details of most initiative
measures at either stage of the process.
State law requires the Attorney General to prepare a title and
short summary (not to exceed 100 words) of the "chief purpose and
points" of a proposed initiative. 60 The summary must appear on each
page of the petition that contains voter signatures. 61 The primary
purpose of the short summary is to give the voters the opportunity to
read a short, impartial description of a proposed initiative before
signing a petition which supports putting that proposed initiative on
the ballot. Recognizing that voters are not likely to read the full text
of many proposed initiatives, the short title and summary is one effort at voter education.
57. It is of course no answer to suggest that the people will make their own determination of constitutionality or that such a determination is entitled to any weight.
The people have no obligation to enact constitutional initiatives and have in practice
proven themselves remarkably adept at enacting unconstitutional initiatives. See infra
notes 197-247 and accompanying text.
58. Henke & Woodlief, supra note 50, at 255.
59. MAGLEBY, supra note 35, at 22, 122-23.
60. CAL. ELEC. CODE §§ 3501-3504 (West 1977 & Supp. 1991).
61. CAL. ELEc. CODE § 3501 (West 1977).
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Unfortunately, other factors have tended to overwhelm the state's
effort to educate voters. Producing the requisite number of signatures to qualify an initiative measure is an expensive task that is now
left up to professional signature gatherers. 62 The most widely used
strategies for securing signatures downplays education in favor of a
quick and uninformed decision to sign.63 And it has not been unusual for signature gatherers to conceal by one device or another even
the short title and summary by the use of a ballot card which contains the proponents own short title and summary.64 Educating voters takes time, time costs money, and securing the requisite number
of signatures is already an expensive process.65
Once an initiative is on the ballot, it is likely to become the subject
of an expensive and slick media campaign by proponents and opponents. Our recent experience in California includes, among other
things, expensive television and radio commercials, Madison Avenue
slogans, and celebrity endorsements or criticisms. So pervasive is the
campaign in some instances, that a voter cannot hope to avoid the
publicity. Not surprisingly, voters indicate that most of their information about initiatives comes from the mass media newspapers, television, and radio. 65
62. MAGLEBY, SUpra note 35, at 61-65.
63. Magleby's summary of the signature-gathering process suggests some of the
abuses:
The practices of both volunteer and professional petition circulators lead to
the same questions: Do those citizens who sign petitions actually read what it
is they are signing? The answer is generally no. Most people trust the petition circulator's description of the proposition to be accurate, and they desire
to comply with the request for assistance. The Los Angeles Times report on
signature collection for the 1980 rent initiative concluded that "voters who
signed petitions rarely bothered to read what they were signing." Many of the
circulators "misunderstood what it was they were asking people to sign." The
petition circulators who understood the proposition "frequently kept silent
when uninformed signers drew the wrong conclusion," and in some cases they
"lied to voters about what the initiative was intended to do." Social psychologists studying the process of signature solicitation have determined that both
situational factors-how and where someone is approached--and inner convictions about the initial question predict the likelihood of signing. (citation
omitted) Petition circulators in both the Common Cause and the
farmworkers' cases framed the requests so as to maximize the likelihood of
signing: "Want to stop corrupt politics?" and "Want to help the farm workers?" In an effort to play upon the conforming tendencies in most people, circulators also encourage quick signing rather than discussion.
MAGLEBY, supra note 35, at 62-63 (citations omitted); see also LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS, supra note 56, at 46-48.
64. Lousy Lawmaking, supra note 37, at 746-47.
65. MAGLEBY, supra note 35, at 62-65 (indicating that it may cost anywhere from
$500,000 to well over $1,000,000 to qualify a measure for the ballot).
66. MAGLEBY, supra note 35, at 130-35.

The voter can always attempt to ignore the media campaign, of
course, and focus upon the words which appear in the ballot pamphlet. The ballot pamphlet contains the text of each initiative, a legislative analysis of each initiative, and arguments both for and against
each initiative.6 7 Although the ballot pamphlet would be a useful
guide to an already interested and involved electorate, it is difficult to
believe that substantial numbers of voters today are influenced more
by the dryly drafted ballot pamphlet than by the multi-million dollar
media blitz that is now a mandatory part of any successful initiative
campaign. 68 As anyone who has seen the ballot pamphlet in California knows, it would require a herculean effort simply to read all of
the material, much less to understand it. The most recent state ballot pamphlet, for example, was 110 pages of closely-spaced type, and
many electors also received bulky pamphlets with respect to local issues. How many Californians read these documents? How many
Californians understand what they read?
The small amount of empirical research which has been directed at
voter initiatives generally supports the common sense conclusion that
electors do not rely significantly upon the ballot arguments contained
in the ballot pamphlet. In the first place, when asked about the importance of information sources concerning initiatives, voters rank
the voter pamphlet and arguments pro and con below newspapers
and television. 69 Moreover, the arguments pro and con printed in the
67. CAL. ELEc. CODE §§ 3567.5-3579 (West 1977 & Supp. 1991); CAL. GOV'T CODE
§§ 88000-88007 (West 1987).
68. This is not to say, however, that the one who spends the most money in a media campaign is assured of success. There is a healthy debate among commentators
about the effectiveness of one-sided campaign spending on initiative measures. See
David A. Lowenstein, Campaign Spending and Ballot Propositions: Recent Experience, Public Choice Theory and the First Amendment, 29 UCLA L. REV. 505 (1982);
MAGLEBY, supra note 35, at 145-65; LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS, supra note 56, at 44-49.
69. The few studies concerning this topic are well summarized in MAGLEBY, Suipra

note 35, at 130-36. He reports, for example, that when asked in 1976 to rank the important sources of information regarding Proposition 15, voters responded with television
at 46%, newspapers at 31% and voter's handbook at only 13%. MAGLEBY, supra note
35 at 132. In 1982, 27% of the voters listed the handbook as an important source of
information. Id. at 133. This apparent increase in reliance on the handbook may be
misleading, however, because 15% of the voters in this study also indicated that they
used the handbook as an important source of information about candidates even
though the handbook contained proposition information only and no information
about candidates. Id. at 233 n.37.
There are, of course, polls which apparently prove, contrary to what Magleby suggests, that the voter's pamphlet is very important to voters. The Charlton Research
Company of San Francisco released the results of a telephone poll conducted during
the November 1990 election which purported to show that "[t]he most powerful
sources of information, according to the voters, were newspaper articles or analysis,
and voter pamphlets sent out by the state, both of which had more than seven out of
ten voters saying they were either extremely or somewhat important in their decision
making." Television news stories or analysis were ranked just below the voter pamphlet in this study, and television advertisements, especially by celebrities, were
ranked near the bottom of the heap.
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ballot pamphlet may do little more than mirror the media campaign,
providing equally misleading information to the voters. This is certainly not true in every case (or even in many cases), but there are
virtually no controls over what may be said in an argument by either
side,70 which counsels for judicial caution.
In the second place, there is good reason to believe that only a portion of the electorate, perhaps as little as thirty percent, can even
7
comprehend the information presented in the ballot arguments. 1
Studies of readability indicate that most ballot arguments require at
least an eighth-grade grade reading ability, which is possessed by at
most fifty percent of the voting public. The neutral analysis that appears on the ballot is even harder to understand, requiring a thirdyear college reading level. The best that can be said is that the information contained in the voter pamphlet and the ballot arguments is
simply one chunk of information that may affect some undetermined
percentage of the electors. The notion that a significant percentage
of voters have educated themselves about the details of most initia72 tive measures is pure fiction.
Some may complain that the criticisms which I have levelled at the
understanding and competence of the people apply with equal force
to ordinary legislative behavior. No one believes that all or many leg70. State law provides that "[t]he following statement shall be printed at the bottom of each page [of the pamphlet] where arguments appear: 'Arguments printed on
this page are the opinions of the authors and have not been checked for accuracy by
any official agency.'" CAL. GOV'T CODE § 88002(f) (West 1987).
It is theoretically possible to correct gross misrepresentations in the ballot pamphlet
pursuant to Government Code section 88006, which provides for a writ of mandate to
amend or delete any language in the ballot pamphlet. As a practical matter, however,
such a writ is almost impossible to secure. In the first place, the copy for the ballot
pamphlet is publicly released only twenty days before the copy is to be sent to the
printer. This doesn't give a potential plaintiff much time to act. Second, the writ issues only upon a showing of "clear and, convincing proof that the copy in question is
false, misleading or inconsistent with the requirements of this chapter or the Elections
Code." CAL. GOV'T CODE § 88006 (West 1987). Third, even if this burden is met, the
court must be satisfied that "issuance of the writ will not substantially interfere with
the printing and distribution of the ballot pamphlet as required by law." IM
71. Magleby summarizes the results of the available empirical research in his
work. MAGLEBY, supra note 35, at 137-39.

72. Lousy Lawmaking, supra note 37, at 738-42. This is of course not to say that
voters lack a general understanding of what they are voting on, and recent research
suggests that voters may indeed have a general understanding of the issues being addressed by various initiative measures. The Charlton study, supra note 69, concluded
that "[m]essages on major initiatives got through to voters who voted down most of the
initiatives, yet they were informed in their vote decisions." But a general understanding of what a particular piece of legislation may do is usually not very helpful when it
comes to solving specific problems of statutory construction.

islators actually know the details of the legislation that is now enacted at the state and federal level. No one believes that all
legislators read committee reports. Yet there remains a critical difference between the process which leads to ordinary legislation and
the process which leads to an initiative. In the case of ordinary legislation, the hearings and speeches that make up the remainder of the
history are to some extent controlled by our elected representatives.
And even if all legislators do not know the details of a particular
piece of legislation, there are at least one or two members who have
been responsible for the legislation from the beginning and who
probably do know what is in the act. In effect, then, we have permitted the entire legislative body to delegate its overall responsibility for
sweating the details to a much smaller, and more manageable, group
73
of people.
With voter initiatives, by contrast, control is not exercised by any
elected official. And it stretches reality beyond the breaking point to
assert that the public has somehow delegated the responsibility for
sweating the details to any particular interest group. The critical
premise that informed voter participation validates the initiative process appears to be only weakly supportable.
B. Judicial Review and Interpretation
The history and empirical research briefly described above suggest
problems with the initiative process in California. The process may
be prone to producing poorly drafted and poorly thought out changes
in California's organic law. If there were reason to believe that the
people cast truly educated votes, the process might be saved. Unfortunately, the research described above undermines this critical component of the initiative system by quantifying what common sense
naturally suggests: the majority of the electorate is terribly underinformed when it comes to voting on initiatives.
The weaknesses in the initiative process should have important implications when it comes time for a court to review or interpret initiative measures. As a general rule, anything that depends upon the
fictional "will of the people" or the "intent of the electorate" should
be handled with extreme caution. There should be a Rule of
Caution.
The first consequence of the Rule of Caution relates to the materials which make up the legislative history for initiatives. One likely
extrinsic source for initiatives (especially voter initiatives) is the ballot pamphlet, which contains an analysis of the initiative and pro and
con arguments. Ballot arguments, however, are drafted by interested
73. See infra note 105 and accompanying text.
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parties, and their reliability as an indication of voter intent depends
upon the fiction that voters read and understand the arguments. Yet
as discussed above, few persons actually rely significantly on the ballot pamphlet, and fewer still are able to understand what is in the
ballot pamphlet. 74 Ballot arguments (along with the rest of the media campaign) should be relegated to an especially low rung on the
7
legislative history ladder. 5
Furthermore, the legislative counsel's analysis of an initiative,
which is also printed in the ballot pamphlet, is entitled to no greater
weight although that analysis appears to be drafted by a government
official and is intended to be a largely unbiased interpretation of the
initiative. The difficulty is that the legislative counsel does not play a
constitutional role in the passage of voter initiatives. A legislative
analysis is not constitutionally required and has no constitutional significance. Instead, the reliability of the analysis as an indication of
voter intent, like the reliability of ballot arguments, depends upon
the fiction that voters read and understand the analysis.
The legislative history for a legislative initiative, such as the initiative which added the privacy clause, additionally includes any materials developed by the legislature as it considered the initiative. This
would include committee reports, staff reports, drafting history, and
similar documents. These materials, unlike the legislative counsel's
analysis, are created by an institution which has a constitutional role
to play in putting the initiative on the ballot. The significance of
these materials thus does not depend upon the fictional intent of the
electorate. These materials should be respected by the courts.
A second consequence of the Rule of Caution relates to a fundamental rule of statutory construction. Unlike ordinary legislation,
voter initiative measures especially those which change significant
aspects of our organic law should be strictly construed in order to
minimize the changes to California law. This rule finds its inspiration in the rule (still applied in some jurisdictions) that statutes in
derogation of the common law should be strictly construed, 76 which,
in turn, found its inspiration in judicial distrust of the competence of
the legislative branch to improve upon the perfection of the common
74. See supra notes 66-72 and accompanying text.
75. As will be seen below, this proposed rule is contrary to the rule stated by the
courts. See infra notes 142-66 and accompanying text.
76. See, e.g., Lichtman v. Nadler, 426 N.Y.S.2d 628 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980); Grayson
v. Town of Huntington, 545 N.Y.S.2d 633 (N. Y. App. Div. 1989).

law. 77 The rule fell into disrepute as courts recognized the constitutional supremacy of the legislative branch and as legislatures became
78
increasingly expert in performing their constitutional tasks.
Although the people are in theory constitutionally supreme,79 until
the people prove themselves to be better legislators,0 courts should
interpret voter initiatives strictly to protect the people from
themselves.81
A third consequence of the Rule of Caution is that voter initiative
measures should not be entitled to a presumption of constitutionality.
Unlike members of the legislature, the people have no constitutional
obligation to vote against unconstitutional initiatives, and the people's
constitutional track record is abysmal.82 By contrast, legislative initiatives such as the initiative which added the privacy clause need
not be strictly construed and are entitled to a presumption of constitutionality because these measures do not entirely depend for their
validity upon the "intent of the electorate." Instead, these involve
the significant participation of the legislature.
Despite the obvious problems with the initiative process, the
Supreme Court of California has not publicly adopted the Rule of
Caution and has, instead, been careful not to offend the voters who,
after all, have the power to recall the justices by denigrating the initiative process. In decisions involving the initiative process itself, the
court has spoken in grand terms favoring direct democracy. Thus,
for example, in Associated Home Builders v. City of Livermore,8 3 the
court declared the "judicial policy to apply a liberal construction to
the [initiative] power wherever it is challenged in order that the right
be not improperly annulled," and described the initiative process as
77. For example, Sir Frederick Pollock observed that the English courts' disrespectful treatment of statutes "cannot well be accounted for except upon the theory
that Parliament generally changes the law for the worse, and that the business of the
judge is to keep the mischief of its interference within the narrowest possible
bounds." F. POL.OCK, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND ETHICS, 85 (London, Macmillan
1882). See also W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAws OF ENGLAND, § 1, at 10

(1765) (praising the perfection of the common law).
78. See John M. Kernochan, Statutory Interpretation: An Outline of Method, 3
DALHOUSIE L.J. 333, 345 (1976). In California, the legislature early on asserted its
supremacy by enacting the following provision in 1872 when the Civil Code was initially promulgated: "The rule of the common law, that statutes in derogation thereof
are to be strictly construed, has no application to this Code. The Code establishes the
law of this State respecting the subjects to which it relates, and its provisions are to be
liberally construed with a view to effect its objects and to promote justice." CAL. CIV.
CODE § 4 (West 1973).
79. See CAL. CONST. art. II, § 1 (providing that "[a]ll political power is inherent in
the people").
80. See infra notes 197-247 and accompanying text.
81. Legislative initiatives should not be subject to this rule of strict interpretation
because of the participation of the legislature in the drafting of the initiative.
82. See infra notes 197-99 and accompanying text.
83. 557 P.2d 473 (Cal. 1976).
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"one of the most precious rights of our democratic process."8 4 The

court has indicated that "the power of initiative must be liberally
construed . .. to promote the democratic process."8 5 Moreover, in
considering broad constitutional challenges to initiative measures, the
courts "are required to resolve any reasonable doubts in favor of the
exercise of this precious right," thus accepting the presumed constitutionality of initiative measures.8 6 Finally, in interpreting initiatives,
the text must "receive a liberal, practical common-sense construction
which will meet changed conditions and the growing needs of the
87
people."
Such pro-initiative statements are a bit overblown. If the initiative
process was so fundamental to democratic institutions, why is it that
the initiative was not included in the California Constitution originally? Why has direct democracy never found its way into the
United States Constitution or into the constitutions of a majority of
the states? Although the court's rhetoric in favor of the initiative
process is poor history, it is good politics.
When the issue relates not to the process itself but to actual judicial review and interpretation of initiatives, the court's rhetoric is
more restrained, and, more important, the results are much less
favorable.88 In general, the court does not formally recognize any
distinct canons of construction when it comes to interpreting constitutional or statutory initiatives. Instead, the court officially treats initiatives as simply another form of legislation, subject to the same
canons of construction as any other piece of legislation. As will be
seen in the next several sections, however, the results of the cases
suggest the court has effectively followed the Rule of Caution (i.e.,
rejection of the ballot argument when expedient, strict construction,
and, especially, no presumption of constitutionality).
1.

"Legislative Intent" and the "Intent of the Electorate" Extrinsic Aids

When attempting to interpret or apply an ordinary statute, a
84. Id. at 477.
85. Amador Valley Joint Union High School District v. State Board of Equalization, 583 P.2d 1281, 1283 (Cal. 1978) (emphasis added) (citing San Diego Bldg. Contractors Assn. v. City Council, 529 P.2d 570 (1974); Associated Home Builders, Inc. v. City
of Livermore, 557 P.2d 473 (1976)).
86. Brosnahan v. Brown, 651 P.3d 274, 277 (Cal. 1982).
87. Amador, 583 P.2d at 1300.
88. James D. Gordon & David B. Magleby, Pre-ElectionJudicialReview of Initiative & Referendums, 64 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 298, 301 (1989).

court's function is to "ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to
effectuate the purpose of the law."8 9 This has been the law in California from the very earliest cases until the present9 o and is
grounded in the constitutional supremacy of the legislature in making law.91 Indeed, the second case ever decided by the California
Supreme Court involved a determination of whether, in the court's
words, the "legislature in the 3d sec. of the act of 28th of February,
intended only to transmit to this court all such appeals from the
courts of First Instance, in which the amount in controversy shall exceed in value the sum of $200."92

There is admittedly an argument that "legislative intent" should
not be the touchstone for statutory interpretation. Professor Kernochan's delightfully written article on statutory interpretation recites
many of the traditional complaints about "legislative intent" in the
following excerpt:
Note that the concept of legislative intent has been much criticized. It has
been labeled a "fiction" 9 3 and called "beclouding."' 9 4 "[A] composite body," it
is said, "can hardly have a single intent."' 9 5 Even if such an intent exists,9 7it
96
and, if discoverable, irrelevant.
has been argued that it is undiscoverable

Notwithstanding these long-standing complaints, courts continue to
rely upon the concept of "legislative intent" as a convenient and practical guide to interpretation. After all, "legislative intent" has a common sense, albeit fictional, referent, that is, the intent of the body
89. California Teachers Assoc. v. San Diego Community College Dist., 621 P.2d
856, 858 (Cal. 1981).
90. See, e.g., Moyer v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd., 514 P.2d 1224, 1229 (Cal.
1973); Select Base Materials v. Board of Equalization, 335 P.2d 672, 675-76 (Cal. 1959);
California Toll Bridge Auth. v. Kuchel, 251 P.2d 4, 9 (Cal. 1952); County of Alameda v.
Kuchel, 195 P.2d 17, 20 (Cal. 1948); Dickey v. Raisin Proration Zone No. 1, 151 P.2d 505,
508 (Cal. 1944); In re Haines, 234 P. 883 (1925).
91. Kernochan, supra note 78, at 345. "The first premise is the supremacy of the
legislature. This premise provides our fundamental interpretive guideline." Id.
92. Luther v. The Master and Owners of Ship Apollo, 1 Cal. 15, 16 (1850) (emphasis added). Section 1859 of the Civil Procedure Code, added in 1872, provides that "[i]n
the construction of a statute the intention of the legislature .. .is to be pursued, if
possible." CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1859 (West 1973).
93. Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation,43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 869-70 (1930); J.A.
Corry, The Use of Legislative History in the Interpretationof Statutes, 32 CAN. B. REV.
624, 625 (1954); E. DRIEDGER, THE CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES 82 (1974) (footnote in

original).
94. Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L.
REV. 527, 538 (1947) (footnote in original).
95. John Willis, Statute Interpretationin a Nutshell, 16 CAN. B. REV. 1, 3 (1938).
See also J.A. Corry, Administrative Law and the Interpretation of Statutes, 1 U. ToRONTO L.J. 286, 290 (1936); Johnstone, An Evaluation of the Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 3 KAN. L. REV. 1, 14 (1954); DRIEDGER, supra note 93, at 82 (footnote in

original).
96. Radin, supra note 93, at 870-72 (footnote in original).
97. Kernochan, supra note 78, at 346-47. See also Harry W. Jones, The Plain
Meaning Rule and Extrinsic Aids in the Interpretationof Federal Statutes, 25 WASH.'
UNIV. L.Q. 2 (1939).
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which drafted and enacted the provision. To the extent that a particular "legislative intent" is drawn out of the words of the statute
alone, the fiction of a "legislative intent" is simply a convenient way
of talking about the meaning attributed to any type of written document (as in, "Upon reading this document, I conclude that the person
who wrote it must have intended that...,,).98

The fiction of a "legislative intent" has had an additional and important consequence. It has made it more plausible for courts to resort to certain extrinsic aids in construing a statute. 99 Because courts
employ the fiction of a "legislative intent," it has been natural to accept the argument that evidence of that intent can be found not only
in the text of the statute, but also in other official documents or
records promulgated by the body which enacted the statute. At the
very least, those documents or records help to establish the context
in which the language was drafted.100
Critics of reliance upon these extrinsic sources complain that legislative histories can be manipulated and that the Senate and House ultimately vote only upon the words of the statute rather than the
words contained in committee reports.' 0 ' The traditional response
has been to indulge in the fiction that the reports and other documents were read by all of the members who voted on the legislation. 0 2 This rationale is subject to the familiar criticism that
98. This use of "legislative intent" is consistent even with the plain meaning rule,
as can be seen in a series of decisions authored by Justice Anthony Kennedy. See, e.g.,
K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 290 (1988) (using the plain meaning rule to
"give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress").
99. See, e.g., K Mart, 486 U.S. at 1821-26 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 432 n.12 (1987).
100. Jones, supra note 97, at 3-4 (emphasizing the importance of establishing historical context); 2A SUTHERLAND ON STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, 191 (Sands 4th ed. 1989).
101. See, e.g., Nicholas S. Zeppos, Legislative History and the Interpretationof Statutes: Toward a Fact-FindingModel of Statutory Interpretation,76 VA. L. REV. 1295,
1299-1310 (1990); Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REV. 195, 200 (1983); Corry, The Use
of Legislative History in the Interpretationof Statutes, 34 CAN. B. REV. 624 (1954).
102. Harry W. Jones, Extrinsic Aids in the FederalCourts, 25 IOWA L. REV. 737, 743
(1940). See Hutnick v. U.S. Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 763 P.2d 1326 (Cal. 1988)
stating:
The rationale for considering committee reports when interpreting statutes is
similar to the rationale for considering voter materials when construing an initiative measure. In both cases it is reasonable to infer that those who actually
voted on the proposed measure read and considered the materials presented
in explanation of it, and that the materials therefore provide some indication
of how the measure was understood at the time by those who voted to enact
it.
Id. at 1331 n.7. See also Elizabeth A. McNellie, Note, The Use of Extrinsic Aids in the

members of the legislature do not actually read the committee reports and supporting documents.l03 Moreover, even if the members
have read the reports (and there may be reason to believe that members are more likely to read a committee report than the bill itself),104 there is no assurance that the members interpreted what
they read in the same way. Legislators may have based their votes
upon differing interpretations of this legislative history.
There is a second and more convincing theory which explains why
it is appropriate to rely upon committee reports and other similar extrinsic aids. When a committee acts in its official capacity, it is acting
on behalf of the legislature.105 The official documents and reports of
those committees are, in effect, documents on behalf of the entire
legislature. We may then utilize a familiar rule from the law of
agency that knowledge by an agent will be imputed to the principal.106 It is for this reason that documents and reports generated by
a committee may appropriately be relied upon to interpret a statute
enacted by the entire body. The work of the committee is the work
of the entire body.107 As will be seen below, this explanation of why
committee reports and documents are properly consulted as part of
the legislative history has important consequences when it comes to
Interpretation of Popularly Enacted Legislation, 89 COLuM. L. REV. 157, 161 (1989);
Note, Nonlegislative Intent as an Aid to Statutory Interpretation,49 COLUM. L. REV.
676, 677-78 (1949).
103. Zeppos, supra note 101, at 1311; Jones, supra note 102, at 746-47.
104. Zeppos, supra note 101, at 1311 n.61.
105. See, e.g., STANDING RuLE OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE XXVI(11); STANDING
RULES OF THE CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY 56.5, 68.6, 68.7; STANDING RuLEs OF THE CALIFORNIA SENATE 16, 21.5, 29.8.
106. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 9(3) (1958). Although imputing an
agent's knowledge to the principal involves the use of a legal fiction, this legal fiction
is to be preferred to the factual fiction that legislators actually read the reports and
documents generated in the legislative process. A factual fiction is demonstrably
wrong. A legal fiction, by contrast, may represent a delicate legal response to a recurring situation based upon significant policy judgments. The law of agency, for example, in which the tortious acts of a servant are imputed to a master, involves just such a
careful balancing of interests. See generally L. FuLLER, LEGAL FICTIONS (1967); Aviam
Soifer, Reviewing Legal Fictions, 20 GA. L. REv. 871 (1986).
107. This agency rationale was clearly put forth by Judge Learned Hand as follows:
It is of course true that members who vote upon a bill do not all know, probably very few of them know, what has taken place in committee. On the most
rigid theory possibly we ought to assume that they accept the words just as
the words read, without any background of amendment or other evidence as
to their meaning. But courts have come to treat the facts more really; they
recognize that while members deliberately express their personal position
upon the general purposes of the legislation, as to the details of its articulation they accept the work of the committees; so much they delegate because legislation could not go on in any other way.
SEC v. Collier & Co., 76 F.2d 939, 941 (2d Cir. 1935) (emphasis added). See also Zeppos,
supra note 101, at 1344-47; Wald, supra note 101, at 201 n.48 (stating that "[t]he committee is the 'work place' of the Congress. Members of the committee . . . act as the
'agents' of the rest of the members").
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interpreting initiative measures.l0 8
The referent for "legislative intent" becomes less clear in the context of legislative initiatives that are approved by voters and in the
context of voter initiatives, which do not involve the legislature at all.
The problem is that legislative initiatives are ultimately approved by
the people, and voter initiatives are drafted by one private person
and then approved by the people. "The people," unlike a legislative
body, is not a readily identifiable institution. There is no simple,
even if fictional, referent.
The courts in California have solved this problem by treating the
people as some sort of super-legislature, and the courts then speak
about the "intent of the electorate" in approving a particular measure. 0 9 The courts thus have fictionalized an "electorate intent" in
much the same way that they fictionalized a "legislative intent." For
example, in discussing the plain meaning rule in Lungren v.
Deukmejian,l"O the court noted that "[i]f the language is clear and
unambiguous there is no need for construction, nor is it necessary to
resort to indicia of the intent of the legislature (in the case of a statute) or of the voters (in the case of a provision adopted by the votSimilarly, in Davis v. City of Berkeley,112 the court
ers)." '
explained that "[w]hen construing a constitutional provision enacted
by initiative, the intent of the voters is the paramount
consideration."113
Of course, the fiction of an identifiable "people" is not made up out
of whole cloth. There is indeed a constitutional basis for paying obeisance to this fiction. According to the Preamble to the California
Constitution, "We, the People of the State of California... do establish this Constitution.""X4 The California Constitution also provides
that "[a]ll political power is inherent in the people." 115 These references themselves appear to assume a fictional "people."
Although the constitution's text provides a basis for assuming the
108. See infra notes 136-67 and accompanying text.
109. Commentators have generally followed this approach. See, e.g., Kara Christenson, Note, Interpreting the Purposes of Initiatives: Proposition 65, 40 HASTINGS L.J.
1031, 1042 (1989).
110. 755 P.2d 299 (Cal. 1988).
111. 1& at 303-04 (emphasis added).
112. 794 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1990).
113. Id. at 900. See also In re Lance W., 694 P.2d 744, 754 (Cal. 1985). "In construing constitutional and statutory provisions, whether enacted by the Legislature or by
initiative, the intent of the enating body is the paramount consideration." I&
114. CAL. CONST. pmbl.
115. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 1.

fictional existence of an "intent of the people," the nexus between
the fiction and reality is so much more attenuated than is the case
with "legislative intent," that courts should employ the fiction cautiously. It is surely permissible to refer to an "intent of the electorate" when a court is doing nothing more than looking at the
language of an initiative. The statement, "the voters intended by this
language to accomplish X," is both understandable and harmless.
It is less clear, however, that the fictional "intent of the electorate"
can properly be invoked to justify resort to extrinsic aids in interpreting an initiative. The legislature has a constitutional role to play in
the passage of legislative initiatives. These initiatives are first considered by the legislature and are then proposed to the people for their
approval. Because of this constitutional role, it would be appropriate
to treat the official documents and records of the legislature as evidence of a legislative initiative's "legislative intent."
It is "the people" (or more properly, the electorate) who ultimately
vote to approve an initiative. Are there any extrinsic aids to help a
court determine what "the people" intended when they voted to approve an intiative? There are a wealth of possible sources which
might indicate the historical context in which an initiative was approved: the material which is printed in the ballot in addition to the
language of the initiative itself (i.e., the analysis by the legislative
counsel and arguments pro and con); the content of television and radio advertisements; the content of newspaper and magazine articles;
voter polls (both preceding the vote and upon exit from the voting
booth); advertisements on billboards; and so on.
In the context of a legislative enactment, it can be argued that
committee reports and similar documents are entitled to judicial respect because such reports are produced by a committee which has
been delegated the responsibility of studying the legislation.11 6 However, such an argument is not possible in the context of a voter initiative. No one could plausibly claim, for example, that the people have
delegated to the proponents of a voter initiative the power to create a
legislative history in the form of television commercials. Accordingly, if any of these materials are a proper part of the "legislative
history" of an initiative, it is because they represent materials that
were before the electorate in order to influence votes, and of which
the electorate was presumptively aware when voting. 117 The question for the courts is whether any of this material (or all of it) should
be examined when attempting to interpret an initiative.
116. See infra note 121 and accompanying text.
117. This is similar to the argument that committee

reports are a proper part of an
ordinarily legislative history because the reports were presumably before the full legislature. See supra notes 131-33 and accompanying text.
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a. Legislative Hearings and Reports
Legislative initiatives are almost invariably constitutional proposals
because, apart from constitutional amendments, the legislature has
power to enact statutes without seeking the approval of the electorate. 118 In order to put a constitutional initiative on the ballot, both
houses of the legislature must approve the proposal by a two-thirds
vote. 119 A legislative constitutional initiative becomes effective if approved by a majority of the qualified electors.120
Legislative initiatives are treated by the legislature very much like
proposed statutes. A legislative initiative is proposed by a member of
either the assembly or the Senate. The initiative is first referred to
the appropriate committee or committees which may hold hearings
and propose amendments to the initiative. The committee may then
report back to the house with a recommendation. When one house
has voted favorably on the initiative, it is sent to the other house for
its consideration. Throughout this normal legislative process, the
usual set of documents and reports are generated.121 There may be a
transcript of testimony before committees. The committees usually
will issue a report to accompany the measure.
It would be natural to expect courts to rely upon the documents
generated in this customary legislative process. These documents, after all, are probably a pretty good indication of what the drafter of
the initiative intended and what the legislature intended in proposing
the initiative to the people.
Voter initiatives, unlike legislative initiatives, are usually drafted
entirely by private parties. There is no requirement of formal public
hearings at which opposing parties are given an opportunity to present their views. There is ordinarily no drafting history whatsoever.
The draft that appears on the ballot is the only draft.122
Occasionally, legislative committees will hold hearings on voter initiatives prior to their enactment. However, the legislature has no
constitutional role to play in the consideration of voter initiatives.' 2 3
118. As already noted, one significant exception to this rule is that the legislature
may not amend or repeal a statutory initiative without the approval of the voters
(either expressed in the initiative itself or through a subsequent statutory initiative).
CAL. CONST. art. 2, § 10(c).

119.
120.
121.
122.

CAL. CONST., art. XVIII, § 1.
Id.
See generally REFERENDUMS, supra note 35.
Id.

123. CAL. CONST. art. IV.

Legislative committees have no power to approve, disapprove, or
amend a voter initiative. Accordingly, such hearings (and reports
based on such hearings) are not a proper part of the legislative history of a voter initiative. A committee hearing on a voter initiative is
thus entitled to no more weight than would be attached to a privately
held hearing on a voter initiative.
The California Supreme Court has recognized that legislative reports on voter initiatives are not ordinarily a proper part of the legislative history. In People v. Castro,124 the issue was whether a section
in the Victims' Bill of Rights which provided that prior felony convictions "shall subsequently be used without limitation for purposes of
impeachment" was intended to displace the trial court's discretion
under Evidence Code section 352 to exclude evidence if its probative
12 5
value is substantially outweighed by its probable prejudicial effect.
The State was of the opinion that the Victims' Bill of Rights was intended to abrogate section 352 insofar as evidence of prior felony convictions was concerned, and the State supported this argument in
part by proferring majority and minority reports prepared by the Assembly Committee on Criminal Justice. Both reports directly sup126
ported the State's argument.
The court quite properly rejected the State's effort to include these
reports in the legislative history for the Victims' Bill of Rights.127
Since the Victims' Bill of Rights was a voter initiative, neither the
Assembly nor the Senate had any constitutional role to play in the
process of enactment. Accordingly, as noted by the court, "[t]he reports represent the opinions or understandings of individuals who
happen to be legislators but who were not drafters of the proposed
initiative. These opinions, of themselves, do not provide aid in determining the intent of the electorate." 2 8 According to the court, if
these legislative reports had been widely disseminated to the voters
(either by direct mail or by widespread reporting), the substance of
the reports might have been relevant in determining what the voters
believed they were deciding by their votes.129 There was, however,
124. 696 P.2d 111 (Cal. 1985).
125. Id. at 113.
126. The majority report contained the following sentence: "The initiative will require the use of prior felony convictions for impeachment even though the probative
value is outweighed by the danger of substantial prejudice." ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, ANALYSIS OF PROPOSITION 8, THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, 31
(Mar. 24, 1982) (quoted in Castro,696 P.2d at 117). The minority report did not dispute
this conclusion, and provided that the initiative "'will end the abuse of justice associated withthe prohibition against presenting to the jury felony records of witnesses.'"
IN DEFENSE OF THE VICTIMS OF CRIME, AN ANALYSIS OF PROPOSITION 8, THE CRIMINAL

18 (Mar. 24, 1982) (quoted in Castro, 696 P.2d at 117).
127. 696 P.2d at 117.
128. Id.
129. Id.

JUSTICE INITIATIVE,
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no evidence that the contents of these reports had been widely reported, and, as a result, the court could "only speculate the extent to
which the voters were cognizant of them."1 30
In deciding whether a legislative committee report is properly part
of the legislative history, it is critical to distinguish between legislative initiatives and voter initiatives. Committee reports (and similar
documents) are part of the history of a legislative initiative; they are
ordinarily not part of the history of a voter initiative.
Unfortunately, in Lungren v. Deukmejian,131 the court appears to
have confused matters by relying in part upon the rule in Castro, a
voter initiative case, to reject consideration of a committee staff report in a legislative initiative case. The issue in Lungren was
whether the constitutional confirmation requirements were met
when the governor's nominee for the office of Treasurer had been
confirmed by one house of the legislature and rejected by the other
house.132 The relevant portion of the initiative provided as follows:
Whenever there is a vacancy in the office of the... Treasurer. . ., the Governor shall nominate a person to fill the vacancy who shall take office upon confirmation by a majority of the membership of the Senate and a majority of the
membership of the Assembly and who shall hold office for the balance of the
unexpired term. In the event the nominee is neither confirmed nor refused
confirmation by both the Senate and the Assembly within 90 days of the submission of the nomination, the nominee shall take office as if he or she had
been confirmed by a majority of the Senate and Assembly ....133

Lungren, the governor's nominee to fill the office of Treasurer, had
been confirmed by the assembly but rejected by the Senate. According to Lungren, since he had been "neither confirmed nor refused
confirmation by both the Senate and the assembly within 90 days," he
was permitted to take office as though he actually had been confirmed by both houses.
Lungren's legislative history argument was premised upon a single
sentence in a staff report concerning prior legislation that had not
been enacted, but which was virtually identical to the language ultimately adopted in Article X, Section 5(b) of the California Constitution. The staff report stated that "[i]t is understood that the author
will submit amendments to permit the nominee to take office on the
91st day after nomination unless both Houses vote to reject the nominee."'134 The critical language in Section 5(b) was subsequently added
130. M
131. 755 P.2d 299 (Cal. 1988).
132. 1&i
133. CAL. CONST. art. V, § 5(b).
134. 696 P.2d at 308-09.

by an amendment proposed by the author of the bill. According to
Lungren, the court was required to give the second sentence in Section 5(b) the meaning suggested by the staff report, since the staff report had apparently predicted that the second sentence would be
added to Section 5(b).135
There were any number of reasons to reject this single sentence as
being of controlling importance in interpreting Section 5(b). In the
first place, the sentence did not actually purport to describe Section
5(b) as it was finally proposed. Rather, the sentence only predicted
that some future amendment would be proposed. It is at best unclear
whether the subsequent amendment was in fact the same amendment predicted by the staff report. Second, and probably more important, the author of the staff report submitted a declaration that
the language which appeared in the second sentence was substantially different from what he had anticipated. 38 Thus, there was a
strong basis in the record for rejecting the staff report as an indication of what the second sentence in Section 5(b) meant.
The court did not rely upon these arguments alone, however. In its
effort to bury the staff report, the court also drew upon two relatively well-established rules of statutory interpretation -unfortunately, application of the rules was unwarranted in the circumstances
presented. Citing California Teachers Association v. San Diego Community College Distlict,1 37 the Lungren court held that the staff re-

port was nothing more than the individual view of "an unnamed staff
member of a legislative committee, derived from an unnamed
source." 138 California Teachers does indeed stand for the proposition
that the personal views of a single legislator are not properly part of
the legislative history unless those views are communicated to the
legislature and are a part of the legislative debate. Nothing in California Teachers, however, indicates that a written staff report prepared in the normal course of the legislative process and submitted to
a committee that is considering a piece of legislation should not be
considered as part of the legislative history. Such a conclusion is entirely unwarranted. Courts routinely have considered such documents to be a part of the legislative history. 139 Staff reports may be
given less weight than committee reports, but they are certainly part
of the history.
135. Id. at 309.
136. Id at 309 n.17.
137. 621 P.2d 856 (Cal. 1981).
138. Lungren, 755 P.2d at 309.
139. See, e.g., Hutnick v. U.S. Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 763 P.2d 1326, 1331 n.7
(Cal. 1988) (considering assembly committee report despite court of appeals' observation that "'the views of a committee staff member are not appropriate legislative
history' ").
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Yet according to the court in Lungren, the staff report was not relevant because "it appears that the report was distributed only to the
members of the committee that was considering the bill and its author, and was not before the general membership of either house of
the legislature." 40 This is a poor rationale for rejecting the staff report. Committee reports, even though available, may not be widely
read by legislators. However, that is no reason for rejecting committee reports as an important part of the legislative history.
The Supreme Court of California appears to be confused. The
court's major premise seems to be that a legislative history properly
includes only those matters which were brought to the attention of
the entire membership of the legislature. This premise is unnecessarily narrow. When a legislature sends a bill to committee for consideration, it is delegating some of its power and responsibility to that
committee. When the committee acts, it is acting on behalf of the entire legislature. The official acts of committees are thus properly
part of the legislative history because they are properly considered
official acts of the legislature itself.
The court in Lungren was not content to misapply California
Teachers, however. Citing Castro, the court held that the staff report
was not part of the legislative history because the voters who approved the initiative were not aware of the report.141 In proper context, this holding is unremarkable. There were only two ways in
which the staff report could properly be considered part of the legislative history: (1) if the report was properly before the legislature; or
(2) if the report was before the voters. The court held that the report
was not before the legislature, citing California Teachers. In order to
reject the report, the court was forced to consider whether the report
was before the voters. The evidence did not indicate the report was
before the voters.
The court's discussion did not proceed so clearly, however. Instead
of simply noting that the report was not before the electorate, the
court described Castro in the following terms:
[I]n Castro, we rejected as evidence of the voters' intent in adopting an initiative measure the majority and minority reports of a legislative committee on
the ground that these reports did not represent either the intent of the draft-

ers or of the electorate in approving the measure. We stated that because the
reports were not included in the voters' pamphlet they were not helpful in

140. Lungren, 755 P.2d at 309. Cf.Hutnick, 763 P.2d at 1331 n.7 (explaining that
committee reports are a valid part of the legislative history because the members presumably read and consider those reports).
141. Lungren, 755 P.2d at 309.

interpreting the intent of the voters ....

142

This language could easily be interpreted as holding that committee
reports are never a proper part of the legislative history of any initiative whether a voter initiative or a legislative initiative. Hopefully
the court will clarify this discussion when it next has an opportunity
to address the importance of committee reports in construing legislative initiatives. Committee reports are a proper part of the legislative
history of a legislative initiative.
b. Ballot Analysis and Arguments
The court has explicitly relied upon ballot analysis and arguments
in construing statutory and constitutional initiatives. Indeed, resort
to the ballot pamphlet has now acquired the virtually unassailable
status of a long-accepted position.143 The court has justified its reliance upon the ballot analysis and arguments by use of a fictional educated electorate: "We repeat our observation of some time ago that
we ordinarily should assume that the voters who approved a constitutional amendment ... 'have voted intelligently upon an amendment
to their organic law, the whole text of which was supplied each of
them prior to the election and which they must be assumed to have
duly considered.' "144
As set forth above, the premise that voters rely significantly upon
the ballot argument or ballot pamphlet is contrary to both common
sense and empirical research. 45 In light of these considerations, the
courts should not give ballot arguments much weight in the interpretation process. Instead, the ballot arguments should be treated as
what they truly are: an individual statement by a biased advocate
whose primary aim is to influence a voter, which may or may not include an effort to educate the voter.' 4 6 Such statements are entitled
142. Id.
143. According to the court in Lungren, "[t]he rule that the ballot pamphlet is an
important aid in determining the intent of the voters in adopting a constitutional
amendment or statute is too well settled to require extensive citation of authority." Id.
at 307 n.14.
144. Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 583
P.2d 1281, 1299 (Cal. 1978) (quoting Wright v. Jordan, 221 P. 915, 919 (Cal. 1923)). Ironically, the complete quote from Wright suggests that the court had previously viewed
ballot arguments with less enthusiasm and that the assumption was the electorate
would understand the text of the legislation in spite of the ballot arguments. The
Wright court stated that we must assume the electorate has "voted intelligently upon
an amendment to their organic law, the whole text of which was supplied each of them
prior to the election and which they must be assumed to have duly considered, regardless of any insufficient recitalsin the instructions to voters or the arguments pro and
con of its advocates or opponents accompanying the text of the proposed measure."
Wright, 221 P. at 919 (emphasis added).
145. See supra notes 51-53, 59-72 and accompanying text.
146. A ballot pamphlet even contains the following warning on each page of pro
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47
to extremely little or even no weight in the interpretive process.
Although the court says that it gives statements in the ballot pamphlet significant weight, that rule appears to be true only when it
suits the court's purpose. When the court is determined to reach a
particular result, the ballot arguments become largely irrelevant. In
cases arising under the privacy clause, the court has relied upon the
ballot pamphlet only now and then, ignoring the ballot when expedient. 48 The court has also ignored the ballot in cases interpreting
portions of Proposition 13, the Jarvis-Gann tax initiative. Among its
many provisions, Proposition 13 requires a two-thirds vote of the
electorate to approve any proposed special taxes levied by a special
district.1 49 In Los Angeles County Transportation Commission v.
Richmond,150 the court held that "special districts" (which ordinarily
would seem to include transportation districts, school districts, fire
districts, etc.) does not include any district that lacks
real property.' 5 ' In reaching this holding, the court power to tax
indicated that
the primary purpose of Proposition 13 was to reduce only property
taxes, rather than to reduce all taxes, and that contrary statements
contained in the ballot pamphlet were somehow ambiguous.152
The pamphlet analysis included the following seemingly clear
statements about the effect of Proposition 13: "Authorizes imposition
of special taxes by local government (except on real property) by 2/3
vote of qualified electors."i53 "[A]uthorizes local governments to impose certain nonproperty taxes if two-thirds of the voters give their
approval in a local election."i54 "This measure would authorize cities, counties, special districts and school districts to impose unspecified 'special' taxes only if they receive approval by two-thirds of the

and con arguments: "Arguments printed on this page are the opinions of the authors
and have not been checked for accuracy by any official agency."
147. In the interpretation of statutes, the courts have held that even a contemporaneous interpretation given to a statute by a single legislator is not a proper part of the
legislative history, recognizing that statements by individual legislators or proponents
are a poor indication of legislative intent, unless those statements were part of the legislative debate itself. See, e.g., California Teachers Assoc. v. San Diego Community
College Dist., 621 P.2d 856, 860-61 (Cal. 1981); In re Marriage of Bouquet, 546 P.2d 1371,
1374-75 (Cal. 1976).
148. See infra notes 167-246 and accompanying text.
149. CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA, § 4 (added 1978).
150. 643 P.2d 941 (Cal. 1982).
151. 643 P.2d at 946 n.9.
152. Id. at 945-46.
153. 1978 Voter Pamphlet, at 56.
154. l

voters."15s These statements were generally consistent with the public debate about Proposition 13, which focused on government waste
and overall lower taxes.56
The court manufactured ambiguity by implication from other language in the ballot analysis that had nothing directly to do with the
taxing power of special districts. The analysis explained that because
of Proposition 13's stringent requirements (i.e., requiring a two-thirds
vote to approve tax increases), special districts would have difficulty
"replacing" lost property tax revenues. 5 7 According to the court, a
special district had need to "replace" lost property tax revenue only if
the special district had power to raise property taxes. 5 8 Accordingly,
districts without power to impose property taxes were not "special
districts." The court's reasoning is strained here.iS9 To reach the desired result, the court was willing to ignore clear language directly on
point dealing with the power to tax in favor of an implication painfully drawn out of language that dealt with the difficulties that local
government would face if Proposition 13 were enacted. The ballot
language did not control.
0
In People v. Castro,16
the court ignored clear language in the ballot analysis that was directly contrary to the court's interpretation of
one provision of the Victims' Bill of Rights. The issue in Castro was
whether the Victims' Bill of Rights had amended the Constitution in
such a way as to require in all cases the admission into evidence of
prior convictions of a witness for impeachment purposes. As
amended, article I, section 28(f), provided that "[a]ny prior felony
conviction of any person in any criminal proceeding, whether adult
or juvenile, shall subsequently be used without limitation for purposes of impeachment or enhancement of sentence in any criminal
proceeding." This language could not be clearer, as even the court
recognized.161
Unfortunately for the Victims' Bill of Rights, section 28(d) provided that "[n]othing in this section shall affect . . . Evidence Code,
Sections 352, 782 or 1103."162 Section 352 of the Evidence Code generally authorizes the trial court to exclude any evidence the probative
value of which is outweighed by the danger of prejudice or confu155. Id
156. "The authors of proposition 13 and most voters, in fact, wanted and intended
not only property tax relief, but relief from taxes in general and a reduction in governmental waste and spending as well." Henke & Woodlief, supra note 50, at 260.
157. 643 P.2d at 945-46.
158. Id
159. See Henke & Woodlief, supra note 50, at 264-67.
160. 696 P.2d 111 (Cal. 1985).
161. Castro, 696 P.2d at 115 (quoting CAL. CoNST. art. I, § 28(f)).
162. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(d) (emphasis added).
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sion.163 Thus, the language of article I, section 28(d) appeared to
trump the otherwise clear language in section 28(f). On the other
hand, the use of the word "section" in section 28(d) appears to have
been a drafter's error; the word "subsection" appears to have been actually intended and would have prevented the modification of section
28(d).164
The language contained in the ballot analysis was just as clear as
Section 28(f): "The measure would amend the State Constitution to
require that information about prior felony convictions be used without limitation to discredit the testimony of a witness, including that
of a defendant. Under current law, such information may be used
only under limited circumstances."'65 Focusing its attention only
upon the second sentence, the court concluded that this language did
not refer to section 352, but referred only to a series of special court
created rules excluding evidence of prior convictions.1x 6 It is not
clear from the court's opinion how the second sentence, which does
not mention either section 352 or the line of cases that the court
mentions, is supposed to modify or limit the clear meaning of the
163. CAL. EViD. CODE § 352 (West 1966).
164. The argument in support of poor drafting is as follows. Section 28(d) provides
in full as follows:
Except as provided by statute hereafter enacted by a two-thirds vote of the
membership in each house of the Legislature, relevant evidence shall not be
excluded in any criminal proceeding, including pretrial and post conviction
motions and hearings, or in any trial or hearing of a juvenile for a criminal
offense, whether heard in juvenile or adult court. Nothing in this section
shall affect any existing statutory rule of evidence relating to privilege or
hearsay, or Evidence Code, Sections 352, 782 or 1103. Nothing in this section
shall affect any existing statutory or constitutional right of the press.
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(d).
The reference to Evidence Code section 352 comes at the end of section 28(d) in a
proviso. Ordinarily, such a proviso has reference to what immediately precedes it. Applying this rule of interpretation, Section 28(d) would mean that all relevant evidence
would be admissible except to the extent that its probative value was outweighed by its
prejudicial value. This makes perfect sense.
Moreover, section 28(d) would not be the only example of poor drafting in the Victims' Bill of Rights. Section 28(b) provides that "[t]he Legislature shall adopt provisions to implement this section during the calendar year following adopting of this
section." CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(b). As the majority notes, the first use of the word
"section" in section 28(b) is incorrect and should be read as "subdivision." Castro, 696
P.2d at 116 n.6. The court rejects the obvious conclusion that the drafter of Section 28
was not too careful with the observation that "there is . . .no rule of statutory construction to the effect that one instance of sloppy draftsmanship compels courts to presume a habit." Id,
165. Castro, 696 P.2d at 116 (emphasis in original) (citing Analysis by the Legislative Analysts, Ballot Pamphlet, Proposed Amend. to Cal. Const., Primary Election 54
(June 8, 1982)).
166. Castro, 696 P.2d at 116.

first sentence. The court in Castro appears to have run roughshod
over the ballot pamphlet in order to reach what the court believed
was a better rule of evidence.
These examples suggest that the ballot analysis and arguments are
used only fitfully by the court. When the ballot pamphlet supports
the court's result, it cites the pamphlet in support. When the ballot
pamphlet is contrary to the result the court wishes to reach, it manufactures ambiguities that do not exist and ignores the common sense
meaning of the pamphlet language. Instead of engaging in extraordinary gymnastics to overcome language in the ballot pamphlet, the
court would do well to adopt a consistent rule which places the ballot
pamphlet near the bottom of the list of acceptable legislative history
67
materials.1
2.

Strict Interpretation

Although the court has indicated that it will liberally construe initiative measures, its actual decisions do not support this rule. Initiatives that make far-reaching changes in California's organic law
appear to be given a more cautious, narrow construction. 168 The best
example of this tendency is the interpretation of Proposition 13.
In 1978, California led the voter anti-tax revolution of the 1980's by
enacting Proposition 13.169 The general purpose of the initiative was
to reduce taxes and limit the power of state and local governments to
raise taxes in the future. 170 The drafters of Proposition 13 foresaw a
167. C. Christenson, supra note 109, at 1048-52 (arguing that ballot arguments
should be entitled to substantial, though not conclusive, weight as an indication of the
intent of the electorate).
Perhaps the only material lower on the ladder would be newspaper reports and campaign slogans. Newspapers and, more generally, the media blitz, should be used only
for the very limited purpose of helping to identify the historical circumstances existing
at the time an initiative was enacted. See, e.g., California Hous. Fin. Agency v. Patitucci, 583 P.2d 729, 733 (Cal. 1978) (relying upon newspaper and campaign literature
to identify "historical context" of an initiative enacted in 1950). Such material has no
place in the interpretation of specific language appearing in an initiative or in the interpretation of recently enacted initiatives where the historical context is fresh in the
mind of the court. But see Elizabeth A. McNellie, Note, The Use of Extrinsic Aids in

the Interpretation of Popularly Enacted Legislation, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 157, 174-78
(1989) (arguing that courts should consider, in addition to ballot arguments, the media
campaign and the results of reliable exit polls).
168. If the changes are too fundamental or far-reaching, the court has the option of
declaring even a constitutional initiative to be an unconstitutional revision. Raven v.
Deukmejian, 801 P.2d 107, 1086 (Cal. 1990). Short of this drastic remedy, the court always has the power simply to rewrite what the people have approved, although such
judicial intervention creates its own serious legitimacy problems for the courts. See
People v. Skinner, 704 P.2d 752 (Cal. 1985) (reading the word "and" in one section of
Proposition 8 as "or" in order to avoid constitutional problem).
169. CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA.
170. Huntington Park Redevelopment v. Martin, 695 P.2d 220, 222 (Cal. 1985). See
Henke & Woodlief, supra note 50, at 260-63.
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practical problem: What would state and especially local governments do if deprived of taxes on real property? Like any good legislature, they would be likely to raise other taxes to offset the loss of
real property taxes. In order to keep local and state governments
from taking with the left hand what could not be taken with the
right, language was inserted in section 4 of Article XIII A "to prevent
the government from recouping its losses from decreased property
taxes by imposing or increasing other taxes.' 17 ' Section 4 provides as
follows:
Cities, Counties and special districts, by a two-thirds vote of the qualified electors of such district, may impose special taxes on such district, except ad
valorem taxes on real property or a transaction tax or sales tax on the sale of
real property within such City, County or special district.1 7 2

Consistent with the sloppy drafting that seems to pervade voter initiatives, section 4 does not, in plain terms, prohibit cities, counties
and special districts from raising special taxes by less than a twothirds vote. The section is instead drafted in permissive terms. The
meaning was clear, however, and although section 4 is drafted in permissive terms (i.e., what cities, counties and special districts may do),
it has been properly understood as imposing a constitutional limitation upon local government's power to impose special taxes. 173 Specifically, cities, counties and special districts may not impose a
"special tax" upon a district unless approved by a two-thirds vote of
the district's qualified electors.174 Section 4's two-thirds vote requirement is thus triggered if (1) the tax imposed is a "special tax", and
(2) the taxing entity is a city, county or "special district."l75
The two-thirds vote requirement of section 4 has severely limited
local government's ability to finance even necessary operations. Historically, general fund taxes, which, even after the enactment of
Proposition 13 can be approved by a simple majority of the voters,
have been unpopular and generally unsuccessful. Voters are suspicious of approving a tax increase without knowing precisely what the
politicians are going to do with the extra money. For example, a special tax to support the local public library is much more likely to be
approved since the voters have a better understanding of what they
171. Henke & Woodlief, supra note 50, at 220.
172. CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA, § 4.
173. See generally Daniel G. Nauman, Local Government Taxing Authority Under
Proposition13, 10 Sw. U. L. REV. 795, 811 (1978).
174. Los Angeles County Transp. Comm'n v. Richmond, 643 P.2d 941, 943 (Cal.
1982); Amador, 583 P.2d at 1283.
175. City and County of San Francisco v. Farrell, 648 P.2d 935, 941 (Cal. 1982); Richmond, 643 P.2d at 943.

are getting for their money, which may be why section 4 is directed
at special taxes that had become a primary method by which local
government raised taxes.
Section 4 has not fared well at the hands of the Supreme Court of
California, and was saved from oblivion only by the court's most recent section 4 case. 176 Although initiatives are ordinarily to be liberally construed to further their purposes, the Supreme Court of
California found in Proposition 13 a reason to reverse this accepted
canon of construction. Instead of liberally construing Proposition 13,
the court strictly and narrowly construed it because, according to the
court, Proposition 13 is anti-majoritarian. This rule appeared in Los
Angeles County TransportationCommission v. Richmond,177 the first
case to consider the two-thirds requirement under section 4:
In view of the fundamentally undemocratic nature of the requirement for an
extraordinary majority .... the language of section 4 must be strictly construed and ambiguities resolved in favor of permitting voters of cities, counties
to enact 'special taxes' by a majority rather than a twoand 'special1 districts'
78
thirds vote.

The great irony of this analysis is that, by a parity of resuming,
nearly all significant constitutional restrictions should be strictly construed because all such provisions on government are, in their nature, anti-majoritarian and undemocratic. The Bill of Rights is antimajoritarian; the Fourteenth Amendment is anti-majoritarian. Further, most constitutional language, like much of Proposition 13, is
both general and ambiguous. The ambiguities in the Bill of Rights
are indeed part of its strength. Are we to construe the Bill of Rights
and the Fourteenth Amendment narrowly because they are antimajoritarian and ambiguous? Obviously not. Instead, the fact that
such anti-majoritarian restrictions have been placed in a constitution
is a significant reason for giving that restriction a liberal reading consistent with its purpose, a reading that will permit the restriction to
achieve its full purpose.
Proposition 13 has not received this treatment, however. In Richmond, applying its rule of strict construction, the court came very
close to gutting Proposition 13 by defining "special district," an undefined and ambiguous term, to exclude districts that lack real property
taxing power.179 Given this definition, state and local governments
could easily evade the requirements of Proposition 13 by vesting
power to raise other ad valorem taxes (e.g., sales taxes) in an entity
that otherwise lacks power to tax real property.18 0 Since such an en176. Rider v. County of San Diego, 820 P.2d 1000 (Cal. 1992).
177. 643 P.2d 941 (Cal. 1982).
178. I& at 945.
179. Id, at 945-46. See also Huntington Park Redevelopment v. Martin, 695 P.2d
220, 223 (Cal. 1985).
180. A discussion of various methods of avoiding Proposition 13's strictures and of
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tity would not appear to be a "special district" under the Richmond
court's definition, section 4's super-majority voting requirement
would apparently not be triggered.
The court in Richmond recognized this danger. Unfortunately, the
court's solution was to put the issue off until another day:
Nor are we impressed with a suggestion that our interpretation of section 4
could result in the wholesale avoidance of the purpose of article XIII A by the
Legislature, which could reorganize existing "special districts" to remove their
property-taxing power or create new ones without such power, thereby allowing them to adopt a "special tax" by majority vote. We cannot assume
that the Legislature will attempt to avoid the goals of article XIII A by such a
device. In any event that problem can be dealt with if and when the issue
arises. The legislation creating [the county transportation commission] and
granting it the power to levy only a sales tax antedated Proposition 13 by two
years. Thus, there can be no claim here that the Legislature was attempting
to evade the restrictions imposed by section 4.181

It took local government and the legislature several years to catch
on to the game, but catch on they ultimately did. The courts are now
facing the issue in cases challenging an attempt by the legislature and
local government to establish county justice facilities financing commissions (that of course do not have real property taxing power),
whose predominant purpose is to raise sales taxes to finance the construction and operation of county jails.
The Superior Court for the County of San Diego declared the legislation affecting that county unconstitutional, finding that the financing commission was created with the sole purpose of avoiding section
4. Applying the language from Richmond quoted above, the court
struck down the authorizing legislation.' 82 However, the California
Court of Appeals for the Fourth District has reversed the San Diego
Superior Court's decision.' 8 3 The fourth district did not read the language in Richmond as requiring the courts to deal with the problem
once it arose, noting that the Richmond court said only that the
"problem can be dealt with if and when the issue arises."''1 4 Itis fair
to ask the fourth district: "Who is supposed to deal with the problem?" The fourth district's answer was the "electorate and/or the
State Legislature."lS5 This answer cannot be taken very seriously.
other supreme court cases is contained in Joseph Henke & Woodlief, supra note 50, at
251.
181. Richmond, 643 P.2d at 947 (emphasis added).
182. The superior court's decision was reversed in Rider v. County of San Diego,
272 Cal. Rptr. 857 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990), rev'd 820 P.2d 1000 (Cal. 1992).
183. Rider, 272 Cal. Rptr. 857.
184. Id. at 860 (citing Richmond, 643 P.2d at 947).
185. Id. at 861.

How can we rely upon the legislature to deal with the problem when
it is the legislature itself that is attempting to avoid the constitutional
provision? Further, is it plausible to require the electorate to enact
another constitutional initiative to protect the purposes of a prior
initiative?
If the court of appeals' decision had been affirmed, Section 4 would
have become essentially a dead letter. The California Supreme Court
reversed, however, saving at least some of Section 4's limiting principle.18 6 Although it reversed, the Court did not explicitly repudiate
Richmond's strict construction rule, and it remains unclear just how
87
much of an impact the Rider decision will have.
There are, of course, other examples where the court has interpreted an initiative consistently with its apparent intent.s88 But even
in such cases, the votes tend to be close, suggesting disagreement
among the members of the court as to the respect due to voter initiatives.' 8 9 In light of the many problems created by the enactment of
voter initiatives, the court should abandon the liberal construction
rule in favor of a rule that voter initiatives will be strictly, or at least
cautiously, construed so as to minimize their damage to the law. The
voters simply do not have the expertise of a legislature and do not
deserve the same deference.
3.

The Presumption of Constitutionality

Because the court formally treats an initiative measure as though it
was an ordinary piece of legislation, initiatives are supposedly entitled to a presumption of constitutionality. The presumption has been
stated in a number of different ways: "[A]Ul presumptions and intendments favor the validity of a statute and mere doubt does not afford sufficient reason for a judicial declaration of invalidity. Statutes
must be upheld unless their unconstitutionality clearly, positively,
and unmistakably appears." 90 If the constitutionality of an initiative
is "fairly debatable," the courts must uphold it.191 And, of course,
courts "do not consider or weigh the economic or social wisdom or
186. Rider v. County of San Diego, 820 P.2d 1000 (Cal. 1992).
187. The court set forth six factors which it directed lower courts to consider in determining whether a particular local tax agency was created with the predominate
purpose of avoiding Section 4. Id., 820 P.2d at 1006. Only time will tell whether the
legislature will discover a way to create new local taxing agencies that satisfy those six
factors and whether courts will permit such a subterfuge.
188. See, e.g., In re Lance W., 694 P.2d 744 (Cal. 1985) (interpreting Victims' Bill of
Rights as abrogating court-created exclusionary rule).
189. See, e.g., In re Lance W., 694 P.2d at 745 (4-3 vote).
190. In re Ricky H., 468 P.2d 204 (Cal. 1970) (quoted in Calfarm Ins. Co. v.
Deukmejian, 771 P.2d 1247, 1251 (Cal. 1989) (reviewing Proposition 103)).
191. Associated Home Builders of Greater East Bay, Inc. v. City of Livermore, 557
P.2d 473, 483 (Cal. 1976).
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general propriety of the initiative. Rather, [their] sole function is to
evaluate [it] legally in the light of established constitutional
standards."192
The presumption that legislatively enacted statutes are constitutional is supported by two powerful principles. First, the legislature
is a co-equal branch of government, and the separation of powers
counsels judicial caution when reviewing the acts of a co-equal
branch.193 Second, each member of the legislature, like each judicial
officer, has taken a constitutional oath which obligates each member
to consider the constitutionality of legislative acts.194 Although the
judicial branch has in a practical sense the last word on the constitutionality of legislative acts, 195 the judicial branch must recognize that
its word is not the only word. 19 6 The legislative branch and the executive branch have already passed upon the constitutionality of an act
before the judiciary gets a look, and thus the judiciary must be well
convinced of an act's unconstitutionality before striking it down.
A voter initiative, by contrast, may be proposed by a self-centered
interest group that has no constitutional obligation to even consider
the constitutionality of what is proposed. Individual citizens (even if
they understood the constitutional problems created by a particular
initiative) likewise have no constitutional obligation to vote against
an unconstitutional initiative. It is therefore inappropriate to presume that a voter initiative is constitutional. Instead, voter initiatives
should be given a careful review because the "intent of the electorate" is not always to be trusted.
Although the Supreme Court of California has declared that initiatives are entitled to a presumption of constitutionality, the court
managed to strike down as unconstitutional all or significant portions
192. Amador, 583 P.2d at 1283.
193. See, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 472 (1980) (Burger, C.J.); Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 102 (1973); Blodgett
v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 147-48 (1927) (Holmes, J.).
The Supreme Court of California has also noted that since the California Constitution, unlike the federal Constitution, only limits the power of the legislature (rather
than grants it limited powers), the Legislature's interpretation of the state Constitution is entitled to "a strong presumption of constitutionality." California Hous. Fin.
Agency v. Patitucci, 583 P.2d 729, 731 (Cal. 1978). See also Methodist Hosp. of Sacramento v. Saylor, 488 P.2d 161, 166 (Cal. 1971); Delaney v. Lowery, 154 P.2d 674, 678
(Cal. 1944).
194. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 of art. VI; CAL. CONST. art. XX, § 3.
195. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
196. But see Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (stating that "the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution"). See LAWRENCE H.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 3-4 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing Cooper).

of seven of fourteen voter initiatives between 1964 and 1990.197 This
track record indicates either (a) the court is actually not according
voter initiatives a presumption of constitutionality, or (b) the court in
the fuiture should not accord voter initiatives a presumption of constitutionality because voters historically have approved a significant
number of unconstitutional initiatives (in short, voters have abused
the presumption). 198 In either case, it is time to acknowledge what is
really going on; the court treats the "intent of the electorate" as expressed in voter initiatives with understandable skepticism as seen in
the case discussions that follow.
Proposition 15 on the November 1964 ballot was the "Free Television Act." The Free Television Act absolutely prohibited the business of home subscription or pay television in California. In Weaver
v. Jordan,199 the court struck down the Act as a violation of the free
speech clauses of the federal and state constitutions. Characterizing
the Act as involving a prior restraint, the court reversed the presumption of constitutionality, holding that the Act came before the
court " 'bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.' "20o Finding no "clear and present danger,"2 01 and also rejecting
as insubstantial the Act's stated goals,202 the court easily found the
Act constitutionally defective.
197. Raven v. Deukmejian, 801 P.2d 1077 (Cal. 1990); Calfarm Ins. Co. v.
Deukmejian, 771 P.2d 1247 (Cal. 1989); People v. Ramos, 639 P.2d 908 (Cal. 1982); Citizens for Jobs & Energy v. Fair Political Practices Comm'n, 547 P.2d 1386 (Cal. 1976);
Santa Barbara Sch. Dist. v. Superior Court, 530 P.2d 605 (Cal. 1975); Mulkey v. Reitman, 413 P.2d 825 (Cal. 1966); Weaver v. Jordan, 411 P.2d 289 (Cal. 1966).
This list of unconstitutional initiatives enacted by the voters does not include two
proposed initiatives which the court held could not even be placed upon the ballot because of constitutional defects. ALF-CIO v. Eu, 686 P.2d 609 (Cal. 1989); Legislature v.
Deukmejian, 669 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1983). See Eastman, supra note 51; Carol Sue Hunting,
Note, Pre-Election Review of Voter lnitiatives AFL-CIO v. Eu, 60 WASH. L. REV. 911
(1985); Greg M. Salvato, Note, New Limits on the CaliforniaInitiative: An Analysis
and Critique,19 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 1045 (1986).
198. In light of this miserable record, it is hard to credit Mr. Eastman's conclusion
that "by and large, citizens have proved to be responsible lawmakers." Eastman, supra
note 51, at 553.
199. 411 P.2d 289 (Cal. 1966).
200. Id at 293 (quoting Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 57-58 (1965)). Justice
Mosk in a lonely dissent took issue with the reversed presumption: "First of all, it appears that the majority finds this Act presumptively unconstitutional, ignoring the
well-established rule that a legislative enactment is presumed to be valid and that persons adversely affected must sustain the burden of demonstrating constitutional intrusion. Neither First nor Fourteenth Amendment cases alter the basic principle." Id. at
300 (Mosk, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
201. I& at 296.
202. The Act itself declared that "[t]he development of any subscription television
business would have an adverse effect upon presently licensed television stations
which do not make a charge to viewers; and would tend to deprive the members of the
public, who have made a substantial investment in television receiving equipment, of
their present freedom of choice with respect to television programs, and of the information, instruction and entertainment now readily and freely available to them. It
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Proposition 14, which was also on the 1964 ballot, amended the California Constitution to create a private right in the owner of real
property "to decline to sell, lease or rent such property to such person or persons as he, in his absolute discretion, chooses." 20 3 In
Mulkey v. Reitman,20 4 the court declared Proposition 14 unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.
In reaching this conclusion, the court correctly noted that "Proposition 14 generally nullifies both the Rumford and Unruh Acts as they
apply to the housing market," 205 and that Proposition 14 thus "provides for nothing more than a purported constitutional right to privately discriminate on grounds which admittedly would be
unavailable under the Fourteenth Amendment should state action be
involved." 20 6 Because Proposition 14 amended the California Constitution, striking it down under the California Constitution would have
been difficult (though not impossible). 20 7 The problem under the
Fourteenth Amendment was to find state action. 208 In a decision
that has been properly criticized by scholars as fundamentally unprincipled, 20 9 the court found that the enactment of Proposition 14
constituted sufficient state "encouragement" of private discrimination so as to constitute state action. 210 They found this state action
despite the fact, noted by the dissenters, that Proposition 14 technically did nothing more than repeal the Rumford and Unruh Acts and
thereby restore California law to a position of race neutrality in the
would tend to create a monopoly. For those and related reasons it would be contrary
to the public policy of this State." Id. at 292 n.1.
Among other criticisms of the Act, the majority noted that "any suggested 'evil' appears to be speculative and illusory." Id. at 296. Justice Mosk criticized his colleagues
for second-guessing the stated legislative goal: "the syllogism may be weak or debatable, but this would hardly be unprecedented in the legislative arena. A disputatious
posture does not justify finding as a matter of law that the logic is captious or the conclusions capricious or arbitrary." I& at 308 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
203. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 26 (repealed 1974).
204. 413 P.2d 825 (Cal. 1966), aff'd, 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
205. Id, at 829.
206. Id. at 830 (emphasis added).
207. See infra notes 366-412 and accompanying text.
208. The federal state action requirement is discussed infra notes 350-412 and accompanying text.
209. See, e.g., Kenneth L. Karst & Harold W. Horowitz, Reitman v. Mulkey: A Telophase of Substantive Equal Protection,1967 Sup. CT. REV. 39; ALEXANDER M. BICKEL,
THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGREsS 65-70 (1970). Reitman involved a
state action problem similar to that addressed by the Court in Shelley v. Kraemer, 334
U.S. 1 (1948). For a criticism of Shelley that applies with equal force to Reitman, see
Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principlesof ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARV. L. REV.
1 (1959).
210. Reitman, 413 P.2d at 833.

transfer of real property (a constitutionally acceptable position under
the Fourteenth Amendment). 211 The court did not even mention the
supposed presumption of constitutionality in its analysis, and the resolution of the state action issue was far from clear.212
Proposition 21, which appeared on the November 1972 ballot, added section 1009.6 to the Education Code, providing that "[n]o public
school student shall, because of his race, creed, or color, be assigned
to or be required to attend a particular school."213 The Proposition
also repealed the Bagley Act, enacted in 1971, which directed school
districts to "eliminate racial and ethnic imbalance in public enrollment."214 In Santa Barbara School District v. Superior Court, 215 the
court struck down that portion of Proposition 21 which added section
1009.6. Section 1009.6 was clearly unconstitutional with respect to
school district efforts to remedy prior de jure segregation under
North Carolinav. Swann,216 which struck down a virtually identical
North Carolina statute. 2 17 It was less clear, however, whether section 1009.6 was unconstitutional with respect to school district efforts
to remedy de facto, but not de jure, segregation. There were intimations from the supreme court as early as 1973 that de facto segregation did not constitute a constitutional violation. 218 It could plausibly
be argued, then, that section 1009.6 was unconstitutional only insofar
as it interfered with remedies for de jure segregation, but that it was
constitutional insofar as it interfered only with remedies for de facto
segregation. The court rejected this argument, however, asserting
that the distinction between de jure and de facto segregation was so
uncertain, that prohibiting a school board from taking steps to remedy de facto segregation would unduly interfere with the constitu211. Id at 840, 845 (White, J., dissenting, and McComb, J., dissenting).
212. The United States Supreme Court affirmed, but was obviously uncomfortable
with the state action analysis and placed unusually heavy reliance upon the California
Supreme Court's conclusion that Proposition 14 constituted state encouragement of
discrimination in California. Reitman, 387 U.S. at 373-76.
The Court's reliance upon the California Supreme Court's finding of encouragement
is suspect because, among other reasons, that finding was based upon the California
court's reading of the Supreme Court's state action cases. A more rigorous analysis
would have involved a de novo review by the Supreme Court itself. Instead, the Court
seemingly treated the California court's finding of state encouragement as a finding of
fact that would not be reconsidered by the Court. The majority's reliance upon the
California court's finding was the center-piece of the four-justice dissent in Reitman.
Reitman, 387 U.S. at 387-96 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
213. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 1009.6 (West 1978 & Supp. 1991) (recodified as CAL. EDUC.
CODE § 35351).
214. CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 5002 & 5003 (West 1978) (repealed by Proposition 21).
215. 530 P.2d 605 (Cal. 1975).
216. 402 U.S. 43 (1971). See also Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402
U.S. 1 (1971).
217. Swann, 402 U.S. at 46.
218. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973). See generally TRIBE, supra
note 196, at § 16-18, 1492-93 n.39.

[Vol. 19: 327, 1992]

California'sRight to Privacy
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

tional obligation to remedy de jure segregation.2 19 The court did not
indulge in a presumption of constitutionality or a presumption that
school districts could generally determine whether segregated conditions were likely to have been the result of prior de jure
220
segregation.
Proposition 9, enacted by the voters in June 1974, limited the
amount of funds which could be spent campaigning for or against
statewide ballot propositions. In Citizensfor Jobs and Energy v. Fair
PoliticalPractices Commission,221 the court, in a short opinion, declared the limits on campaign spending unconstitutional in light of
22
the Supreme Court's then-recent decision in Buckley v. Valeo.2

The California Supreme Court's battle with the electorate over the
death penalty marks one of the more interesting and controversial
stories in California judicial history. Perhaps more than with any
other issue discussed in this section, the death penalty cases reveal a
court openly hostile to the electorate (and an electorate that ultimately fought back and won). In People v. Anderson,223 the court
struck down California's death penalty statute as violative of the California Constitution, article I, section 6.224 The voters responded the
same year with an initiative that overruled Anderson.225 In 1973, the
219. Santa BarbaraSch. Dist., 530 P.2d at 614-15.
220. The Supreme Court of California subsequently held that de facto segregation
in schools violated the state due process clause. Crawford v. Board of Educ., 551 P.2d
28 (Cal. 1976). The legislature and voters reacted to this decision with Proposition I,
which amended the state due process clause to prohibit busing of students to achieve
racial balance unless a violation of the federal constitution had been shown. That
proposition was held constitutional in Crawford v. Board of Education, 458 U.S. 527
(1982).
The decision in Santa Barbara may have been correct for a reason quite different
from that given by the California court. In Washington v. Seattle School District No.
1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982), the Supreme Court struck down a Washington initiative that
took away from school boards the power to assign students to schools on anything
other than a geographic basis. The Court held that the initiative had reallocated political "power nonneutrally, by explicitly using the racial nature of a decision to determine the decisionmaking process." Seattle School District,458 U.S. at 470 (emphasis in
original).
221. 547 P.2d 1386 (Cal. 1976).
222. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
223. 493 P.2d 880 (Cal. 1972).
224. Id. at 898.
225. The initiative added article I, section 27, to the California Constitution which
provided that:
All statutes of this state in effect on February 17, 1972 [the date of the Anderson decision], requiring, authorizing, imposing, or relating to the death penalty
are in full force and effect, subject to legislative amendment or repeal by statute, initiative, or referendum. The death penalty provided for under those
statutes shall not be deemed to be, or to constitute, the infliction of cruel or

legislature responded to the Supreme Court's decision in Furman v.
Georgia,226 which struck down death penalty statutes that granted
too much discretion to the sentencing authority, by enacting a new
death penalty statute. The new statute was ultimately declared unconstitutional in Rockwell v. Superior Court,227 because of the statute's incompatability with a series of Supreme Court decisions in the
mid-1970's.228 The California Legislature again quickly acted to reinstate the death penalty, and this statute was held constitutional by
229
the court in People v. Frierson.
The people, meanwhile, had been working on a death penalty initiative measure which, when approved in 1978, set the stage for a battle with the court. The death penalty initiative added several
sections to the Penal Code setting forth, in substantial detail, the procedural and substantive rules to be followed in the penalty phase of a
criminal trial in which the death penalty was an issue. 230 The court
responded in a series of cases that either struck down a portion of the
initiative or found a constitutional violation in the manner in which
the trial court had instructed the jury in the penalty phase.23 1 In
1986, the people, frustrated in their efforts to see the death penalty
enforced by the supreme court, refused to retain three justices on the
court who were perceived to be part of the problem. 232 A newly-constituted court has acceded to the people's will by upholding California's death, penalty statutes and affirming several death penalty
23 3
sentences.
In Calfarm Insurance Co. v. Deukmejian, 34 the court struck down
one of the most significant portions of Proposition 103, the insurance
relief initiative. Proposition 103 provided for an immediate roll-back
unusual punishments within the meaning of Article I, Section 6 nor shall such
punishment for such offenses be deemed to contravene any other provision of
this constitution.
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 27.
226. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
227. 556 P.2d 1101 (Cal. 1976).
228. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
229. 599 P.2d 587 (Cal. 1979). See also People v. Jackson, 618 P.2d 149 (Cal. 1980).
230. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 190-190.5 (West 1991).
231. See, e.g., People v. Davenport, 710 P.2d 861 (Cal. 1985); People v. Brown, 726
P.2d 56 (Cal. 1985); People v. Easley, 671 P.2d 813, 834 (Cal. 1983); People v. Robertson,
655 P.2d 279, 302-05 (Cal. 1982) (Broussard, J., concurring); People v. Ramos, 639 P.2d
908 (Cal. 1982).
232. Chief Justice Rose E. Bird and Associate Justices Joseph R. Grodin and Cruz
Reynoso were voted out of office by a 66% negative vote. Anthony Paonita, Voters in
3 States Reject Chief Justices, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 17, 1986, at 3.
233. See, e.g., People v. Anderson, 285 Cal. Rptr. 523 (Cal. 1991); People v. Jennings,
760 P.2d 475 (Cal. 1988); People v. Bonin, 758 P.2d 1217 (Cal. 1988); People v. Miranda,
744 P.2d 1127 (Cal. 1987); People v. Anderson, 742 P.2d 862 (Cal. 1987) (overruling
Carols v. Superior Court, 672 P.2d 862 (Cal. 1983)).
234. 771 P.2d 1247 (Cal. 1989).
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of most consumer insurance rates to a level twenty percent below the
level which existed at the time Proposition 103 was proposed
(roughly one year prior to its enactment).235 Insurers could apply to
the newly-created Insurance Commissioner for relief from the rollback, but during the first year of its operation, Proposition 103 prevented the Insurance Commissioner from granting relief except upon
a showing "that an insurer is substantially threatened with insolvency."238 After the first year, the Commissioner could grant relief
upon a showing that the rate applied for was not "excessive, inadequate, unfairly discriminatory or otherwise in violation of [the initiative]."237 The court held in Calfarm that the insolvency standard,
which was applicable only during the first year, was unconstitutionally confiscatory because it denied insurers a fair rate of return.238
By striking down the rate roll-back, the court took away one of Prop2 39
osition 103's major selling points.
The most recent constitutionally defective initiative is Proposition
115, which purported to make sweeping changes in the administration of criminal justice in California. In Raven v. Deukmeian,240 the
court held that Proposition 115's modification of the state constitutional protections accorded to criminal defendants was so fundamental and far-reaching that the proposition constituted a revision of the
constitution (rather than an amendment to the constitution) and was
therefore unconstitutional.2 41 One of Proposition 115's many provisions would have made the constitutional rights of criminal defendants under the state constitution no broader than rights guaranteed
under the federal Constitution.242 Although voters may propose
235. CAL. INS. CODE § 1861.01(a) (West Supp. 1991).
236. CAL. INS. CODE § 1861.01(b) (West Supp. 1991).
237. CAL. INS. CODE § 1861.05 (West Supp. 1991).
238. Calfarm, 771 P.2d at 1252-59.
239. The court also struck down a provision which required the creation of a consumer advocacy corporation as violative of article II, section 12, of the constitution,
which, among other things, prohibits any initiative from naming or identifying a private corporation to perform any function or have any power. Id

at 1263.

240. 801 P.2d 1077 (Cal. 1990).
241. Id at 1089-90.
242. Article I, section 24, provided prior to Proposition 115 that "[r]ights guaranteed
by this Constitution are not dependent on those guaranteed by the United States Constitution." CAL. CONST. art. I, § 24. Proposition 115 proposed to add the following par-

agraph to section 24:
In criminal cases the rights of a defendant to equal protection of the laws, to

due process of law, to the assistance of counsel, to be personally present with
counsel, to a speedy and public trial, to compel the attendance of witnesses, to
confront the witnesses against him or her, to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures, to privacy, to not be compelled to be a witness against

amendments to the state constitution through initiative, a revision of
the constitution can be achieved only by a legislative initiative or constitutional convention. 243 Although the distinction between an
amendment and revision is hazy, the court's focus is upon "both the
quantitative and qualitative effects of the measure on our constitutional scheme."244 Although Proposition 115 survived the quantitative analysis,245 it failed the qualitative analysis because the
proposition purported to "vest all judicial interpretive power, as to
fundamental criminal defense rights, in the United States Supreme
Court."246 Such a fundamental modification of the federalism princi-

ple, a modification that would undermine the independent vitality of
the state constitution, was too great a qualitative change in state government to be achieved through the amendment process. 247
Although the courts claim to treat voter initiatives with the same
respect that is accorded to legislative action, the above review of decisions casts that claim in doubt. In practice, the court appears to follow the path that I have laid out in theory. Voter initiatives are
strictly construed, and ambiguities are corrected by narrow, technical
constructions. The presumption of constitutionality is easily overcome, if it exists at all. Ballot arguments are taken seriously only occasionally. The experience with initiatives suggests that the court
views the "intent of the electorate" with a somewhat jaundiced eye.
Indeed, the track record over the last twenty-five years is quite remarkable for its consistency.
So far, however, the court has been unwilling to insult the voters
by verbalizing what it apparently feels: initiatives tend to be poorly
drafted and thought out, and the electorate possesses a marked propensity to enact constitutionally unacceptable measures (confirming
to some extent Madison's original fears of faction). Silence is politically expedient for the court, which remains subject to voter recall,
but the bar especially should be aware of what is really going on.
It is in light of these actual rules of interpretation that the privacy
himself or herself, to not be placed twice in jeopardy for the same offense, and
not to suffer the imposition of cruel or unusual punishment, shall be construed by the courts of this state in a manner consistent with the Constitution
of the United States. This Constitution shall not be construed by the courts to
afford greater rights to criminal defendants than those afforded by the Constitution of the United States, nor shall it be construed to afford greater rights to
minors in juvenile proceedings on criminal causes than those afforded by the
Constitution of the United States.
Izazaga v. Superior Court, 815 P.2d 304, 326 n.3 (Mosk, J., dissenting) (quoting section 3
of Proposition 115).
243. CAL, CONST. art. XVIII, §§ 1-3.
244. Raven v. Deukmejian, 801 P.2d 1007, 1091 (Cal. 1990).
245. Compare Fadden v. Jordan, 196 P.2d 787 (Cal. 1948) (striking down a proposition which added 21,000 words to the constitution and modified 15 of its 25 articles).
246. Raven, 801 P.2d at 1087 (emphasis in original).
247. Id. at 1087-90.
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clause should be judged. First, because the privacy clause was a legislative initiative, the legislative history will include assembly and senate committee reports and a drafting history, as well as the state of
the law in existence at the time the privacy clause was proposed and
adopted. The ballot argument and analysis, which depend for their
validity upon the fictional intent of an educated electorate, should be
largely ignored. Second, as a legislative initiative, the privacy clause
is entitled to a liberal construction consistent with its general purpose. Third, as a legislative initiative, the privacy clause is entitled to
a presumption of constitutionality.
III.

THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY APART FROM ARTICLE 1, SECTION 1

The interest in "privacy" was protected by California and federal
law long before the privacy initiative added privacy to our state constitution in 1972. A cause of action for invasion of privacy developed
through the common law and ultimately made its way into certain
sections of the California Code. The Supreme Court of California
had recognized that the right to privacy under both the federal and
state constitution protected a woman's right to decide whether to
have an abortion. At the federal level, privacy had found a place in
the short list of unenumerated rights. In accord with customary
rules of statutory and constitutional interpretation, a proper interpretation and understanding of article 1, section 1 can be had only
against this broad background of pre-existing privacy law.248
A.

The Common Law and Civil Code Right to Privacy

The interest in privacy was traditionally protected against invasions by private actors through the common law tort action for "invasion of privacy" and through various code provisions that protected
relatively narrow aspects of privacy. A few introductory comments
concerning the common law's approach to decision-making in the
field of civil liability are in order. There will be nothing novel in this
introduction, only a restatement of what others, after a more com2 9
plete study, have concluded. 4
248. In re Harris, 775 P.2d 1057, 1060 (Cal. 1989); People v. Overstreet, 726 P.2d
1288, 1292 (Cal. 1986).
Although some of the cases discussed below post-date the privacy initiative, for present analytical purposes, they may be treated as part of the background to enactment of
the privacy initiative since they represent only further developments and refinements
of doctrines that pre-dated the privacy initiative.

249. On the process of judicial decision-making and the development of common

At bottom, the common law seeks to resolve conflicts between private litigants by balancing conflicting interests in a way to achieve
justice. The interests include the public's interest in health and
safety, the injured person's interest in freedom from injury and in
compensation once injured, and the defendant's interest in liberty
from state regulation which burdens the defendant's freedom of
choice.250 Ordinarily, this balancing of interests takes place "behind
the scenes," in the judges' chambers or in a judicial conference room
where particular rules of law and causes of action are put together.
The results of the balancing-particular rules of law or requirements
for causes of action--are then reported in judicial opinions, sometimes with an explanation of the balancing process which led to the
rules. The rules, once created, are then applied by the courts to specific factual situations. Because the rules are designed to reflect an
appropriate balancing of the relevant interests, it is hoped that an application of the rules makes it unnecessary to engage in an ad hoc
balancing of interests in every case. But, if the rules are widely perceived to produce unfair results, the balance may be reconsidered and
the rules recast. In this way, the common law can grow and adapt to
changing conditions in society.
The common law action for invasion of privacy follows this pattern.
Through a careful balancing of interests, the courts developed specific causes of action which protected somewhat well-defined aspects
of personal privacy. Although privacy was clearly identified as an interest worthy of some legal protection, courts generally did not give
privacy a privileged place or undue weight in the balancing process.
As will be seen, the balancing has thus far resulted in causes of action for invasion of privacy that contain some rather strict limitations which have created pressure to look elsewhere for protection of
25 1
privacy interests.
The creation of "invasion of privacy" as a distinct tort cause of action can be traced to a law review article published in 1890 by Messrs.
Brandeis and Warren. 252 The inspiration for the article came from
Warren's own personal annoyance at the press, which with some regularity reported on Warren's private life, newsworthy due, in part, to
law, see Duncan Kennedy, Freedom and Constraintin Adjudication: A Critical Phenomenology, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 518 (1986); K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS (1960); E. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING
(1949). On the importance of balancing interests in civil tort litigation, see sources
cited in PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS § 3 (W. Page Keeton & Dan B. Dobbs eds., 5th
ed. 1984).
250. See supra note 248.
251. See inkfra notes 255-311 and accompanying text.
252. Louis D. Brandeis & Earl Warren, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193
(1890).
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Warren's marriage to the daughter of a prominent politician. 253
Given this unique and personal pedigree, it is something of a wonder that invasion of privacy was so quickly thereafter adopted by
courts. There are no doubt two reasons for the proposed tort taking
root. First, the authors of the article were highly respected lawyers
of the time, and their belief that a tort should exist was given substantial weight. Second, the abuses of the press were well known
even in 1890, and the invasion of privacy tort seemed ideal for keeping the press in check since it apparently did not suffer from any of
the inconvenient defenses available in a defamation action (such as
truth or lack of harm to reputation). Indeed, in a privacy action,
these traditional defenses actually are part of the plaintiff's arsenal.254 Disclosure of the truth about a person is often more damaging
than lies.
Because the word "privacy" is so ill-defined, it is not surprising
that an action for invasion of privacy has been the refuge of plaintiffs
who have been, for one reason or another, unable to satisfy the technical requirements for other tort causes of action such as defamation,
intentional or negligent infliction of mental distress, trespass, conversion, or misrepresentation, to name just a few. Recognizing this fact,
courts have been careful to establish relatively well-defined limits to
the invasion of privacy action.
Over time, the cases were organized into classifications. Dean
Prosser, the great tort classifier, identified four distinct causes of action for invasion of privacy: (1) intrusion. into private matters; (2)
public disclosure of private facts; (3) false light; and (4) misappropriation of name or picture. 255 These four categories have been widely
adopted in jurisdictions around the country. Although all four of
these causes of action have been grouped under the privacy rubric,
they actually have little to do with one another. For example, each
cause of action protects an entirely distinct interest. Thus, the cause
of action for intrusion protects the interest in seclusion; the cause of
action for public disclosure protects the interest in controlling the extent to which private information is made widely known to the public; the false light cause of action protects the interest in the truthful
dissemination of information about one's self; the misappropriation
cause of action protects an economic interest in the value of one's
253. A. MASON, BRANDEIS: A FREE MAN'S LIFE 70 (1956).
254. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652 (1989).

255. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383 (1960).

256

name or picture.
Moreover, because different interests are protected, different defenses are available for each cause of action. For example, truth is a
defense to a claim of false light, yet truth is no defense to a claim of
public disclosure of private facts. 257 Indeed, the truth of the matter
disclosed is what makes the public disclosure so damaging.
1.

The Right to Be Let Alone

"A man's home is his castle." This saying adequately sums up the
public policy that supports a cause of action for invasion of "the right
to be let alone" or intrusion.258 The American concept of personal
dignity and worth includes a sphere of private thoughts and conduct
that we should all reasonably be able to expect will be held
9
inviolate.25
At the same time, however, we live in a crowded society, with people bumping up against each other (actually and figuratively). Moreover, even conduct that takes place in the relative seclusion of one's
own bedroom may have an effect on society and on the way society
develops. Accordingly, from a constitutional and common law perspective, the zone of privacy is relatively small. The state may regulate seemingly private conduct in the interests of health, safety and
morals. 260 The law of torts has been similarly careful in recognizing
a right to be let alone, lest the courts become a battleground for all
Two mechanisms exist in the
manner of trivial, personal disputes.
law of intrusion which keep it within bounds. First, intrusion is an
intentional tort. Negligently invading another's seclusion does not
give rise to a cause of action. Second, whether an intrusion is actionable depends upon whether the reasonableperson would find the intrusion objectionable or offensive. 261 Courts thus can exercise some
control over the cause of action by declaring what is offensive or not
offensive and what is reasonable or unreasonable in the
262
circumstances.
The Restatement formulation, which California courts have relied
256. PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS § 117, at 849 (W. Page Keeton & Dan B. Dobbs
eds., 5th ed. 1984).
257. Id.
258. See, e.g., Gill v. Curtis Publishing Co., 239 P.2d 630, 652 (Cal. 1952).
259. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
260. Compare Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (upholding the constitutionality of state sodomy laws against a privacy claim) with Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557
(1969) (striking down a state law that criminalized possessing and reading obscene material in the privacy of one's own home on First Amendment grounds).
261. See, e.g., Noble v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 109 Cal. Rptr. 269, 272 (Ct. App.
1973) (quoting Redner v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd., 485 P.2d 799, 807 n.13 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1971).
262. See Miller v. NBC, 232 Cal. Rptr. 668, 678-79 (Ct. App. 1987).
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upon, is similar.26 3 The Restatement (Second) of Torts section 652B
provides that "[one who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs
or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable
264
person."
Although the above principles are easily stated, their application is
not so easy. As one court has noted, "Since the 'right to be let alone'
can be violated in contexts immensely diverse in consequences and
degree, the common law which recognized the right did not easily
lend itself to analysis."265
Certain recurring fact patterns can be seen in the cases, however.
It is not surprising that there is a line of cases dealing with intrusion
by private investigators since they make their living, in part, by invading others' privacy. The major issue in these cases is whether the
investigation was "unreasonably intrusive." 26 6 Under this standard, a
jury question was presented when an investigator for the defendant
in a personal injury action "gained admittance to a hospital room
where plaintiff was confined and, by deception, secured" information
that the plaintiff did not want disclosed to the defendant.267 In discussing cases from other jurisdictions, the court in Noble noted that
causes of action could also be stated for unreasonably intrusive
shadowing or trailing and for investigations performed in a frightening manner. 268
Another line of cases deal with invasions, physical and otherwise,
into the home. In Miller v. National Broadcasting Co.,269 a cause of
action was stated against NBC when a camera crew, as part of a documentary, accompanied fire department paramedics into the plaintiff's
home without consent and videotaped unsuccessful efforts to revive
the plaintiff's husband, who had suffered a heart attack. The court
held that "[i]n our view, reasonable people could regard the NBC
camera crew's intrusion into Dave Miller's bedroom at a time of vulnerability and confusion occasioned by his seizure as 'highly offensive' conduct, thus meeting the limitation on a privacy cause of action
263. See id. at 678; Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, Inc., 188 Cal. Rptr. 762 (Ct. App. 1983).
264. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1989).

265.
266.
267.
268.
269.

Miller, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 677.
See, e.g., Noble v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 109 Cal. Rptr. 269, 275 (Ct. App. 1973).
Id. at 268-71.
Id. at 272.
232 Cal. Rptr. 668 (Ct. App. 1987).

that the Restatement of Torts section 652B imposes."'' 70
Similarly, in Vescovo v. New Way Enterprises,Ltd.,271 a cause of
action was stated against a newspaper that published, "with intent
and design to injure, disgrace and aggrieve plaintiff," an advertisement giving the plaintiff's address and stating as follows: "Hot Lips
Deep Throat; Sexy young bored housewife; Norma." 272 The advertisement triggered a large number of letters and visitors "soliciting
her to perform lewd, immoral and criminal sexual acts." 273 Although
the physical intrusions in this case were committed by third persons,
the intent allegation in the complaint was sufficient to charge the
newspaper with responsibility for purposes of a demurrer.
In addition to the common law causes of action for intrusion, there
are statutory causes of action for wiretapping, electronic eavesdropping, and use of a voice stress analyzer without consent.2 7 4 These
statutes have been drafted so broadly that they bring within their
scope a case in which one party to a conversation, unbeknowst to the
other party, has a third person listen in on an extension phone. 275
These statutes also prohibit one party to a conversation from recording the conversation without consent. 276 There are, as might be expected, a number of statutory exceptions that permit law
enforcement agencies and others to eavesdrop.277
Finally, there is a statutory cause of action for harassment, defined
as "a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person which seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses such person, and
which serves no legitimate purpose. The course of conduct must be
such as would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress, and must actually cause substantial emotional distress
to the plaintiff."278 The remedy for harassment is an injunction. 279
270. Id. at 682.

271. 130 Cal. Rptr. 86 (Ct. App. 1976).
272. Id. at 87-88.
273. Id.
274. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 630-637.5 (West 1988). These sections were enacted in

1967 as Chapter 1.5, entitled "Invasion of Privacy." See generally Note, Right of Privacy - Assault upon Solitude - a Remedy?, 11 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 109 (1970); Walter Karabian, The Case Against Wiretapping, 1 PAC. L.J. 133 (1970).
275. Ribas v. Clark, 696 P.2d 637 (Cal. 1985).
276. People v. Wyrick, 144 Cal. Rptr. 38, 41-42 (Ct. App. 1978); Forest E. Olson, Inc.
v. Superior Court, 133 Cal. Rptr. 573, 574 (Ct. App. 1976).
277. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 631(b), 632(e), 633 (West 1988). See also People
v. Soles, 136 Cal. Rptr. 328, 330 (Ct. App. 1977) (motel manager may furtively listen in
to calls to keep his premises free of criminal activity since tenants cannot reasonably

expect privacy in their conversations given the motel's interest).
278. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 527.6(b) (West Supp. 1992).

279. Id, at § 527.6(a).
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2. Public Disclosure of Private Facts
According to Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 652D, "[o]ne
who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of another
is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the
matter publicized is of a kind that (a) would be highly offensive to a
reasonable person, and (b) is not of legitimate concern to the public."280 California law is roughly in accord. The elements of the
cause of action have been stated as follows: "(1) public disclosure (2)
of a private fact (3) which would be offensive and objectionable to
the reasonable person and (4) which is not of legitimate public
concern."281
One of the early California cases to recognize a cause of action for
invasion of privacy involved public disclosure of private facts. In a
movie called "The Red Kimono," the plaintiff's true-life story as a
prostitute was told, using the plaintiff's maiden name. She sued, alleging that she had given up that life, become rehabilitated, and that
the picture caused her to lose her friends and subjected her to scorn
and obloquy. The court held that a cause of action for public disclo28 2
sure of private facts was stated.
More recently, in Briscoe v. Reader's DigestAssociation, Inc.,283 the
defendant identified the plaintiff in a magazine article as a former hijacker. The hijacking incident had occurred eleven years prior to
publication, and the plaintiff had in the interim become rehabilitated
and a respectable member of society. The court held that the plaintiff stated a cause of action in these circumstances. In reaching this
conclusion, the court noted that, although reports of recent criminal
activity are public, newsworthy information, publication of the name
of a former felon who has long since been released serves no important interest. 28 4 Moreover, publication of a rehabilitated criminal's
name may interfere with the state's compelling interest in the reha5
bilitative process. 28
Although the passage of time was relevant in each case, Melvin
and Briscoe do not stand for the proposition that a public figure may,
simply with the passage of time, become a private figure who may
bring an action for invasion of privacy when historical accounts are
280. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1987).

281.
282.
283.
284.
285.

Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, 188 Cal. Rptr. 762, 768 (Ct. App. 1983).
Melvin v. Reid, 297 P. 91 (Cal. Ct. App. 1931).
483 P.2d 34 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971).
Id at 39-40.
Id. at 40.

written. In Forsher v. Bugliosi,286 the court emphasized that in Melvin and Briscoe, there were independent state interests in discouraging those particular disclosures, namely, that in each case the state
had an interest in the rehabilitation of criminals and that publication
might have the effect of interfering with the rehabilitation process.2 8 7
Forsher also made it plain that one of the key questions in public
disclosure cases is whether the information disclosed is private or is
newsworthy and, therefore, public. If the information is public and
newsworthy, then the publication of the information is privileged.
The court identified in Forsher a number of factors relevant to making this determination:
Among the factors to consider are the depth of the intrusion into the plaintiff's private affairs, the extent to which the plaintiff voluntarily pushed himself into a position of public notoriety, the exact nature of the state's interest
in preventing the disclosure, and whether the information is a matter of public record. Additionally, we look to any continued public interest in the event
so that the passage of time does not per se extinguish the privilege of the publisher; if a report made reasonably contemporaneously with the incident
would have been in the public interest, the weighing process continues in light
of the circumstances prevailing at the time of publication. 2 8 8

Consideration of these factors requires the court and jury to balance
the public's interest in knowing versus the person's interest in keeping certain information private. For example, in Diaz v. Oakland
Tribune,28 9 a college student body president had kept hidden the fact
that she had undergone a sex change operation some years before.
This was discovered and reported by the school paper. The court
held that a jury question was presented regarding whether the information was private or newsworthy, and the court noted that "[p]ublic
figures more celebrated than she are entitled to keep some information of their domestic activities and sexual relations private." 290
The action for public disclosure of private facts is also limited to
situations in which the information is widely published-there must
be a public, as opposed to a limited or private, disclosure of private
facts. 291 This limitation, like the privilege to publish newsworthy pri286.
287.
288.
289.
290.

608 P.2d 716 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980).
Id at 726.
Id. at 727. See also Kapellas v. Kofman, 459 P.2d 912, 922 (Cal. 1969).
188 Cal. Rptr. 762 (1983).
Id. at 772-73.

291. Comment a to RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs, section 652D, explains as

follows:
The form of invasion of the right of privacy covered in this Section depends
upon publicity given to the private life of the individual. "Publicity," as it is
used in this Section, differs from "publication," as that term is used in § 577 in
connection with liability for defamation. "Publication," in that sense, is a
word of art, which includes any communication by the defendant to a third
person. "Publicity," on the other hand, means that the matter is made public,
by communicating it to the public at large, or to so many persons that the
matter must be regarded as substantially certain to become one of public
knowledge.
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vate facts, arises out of a balancing of interests. Although courts recognize that a private person has an interest in maintaining the
privacy of certain facts, the courts also recognize that, absent a confidential relationship (the breach of which would give rise to its own
cause of action), no one can reasonably expect people not to pass
among their circle of friends private information about other people.
So long as such communications are true and thus not defamatory,
there is no cause of action. Gossip has not yet been made tortious. 292
There currently exists a statutory remedy for disclosure of private
information contained in governmental records under the Information Practices Act of 1977.293 This Act, which was intended to implement the privacy clause,294 provides a civil remedy against a
governmental agency which improperly discloses private information, 29 5 and also provides a civil remedy against any person (including a private person) who "intentionally discloses information, not
otherwise public, which they know or should reasonably know was
29
obtained from personal information maintained by a state agency." %
3.

False Light

According to Restatement (Second) of Torts section 652E, "[o]ne
who gives publicity to a matter concerning another that places the
other before the public in a false light is subject to liability to the
other for invasion of his privacy, if (a) the false light in which the
other was placed would be highly offensive to a reasonable person,
and (b) the actor had knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as
to the falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in which the
other would be placed."297
The false light cause of action obviously bears a similarity to an action for defamation. The theoretic difference is that a false light
claim may be maintained even though there has been no harm to the
reputation, or where harm to reputation may not be presumed, and
there is no evidence of harm to reputation. In these cases, false light
may be used to recover for emotional distress and other non-reputa§ 652D cmt. a (1989).
292. See Kinsey v. Macur, 165 Cal. Rptr. 608, 611 (Ct. App. 1980) "Warren and Brandeis expressed the belief that it was mass exposure to the public gaze and not just
backyard gossip which provided the raison d'etre for the tort" Id,
293. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.45-56 (West 1985).
294. 1& at § 1798.1.
295. 1d at § 1798.45.
296. Id. at § 1798.53.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

297. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 652E

(1977).

tional damage.298 As a practical matter, however, there is little difference between the two torts, and there remains a question as to
whether false light is or should be an independently existing tort.2
Even if false light is an independent cause of action, California
courts have held that all of the defenses available in a defamation action (including statutory privileges) are available in a false light
case.3 00 Truth, of course, is an absolute defense. Moreover, the
Supreme Court of the United States has held that the constitutional
rules which govern defamation actions also govern false light actions. 30 ' False light is an insignificant tort which, as a general matter, may be ignored in considering actions for invasion of privacy.
4.

Misappropriation of Name or Picture

Although treated as a species of privacy, misappropriation of name
or picture is more naturally thought of as a species of unfair competition, conversion or restitution. The primary justification for the tort
is that there is economic value in each person's name or picture, and
use of that value by another without permission is wrongful. A secondary justification, entirely apart from the economics, is that each
person should have the right to control use of his picture or name.
The Restatement provision gives greater weight to the economic
rationale than the privacy rationale. According to Restatement (Sec298. The court in Selleck v. Globe International, Inc., 212 Cal. Rptr. 838 (Ct. App.
1985), described the difference between false light and libel as follows:
There is a distinction between causes of action for invasion of privacy and defamation with regard to the respective interests protected and compensated by
each. "The gist of a cause of action in a privacy case is not injury to the character or reputation but a direct wrong of a personal character resulting in injury to the feelings without regard to any effect which the publication may
have on the property, business, pecuniary interest, or the standing of the individual in the community. The right of privacy concerns one's own peace of
mind, while the right of freedom from defamation concerns primarily one's
reputation. The injury is mental and subjective."
Id. at 846-47 (citations omitted).
Although the court in Selleck articulated a possible difference between false light
and libel, on the specific facts presented, the court dismissed as surplusage a false light
claim because the plaintiff had also alleged a libel cause of action. Id. at 847.
299. See J. Clark Kelso, FalseLight Privacy: A Requiem, - Santa Clara L. Rev. (1992); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, False Light Invasion of Privacy: The Light that
Failed, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 364 (1989) (advocating rejection of the tort).
300. In a series of decisions, the California Supreme Court has extended virtually
all of the limitations placed upon a libel action to a false light claim. See Fellows v.
National Enquirer, Inc., 721 P.2d 97 (Cal. 1986) (analyzing CAL. CIVIL CODE § 48a
(1982), dealing with proof of damages, applicable to false light claims); Reader's Digest
Assoc. v. Superior Court, 690 P.2d 610 (Cal. 1984) (actual malice requirement applied
equally to defamation and false light); Kapellas v. Kofman, 459 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1969)
(dismissing as superfluous a claim for false light when complaint also contained libel
claim).
301. Time v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967); Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 419
U.S. 245 (1974).
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ond) of Torts section 652C, "One who appropriates to his own use or
benefit the name or likeness of another is subject to liability to the
30 2
other for invasion of his privacy."
California law appears to be largely in accord. In Eastwood v. Superior Court (National Enquirer,Inc.), 30 3 the court set forth the requirements for stating a cause of action: "(1) the defendant's use of
the plaintiff's identity; (2) the appropriation of plaintiff's name or
likeness to defendant's advantage, commercially or otherwise; (3)
lack of consent; and (4) resulting injury." 3o4
A cause of action is clearly stated when the defendant uses the
plaintiff's name or likeness in an advertisement in a manner that
suggests the plaintiff's endorsement. 30o A cause of action was also
stated in Stilson v. Reader's Digest Association, Inc.,30 6 when the defendant included the plaintiff's name without consent in a contest solicitation which stated that the recipient of the solicitation and the
plaintiff, among others, had been selected to receive "lucky
30 7
numbers."
Misappropriation can occur, however, even with use not directly
related to an advertisement or promotional activity, so long as the
use involves commercial exploitation. Thus, in Eastwood v. Superior
Court (National Enquirer,Inc.), 308 the court held that the National
Enquirer's use of Clint Eastwood's name, even in the context of a
story in the magazine, constituted a misappropriation. The court analyzed the facts as follows:
The first step toward selling a product or service is to attract the consumers'
attention. Because of a celebrity's audience appeal, people respond almost automatically to a celebrity's name or picture. Here, the Enquirer used Eastwood's personality and fame on the cover of the subject publication and in
related telecast advertisements. To the extent their use attracted the readers'
attention, the Enquirer gained a commercial advantage. Furthermore, the Enquirer used Eastwood's personality in the context of an alleged news account,
entitled 'Clint Eastwood in Love Triangle with Tanya Tucker' to generate
maximum curiosity and the necessary motivation to purchase the newspaper.
Moreover, the use of Eastwood's personality in the context of a news account, allegedly false but presented as true, provided the Enquirer with a
ready-made 'scoop' - a commercial advantage over its competitors which it
302.
303.
304.
305.
1955).
306.
307.
308.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C (1977).
198 Cal. Rptr. 342 (Ct. App. 1983).
Id, at 347.
Fairfield v. American Photocopy Equip. Co., 291 P.2d 194, 197 (Cal. Ct. App.
104 Cal. Rptr. 581 (Ct. App. 1972).
Id. at 582.
198 Cal. Rptr. 342 (Ct. App. 1983).

would otherwise not have. 3 0 9

In 1971, the California Legislature enacted section 3344 of the Civil
Code, which generally mirrors the common law rules. According to
section 3344(a)
[a]ny person who knowingly uses another's name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness, in any manner, on or in products, merchandise, or goods, or
for purposes of advertising or selling, or soliciting purchases of, products, merchandise, goods or services, without such person's prior consent, or, in the case
of a minor, the prior consent or his parent or legal guardian, shall be liable for
any damages sustained by the person or persons injured as a result thereof.3 1 0

As can be seen, this section is, like the common law, focused primarily on commercial exploitation. To deal with cases like Eastwood,
in which the use was not directly tied to advertising, section 3344(e)
provides as follows:
The use of a name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness in a commercial
medium shall not constitute a use for which consent is required under subdivision (a) solely because the material containing such use is commercially sponsored or contains paid advertising. Rather it shall be a question of fact
whether or not the use of the person's name, voice, signature, photograph, or
likeness was so directly connected with the commercial sponsorship or with
the paid advertising as to constitute a use for which consent is required under
311
subdivision (a).

The Supreme Court of California held in Lugosi v. Universal PictureS312 that the common law cause of action for appropriation does
not survive the death of the person whose name or figure was used.
In the court's view, this cause of action is personal and private in nature. This holding was subsequently overturned by Civil Code section 990, which recognized a cause of action for the appropriation of a
deceased personality's name, voice, signature, photograph or
likeness. 313
This was roughly the state of the common law's approach to privacy, as supplemented by certain statutes, when the privacy clause
was enacted. Courts did not attempt to define "privacy" itself.
Rather, particular aspects of privacy were identified as deserving protection: freedom from intrusion, freedom from the unwanted glare
of public notoriety, freedom from false statements about oneself, and
freedom from the unauthorized commercial use of one's name or features. These were the limited areas which the common law courts
traditionally protected, and in each area, the courts were careful to
create rules that balanced the privacy interest against legitimate, but
conflicting, interests.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.

Id. at 349.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(a) (West Supp. 1991).
Id. at § 3344(e).
603 P.2d 425 (Cal. 1979).
CAL. CIV. CODE § 990 (West Supp. 1991).
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B.

The ConstitutionalRight to Privacy Before the Privacy Clause

The common law and Civil Code sections discussed above protect a
person against invasions of privacy by other private actors (as well as
by state actors in cases arising under a state or federal tort claims
act). Limitations on state invasions of privacy (apart from tort claims
acts), prior to enactment of the privacy initiative, were found in
neither the state or federal constitutions. In declaring the existence
of such a right against government interference, courts pointed in the
federal Constitution to the Equal Protection Clause, the Due Process
Clause, the First Amendment, the Fourth Amendment, and the
Ninth Amendment, among other things. 314 California courts could
look to similar provisions contained in California's Declaration of
Rights. The broad outlines of the state and federal constitutional
right to privacy must of course be outlined to put the privacy clause
in its proper perspective.
1.

Federal Constitutional Right to Privacy

The general concept of a right to privacy is a topic that has drawn
the thoughtful attention of great thinkers from a wide spectrum of
disciplines. Treatment of the federal constitutional right to privacy
has been equally exhausting, including significant contributions by
virtually all of the most respected constitutional scholars. The quantity and quality of this output give reason for pause before attempting to enter the fray.
The task is made somewhat easier by the rather limited purpose
making this review necessary. The privacy clause needs to be put in
its proper context, and that context includes the broad, general contours of the federal right to privacy. There is no need, however, to
offer a reinterpretation of the federal right of privacy. 315 There is no
need to comment significantly upon the alleged illegitimacy of reliance upon an unenumerated right or the discovery in the Constitution of rights that were undoubtedly not contemplated by the
Framers.3 16 Instead, this review will be limited to the decisions of
314. See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390 (1923); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973); Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
315. See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONsTrrUTIONAL LAW § 15, at
1302-1435 (2d ed. 1978).
316. See, e.g., John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf A Comment on Roe v.
Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 928-29 (1973); Robert Bork, Neutral Principles and Some
First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 7-12 (1971).

the Supreme Court of the United States and its approach to the topic.
Although the following generalization substantially obliterates the
rich detail of the Supreme Court's privacy decisions, it is possible at a
very general level to discern three quite distinct periods in the
Supreme Court's development of a constitutional right to privacy.
The first period stretches from the 1920s until 1965, when Griswold
v. Connecticut was decided,3 17 and includes the following cases,
among many others: Pierce v. Society of Sisters,318 Meyer v. Nebraska,319 Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson,320 Princev. Massachusett,321 and NAACP v. Alabama.3 22 During this first period,
the Court, by fits and starts, protected an increasing number of what
might be characterized as "private" activities from government regulation. In this pre-Griswold era, the Court seemed only faintly aware
that it was creating a right to privacy.3 2 3 In these early cases, the
Court was usually careful to ground its decisions in one of the substantive constitutional protections contained in the Bill of Rights or
the Fourteenth Amendment, 324 and the Court's attention was focused primarily upon the "absorption" or "incorporation" into the
Fourteenth Amendment of the specific rights contained in the Bill of
Rights.325
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.

381 U.S. 479 (1965).
268 U.S. 510 (1925).
262 U.S. 390 (1923).
316 U.S. 535 (1942).
321 U.S. 158 (1944).
357 U.S. 449 (1958).
The pre-Griswold history of a constitutional right of privacy is well described

in William H. Beaney, The ConstitutionalRight to Privacy in the Supreme Court, 1962
SuP. Cr. REV. 212. After concluding that the Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to
date did not protect a right to privacy apart from "search and seizure," the author concluded his analysis with the following.
It has been suggested that the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, or the provisions of the First Amendment, might provide a basis for developing adequate protection of the right to privacy. But of
the various statements on the constitutional right to privacy contained in the
Court's opinions to date, one might say: And be these juggling fiends no more
believed, That palter with us in a double sense; That keep the word of promise to our ear, And break it to our hope.
1962 Sup. CT.REV. at 251.
324. See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (state statute interfered with Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390 (1923) (limitation on instruction in foreign languages violates Fourteenth
amendment); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (sterilization
of habitual criminals violated the Equal Protection Clause); Prince v. Massachusetts,
321 U.S. 158 (1944); NAACP v. State of Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958) (protecting
"freedom to associate and privacy in one's associations," noting that freedom of association is grounded in the First Amendment).
325. Justice Brennan succinctly describes this slow development in Brennan, Jr.,
supra note 13, at 768-70.
Justice Brandeis's dissent in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), is one of
the rare pre-Griswold opinions to speak broadly in terms of a constitutional right to
privacy. Brandeis defined the constitutional right to privacy as "the right to be let
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Griswold began the second phase and marked a significant change
in the Court's consciousness. The Court explicitly recognized in Griswold that there was no explicit textual support for the constitutional
privacy right which the Court declared existed, apart from the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments' declaration of "liberty" as a constitutionally protected interest. 326 Some members of the Court highlighted in Griswold the possibility that the Ninth Amendment would
authorize the judicial branch to find new constitutional rights in the
"great silences" of the Constitution. 327
By untethering the right of privacy from any specific provision in
the Bill of Rights or Fourteenth Amendment, the Court in Griswold
set the stage for the assertion of a wide variety of privacy interests.
The sweeping language contained in both Justice Douglas's opinion
for the Court and in Justice Goldberg's often-cited concurring opinion suggested the wide scope that could be given to the newly declared right. Justice Douglas spoke in terms of "penumbras, formed
by emanations" from the specific guarantees contained in the Bill of
Rights.328 Justice Goldberg maintained that the protections of the
Bill of Rights were not limited to the specific guarantees contained in
the first eight amendments, but, by virtue of the Ninth Amendment,
included the protection of other undeclared fundamental rights.329
There followed a series of cases expanding the scope of privacy rights
protected under the Constitution from state or federal
interference. 330
alone - the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men."
Id. at 478. The reference by Brandeis is aberrational, however, and is clearly attributable to Brandeis's own parentage of the common law cause of action for invasion of
privacy.
326. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485-86.
327. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 487-93 (Goldberg, J., concurring). Justice Goldberg recognized that his use of the Ninth Amendment was novel. I& at 490 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (noting that "this Court has had little occasion to interpret the Ninth
Amendment"). See also Norman Redlich, Are There "CertainRights * * * Retained by
the People?," 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 787 (1962); Knowlton H. Kelsey, The Ninth Amendment of the Federal Constitution,11 IND. L.J. 309 (1936) (the Ninth and Tenth Amendments reserve certain rights to the people, including the rights to personal security
and personal liberty).
328. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484.
329. Id. at 488-93. The Ninth Amendment provides that "[t]he enumeration in the
Constitution of certain rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."
330. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (state statute preventing racially
mixed marriages violates Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (electronic eavesdropping in a
public telephone booth violated privacy rights of petitioner); Stanley v. Georgia, 394

The very freedom which Griswold gave to the courts was also a primary source of criticism. A number of scholars questioned the constitutional legitimacy of decisions that were not grounded in any
particular substantive provision of the Constitution. They argued that
such decisions were a judicial power-grab contrary both to separation
of powers and federalism and reminiscent of the now discredited doctrine of substantive due process most often associated with the Lochner decision.331
The second phase of federal constitutional privacy law came to an
end with the watershed decision of Bowers v. Hardwick.332 In Bowers, the Court took cognizance of the criticisms of illegitimacy, 333 and
the Court in effect put a halt to the development of additional privacy interests by adopting a test that is virtually impossible to meet.
Subsequent to Bowers, the Court has not found any new privacy interests and has indicated a reluctance to give its prior privacy decisions a liberal interpretation. 334
U.S. 557 (1969) (First Amendment protects private possession of obscene material); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (constitutionally protected right to privacy protects distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973) (state criminal abortion laws violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment which protects right of privacy against state action); Carey v. Population
Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (state statute preventing distribution of contraceptives
to minors infringes on individual privacy interests). Scholars carefully reviewed, catalogued, and in many cases encouraged, these judicial developments. See LAURENCE H.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 15, at 1302-1435 (2d ed. 1988).

331. See, e.g., John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wof." A Comment on Roe v.
Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973); Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First
Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971).
332. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
333. The Court is most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it
deals with judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots
in the language or design of the Constitution. That this is so was painfully
demonstrated by the face-off between the Executive and the Court in the
1930's, which resulted in the repudiation of much of the substantive gloss that
the Court had placed on the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. There should be, therefore, great resistance to expand the substantive reach of those Clauses, particularly if it requires redefining the category of rights deemed to be fundamental. Otherwise, the Judiciary
necessarily takes to itself further authority to govern the country without express constitutional authority.
Bowers, 478 U.S. at 194-95. See also Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 121-22 (1989);
Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977); Carey, 431 U.S. at 544 (White, J.,
dissenting).
334. See, e.g., Hodgson v. Minnesota, 110 S. Ct. 2926 (1990) (upholding constitutionality of parental notification statute when a minor seeks an abortion because the statute contains a judicial bypass mechanism); Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990)
(distinguishing Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), to uphold state law criminalizing possession and viewing of child pornography); Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't
of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2852 (1990) (assuming but not deciding that decision to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment implicates constitutional liberty interest); Webster v. Reproductive Health Serv., 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (upholding state ban on use of
public employees and facilities for nontherapeutic abortions); Michael H. v. Gerald D.,
491 U.S. 110, 127-28 n.6 (1989) (rejecting claim that relationship between natural father
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Bowers achieved this about-face by changing the questions that the
Court would ask in privacy cases. Before Bowers, it was constitutionally acceptable to speak about a constitutional "right to privacy."
The issue was whether the particular right being asserted fell within
the boundaries of protected privacy interests. 335 The Court in Bowers
rejected this approach, however, indicating that it would no longer be
satisfied with a generalized allegation that privacy interests have
been invaded. According to the Court, there was not so much a single constitutional right to privacy in the abstract as there was a series
of independent, fundamental rights that roughly corresponded to the
Court's cases.336 This change in perspective makes it more difficult
to rely upon prior cases to establish new privacy interests, especially
in light of the Court's also newly-declared "resistance to expand the
337
substantive reach" of the relevant constitutional provisions.
The Court in Bowers also drew upon pre-Griswold cases to reestablish a relatively narrow test for determining whether the interest being asserted qualified as a fundamental liberty (as opposed to
privacy) interest. In order for an interest to qualify as a fundamental
liberty interest, deserving of the highest protection from government
and child born into a woman's existing marriage with another man constituted a constitutionally protected liberty interest); City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989)
(rejecting lower court's reliance on dicta in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483
(1965), in upholding municipal ordinance restricting admission to certain dance halls to
persons between the ages of 14 and 18); Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 601-03 (1987)
(employing rational basis scrutiny to uphold Federal Aid to Families with Dependent
Children provision generally requiring that eligibility for benefits be determined by
reference to total income of parents, brothers, and sisters living in the same home).
335. See, e.g., Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists,
476 U.S. 747, 772 (1986) (noting that "[o]ur cases long have recognized that the Constitution embodies a promise that a certain private sphere of individual liberty will be
kept largely beyond the reach of government"); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486 (noting that
we are dealing "with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights").
336. This new approach is most clearly seen in the Court's review of its prior cases.
Each case was narrowly described in terms of a particular interest being asserted
rather than in terms of a generalized interest in privacy. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190.
That this is what the majority was doing in Bowers is highlighted by the first paragraph of Justice Blackmun's dissent:
This case is no more about "a fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodthan Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S.
omy," as the Court purports to declare ....
557 (1969), was about a fundamental right to watch obscene movies, or Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), was about a fundamental right to place interstate bets from a telephone booth. Rather, this case is about "the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civiled men," namely,
"the right to be let alone." Olmatead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (Brandeis,
J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
Bowers, 478 U.S. at 199 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
337. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 195.

burdens, an interest must bd either: (1) "implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty; [or (2)] deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition."33 8 Needless to say, even if a generalized interest in privacy is
part of the concept of ordered liberty and part of our history, it is less
clear that all or even many of the specific interests that might be
classified as privacy interests are "implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty [or] deeply rooted in the Nation's history and tradtion."33 9
The analysis of the specific claim in Bowers indicates how the new
analytic structure can be used to uphold even significant governmental burdens on allegedly private conduct. The plaintiff in Bowers
filed a declaratory judgment action challenging a statute which made
sodomy a criminal offense subsequent to the plaintiff's arrest for
having engaged in repeated acts of homosexual sodomy. Although
the plaintiff asserted a constitutional right to privacy and, somewhat
more narrowly, a constitutional right to engage in consensual sexual
conduct in the privacy of one's own home, the Court saw the case as
involving a much narrower issue: a constitutional right to engage in
homosexual sodomy.
Having identified the narrow interest at stake-homosexual sodomy-the next issue was whether that interest was fundamental
under the Court's two-part test. Implicitly adopting the premise that
we presently live (and for some time have been living) within a system of "ordered liberty," the Court was quick to find that the interest being asserted was not fundamental because, among other things,
the "ancient roots" of the proscriptions against homosexual sodomy
included at one time or another criminal laws against such conduct in
all fifty states.3 40 Since a right to engage in homosexual sodomy was
not a fundamental right, the Court reviewed the criminal statute
under the rational basis test, and easily found a rational basis for the
statute in the state legislature and electorate's apparent belief that
homosexual sodomy is immoral and unacceptable. 341
Cases subsequent to Bowers confirm that the Court appears to have
adopted a new analytic approach to what previously might have been
right to privacy cases,3 4 2 although there is clearly some disagreement
on the Court about how much Bowers changed the law.343 For pur338. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191-92.
339. Id.

340. Id. at 192-94.
341. Id at 196.
342. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2851 n.7
(1990) "Although many state courts have held that a right to refuse treatment is encompassed by a generalized constitutional right of privacy, we have never so held. We
believe this issue is more properly analyzed in terms of a Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest." Id. See also Bowers, 478 U.S. at 194-95.
343. Justice Scalia has relied upon Bowers for the proposition that long-standing
historical practices by the states are almost per se constitutional, but Justice Scalia
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poses of this article, the most significant fact is that Bowers, decided
in 1988, marked a significant break with the analytic approach taken
by the Court in prior post-Griswold cases. Whether the privacy
clause, enacted in 1972, was intended to adopt any particular federal
approach (e.g., the Griswold approach) will be discussed below. 3"
2.

State Constitutional Right to Privacy

Even before the Supreme Court of the United States discovered
privacy in the Constitution in Griswold, courts in California had discovered in the California Declaration of Rights an implied right to
privacy. The first case to rely upon the Declaration of Rights in order to find a right to privacy was Melvin v. Reid,345 discussed above
in the context of the common law action for public disclosure of private facts. The court in Melvin was concerned that in the absence of
a constitutional or statutory provision, it somehow lacked power to
create a new cause of action for public disclosure of private facts.
The court was, "[i]n the absence of any provision of law, .. . loath to
conclude that the right of privacy as the foundation for an action in
tort, in the form known and recognized in other jurisdictions, exists
in California."346 The court resolved its difficulty by finding in the
happiness clause of article I, section 1, a right of privacy: "The right
to pursue and obtain happiness is guaranteed to all by the fundamental law of our state. This right by its very nature includes the right
to live free from the unwarranted attack of others upon one's liberty,
property, and reputation. '347 In subsequent cases, the constitutional
basis for the decision in Melvin was discarded, and the cause of action
in Melvin was ultimately absorbed into the common law.
More significant than Melvin was the Supreme Court of California's decision in People v. Belous,348 where the court anticipated the
decision in Roe v. Wade, finding that the constitutional right to privacy protected a woman's decision whether to bear children. 349 Exdoes not appear to have persuaded his colleagues. See Rutan v. Republican Party, 110
S. Ct. 2729, 2741 n.2 (1990); Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, (1990) (Scalia, J.,
plurality); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
344. See infra notes 447-90 and accompanying text.
345. 297 P. 91 (1931).
346. Id. at 97. The concern was illusory, of course, because state courts in California, like virtually all state courts in the United States, clearly have power to create any
cause of action necessary to secure justice. State courts, unlike federal courts, are
courts of general (rather than limited) jurisdiction.
347. Id.
348. 458 P.2d 194 (Cal. 1969).
349. Id at 199.

plicitly recognizing the legitimacy of a theory of unenumerated
rights, the court found that both the United States Constitution and
the California Constitution protected the woman's interest. 35o There
was no need in Belous to distinguish between a state and federal constitutional right to privacy; indeed, the court cited both federal and
state cases in support of its conclusion.
There was no indication in Belous (or any other state case) that the
state constitution's protection of the right of privacy was any greater
than that afforded by the federal constitutional right to privacy.
Thus, at the time the privacy clause was enacted, state constitutional
privacy law had not expanded beyond the federal protection.
3.

The Federal "State Action" Requirement

Because one of the most significant issues arising under the privacy
clause is whether the clause is intended to regulate anything other
than state action and because the privacy clause may have been
modeled upon the federal right of privacy, we must review federal
"state action" rules, which limit the application of the federal right of
privacy.
Although most of the important federal state action questions now
arise under the Fourteenth Amendment,351 it is clear that an implied
"governmental action" requirement predated passage of the Fourteenth Amendment and limited the types of claims that could be pursued under the Bill of Rights. Pre-Fourteenth Amendment cases
may be of particular interest here because, unlike cases arising under
the Fourteenth Amendment, these cases considered the question of
whether a governmental action requirement should be implied in a
constitutional provision which, as drafted, contained no such requirement-the precise issue that arises under the privacy clause.
a. Pre-FourteenthAmendment State Action
The first case to address a governmental or state action requirement in the Bill of Rights was Barron v. Baltimore.52 The plaintiff
in Barron owned a successful wharf in the City of Baltimore. Over
the course of several years, and as a result of the implementation of
several city ordinances, the water around the plaintiff's wharf became so shallow that the wharf lost all or nearly all of its commercial
value. The plaintiff sued the City of Baltimore in state court for
350. 1& at 200.
351. For example, Professor Tribe's exhaustive chapter on the state action requirement discusses only the Fourteenth Amendment's state action requirement and cites
no pre-Fourteenth Amendment cases. LAURENCE H.
TIONAL LAW §§ 18.1-18.7, at 1688-1721 (2d ed. 1988).

TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITU-

352. 32 U.S. 243 (1833). Justice Brennan discusses Barron in his article cited supra
note 13, at 764-65.
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damages. The trial court found in favor of the plaintiff in the sum of
$4,500. The court of appeals reversed and entered judgment in favor
of the defendants. The plaintiff then sought review in the Supreme
35 3
Court of the United States.
The dispositive issue in Barron was whether the Supreme Court
had jurisdiction under section 25 of the Judiciary Act, which generally limited the Court's appellate jurisdiction to federal questions.
The only federal question arguably present was whether the city's action violated the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Chief Justice Marshall recognized that the issue was "of great importance,"
but with customary confidence, he declared that it was "not of much
difficulty."354
Marshall began by recognizing the federal structure created by the
Constitution, noting that the federal Constitution "was ordained and
established by the people of the United States for themselves, for
their own government, and not for the government of the individual
states." 355 This proposition may be somewhat short of the truth, because article I, section 10, of the Constitution by its express terms put
specific limits upon the exercise of state power, as did the Supremacy
Clause. 356 The Constitution is thus not entirely oriented towards the
federal government. 35 7 Marshall's basic point is clear, however, and
not subject to substantial dispute. The United States Constitution
was written predominately with the motive of establishing only the
federal government; state governments had their own constitutions.
Since the Constitution was written with the predominate purpose
of granting power to the federal government, common sense suggested to Marshall that "the limitations on power, if expressed in
general terms, are naturally, and, we think, necessarily applicable to
353. Barron, 32 U.S. at 244.
354. 1& at 247.
355. Id,
356. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 & art. VI, § 2 (the "Supremacy Clause").
357. Marshall actually used article I, section 10, in his opinion, against the plaintiff.
Barron, 32 U.S. at 248. Marshall noted that section 10's restrictions on state power
were textual and explicit ("No state shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation" U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 (emphasis added)). The Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, by contrast, was written in only general terms, and did not explicitly
limit state power. U.S. CONST. amend. V. According to Marshall, "[h]ad the framers of
these amendments [the Bill of Rights] intended them to be limitations on the powers
of the state governments, they would have imitated the framers of the original constitution, and have expressed that intention.., in plain and intelligible language." Id. at
249.

the government created by the instrument." 358 Accordingly, since
the Takings Clause was a limitation "expressed [only] in general
terms," the Takings Clause (and, by implication, the rest of the Bill
359
of Rights) did not limit the exercise of state power.
Marshall appears to have believed that constitutions are generally
drafted with the primary purpose of organizing government and
structuring the relationship among governments and between government and the people, rather than with the purpose of protecting
private rights against private infringement. 60 Under this view, a Bill
of Rights is conceived more properly as limiting government power
over persons as opposed to creating personal rights, the deprivation
of which by a private person or by government could be the basis for
a judicial remedy.38l
Marshall was not alone in holding these beliefs, of course. The FederalistNo. 84 contains a useful discourse on bills of rights in the context of an argument against inclusion of a separate bill of rights in
the Constitution:
It has been several times truly remarked that bills of rights are, in their origin, stipulations between kings and their subjects, abridgments of prerogative
in favor of privilege, reservations of rights not surrendered to the prince.
Such was Magna Charta, obtained by the barons, sword in hand, from King
John. Such were the subsequent confirmations of that charter by succeeding
princes. Such was the Petition of Rights assented to by Charles I., in the beginning of his reign. Such, also, was the Declaration of Right presented by the
Lords and Commons to the Prince of Orange in 1688, and afterwards
thrown
362
into the form of an act of parliament called the Bill of Rights.

It was in light of this widespread historical understanding that Mar358. Id. at 247.
359. It follows from the Court's analysis that the Bill of Rights also did not restrict
purely private conduct. Marshall treated the Bill of Rights as containing only limitations on the power of the federal government, implying into the Bill of Rights a "federal action" requirement. See id. at 247-0.
360. This belief is most clearly seen in the following sentences:
Each state established a constitution for itself, and, in that constitution, provided such limitations and restrictions on the powers of its particular government as its judgment dictated. The people of the United States framed such a
government for the United States as they supposed best adapted to their situation and best calculated to promote their interests.
Id at 247. "In their several constitutions they [the states] have imposed such restrictions on their respective governments as their own wisdom suggested; such as they
deemed most proper for themselves." Id, at 247-48.
361. Accordingly, violation of a "right" guaranteed by the Bill of Rights does not
invariably give rise to a cause of action in damages absent a statute creating such a
remedy. See, e.g., Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983) (refusing to create nonstatutory
damages remedy for government employees whose First Amendment rights are violated by their superiors). But see Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (recognizing that the violation by a federal
officer of a person's Fourth Amendment rights gave rise to a federal cause of action for
damages).
362. THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 558 (Alexander Hamilton) (Modern Library ed.
1937).
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shall read the provisions of the Bill of Rights as merely limiting government power.
Having made this decision, it was a simple step for Marshall to conclude that the limitations in the Bill of Rights applied only to the
federal government and not to state governments. Article I, section
10, contained specific limitations on state power, and Marshall argued
that if the Bill of Rights was intended to restrict state power, it
363
would have contained an explicit provision like article I, section 10.
Marshall was also fortified in his conclusion by the federal structure of our national government. It was widely understood that the
state governments were primarily responsible for the health, safety
and welfare of their citizens, and that the federal government was
created by the people with only limited powers with respect to matters of national concern. The states then had the primary obligation
to provide a court system for the redress of private grievances, and
the federal judicial system was, at its inception, of exceedingly limited purpose and scope. 364 The application of the Bill of Rights to the
states would have marked a significant expansion of federal judicial
power. Marshall was understandably reluctant to expand federal ju365
dicial power in this way absent textual support in the Constitution.
b.

FourteenthAmendment State Action

With the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment, the federal
doctrine of state action was given a textual basis. The Fourteenth
Amendment by its own terms is a restriction upon only state action.3w6 The Court's first significant state action case confirmed the
limitations contained in the Fourteenth Amendment. In The Civil
363. Barton, 32 U.S. at 249.
364. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5-1 to 5-24 (2d ed.
1978).
365. Barron, 32 U.S. at 349.
366. The Fourteenth Amendment, section 1, provides as follows:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1 (emphasis added).
By contrast, the Thirteenth Amendment contains no language limiting its application to state action. The Thirteenth Amendment, section 1, provides as follows:
"Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof
the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any
place subject to their jurisdiction." U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.

Rights Cases,36 7 the Supreme Court held, over Justice Harlan's eloquent dissent, that the Fourteenth Amendment did not empower
Congress to enact legislation which had the effect of regulating
purely private racial discrimination.3 68
The Court's analysis proceeded on three fronts. First, relying upon
the text of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court concluded that its
scope, and Congress's power under Section 5, was limited to correcting only state action which denied equal protection. 369
Second, with a deep bow toward the principle of federalism, the
Court reasoned that the Fourteenth Amendment must not be interpreted to permit Congress to displace the states in the regulation of
purely private conduct. 370 According to the Court, statutes enacted
pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment
cannot properly cover the whole domain of rights appertaining to life, liberty
and property, defining them and providing for their vindication. That would
be to establish a code of municipal law regulative of all private rights between
man and man in society. It would be to make Congress take the place of the
37 1
State legislatures and to supersede them.

Such a result would contravene the Tenth Amendment, 37 2 and to the
Court, there was no indication that the Civil Rights Amendments
were intended to repeal either the Tenth Amendment or our federalist form of government, the Civil War notwithstanding. 37 3
Third, implicitly adopting Marshall's view that bills of rights in
constitutions are generally intended only to limit governmental action and thereby create only private immunities as opposed to enforceable rights, the Court drew a sharp distinction between the
denial by a state of civil rights and the impairment or interference of
civil rights by a private person. 374 According to the Court, "civil
rights, such as are guarantied [sic] by the Constitution against State
aggression, cannot be impaired by the wrongful acts of individuals,
367. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
368. 1d at 24-25. In so holding, the Court struck down section 1 of the Civil Rights
Act of 1875, 18 Stat. 335, which provided generally for equal racial access to public accomodations and businesses. It was not until the Civil Rights Act of 1964 that equal
access to public accomodations and businesses was guaranteed under federal law. The
Court upheld this aspect of the modern civil rights law pursuant to Congress's broad
commerce power, an analysis which made it unnecessary to overrule the state action
holding in The Civil Rights Cases. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States,
379 U.S. 241 (1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
369. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 10-12.
370. Id at 13-14.
371. Id. at 13.
372. Id at 15.
373. The extent to which the drafters of the Civil War Amendments and related
statutes intended to alter the balance between federal and state sovereigns remains a
lively topic of debate on the Court. See, e.g., Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409
(1968); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491
U.S. 164 (1989) (reaffirming Runyon).
374. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 17.
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unsupported by State authority in the shape of laws, customs, or judi375
cial or executive proceedings."
The Civil Rights Cases established that state action was required
under the Fourteenth Amendment. The definition of state action developed slowly over the years. The leading modern case setting forth
376
the federal state action doctrine is Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.
The federal state action doctrine is easily stated, even if not easily applied. In general, there is "state action" whenever a constitutional
deprivation is "fairly attributable to the State." 377 The Court presently employs a two-part test in determining whether a particular
deprivation is "fairly attributable to the State":
First, the deprivation must be caused by the exercise of some right or privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the State or by a
person for whom the State is responsible ....
Second, the party charged with
378
the deprivation must be a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor.

The first part of the test is apparently satisfied whenever the deprivation is caused by a public official acting within the scope of employment. 379 The first part is also satisfied when the deprivation is
caused by a private person (or public official acting outside the scope
of employment) if that private person is exercising a right or privilege granted by the state. For example, state statutes often give private persons the right to obtain prejudgment attachments in private
civil litigation. 38 0 In such cases, the private person is exercising
power granted by state law, and there is thus a nexus between what
the state clearly has done and what the private person has done
(namely, the state has created a power to cause a deprivation and
38
vested it in the private person). l
The second part of the test is less clearly defined. It is clear that
375. Id. at 17. The remainder of the analysis is as follows:
The wrongful act of an individual, unsupported by any such authority, is simply a private wrong, or a crime of that individual; an invasion of the rights of
the injured party, it is true, whether they affect his person, his property, or
his reputation; but if not sanctioned in some way by the state, or not done
under state authority, his rights remain in full force, and may presumably be
vindicated by resort to the laws of the state for redress.
Id The last clause of this quote naturally raises the issue of whether the failure of
the state to provide redress would be unconstitutional state action.
376. 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
377. Id. at 937.
378. Id
379. See, e.g., Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172 (1961).
380. See, e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
381. Cf Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972) (holding that there was no
nexus between private discrimination and a state liquor board which regulated liquor
practices of a private person).

when a private party does nothing more than invoke procedures created by a presumptively valid state statute, that private party's conduct is not fairly attributable to the State, even if the private party
misuses the state procedures. Thus, for example, the private party in
Flagg Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks382 who invoked the self-help procedures under New York's warehouseman lien law (U.C.C. § 7-210),
was not a "state actor."3 8 3 In order for a private person to be a state
actor, there must be "something more." The "something more" varies with the facts of the case. The Court has held that a private person is a state actor if the private person is engaging in a pervasively
"public function," or is acting under "state compulsion," or is engaged
in "joint action" with a state official, or when the private person's
conduct has a sufficiently close "nexus" to the state.3 8 4
In Lugar, the Court found state action when the private party invoked a prejudgment attachment procedure pursuant to which state
officials, without holding a hearing, seized disputed property identified by the private party.38 5 The statutorily required participation of
state officials in the seizure was sufficient to make the private party a
38
state actor. 6
Based on the reasoning in Lugar, a state actor might include a private person who files a lawsuit and then secures the participation of
state officials in prosecuting that suit (e.g., by accepting the complaint
for filing, issuing summons, and so forth). The Court held in Dennis
v. Sparks,38 7 however, that merely filing and being on the winning
side of a lawsuit does not make a private person a state actor, and the
Court specifically limited Lugar to cases involving prejudgment
attachments.388
A critical difference between Dennis and Lugar relates to the reasons why the person who files the suit wins (or loses, as the case may
be). If the plaintiff wins because the rule of decision applied by the
court violates the Constitution, then there clearly is state action in
the court's own application of the rule to the facts. Thus, for example, state action existed in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan389 because of the state court's application of a common law rule which
382. 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
383. Id. at 165-66.
384. Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
385. Id, at 941-42.
386. I
387. 449 U.S. 24 (1980).
388. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 939 n.21. It appears likely that the Court would extend
Lugar to encompass the invocation by a private litigant of post-judgment procedures
(i.e., a supersedeas bond requirement and lien provisions) designed to secure a judgment pending appeal. See Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 19 (1987) (Brennan,
J., concurring); id at 27 (Blackmun, J., concurring); id at 30 n.1 (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
389. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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permitted the recovery of compensatory and punitive damages in
favor of a public figure without requiring a showing of "actual malice" in the publication of the defamatory material. 390 Similarly, state
action existed in Shelley v. Kraemer 391 because of the state court's
392
decision to enforce a racially restrictive covenant.
If, on the other hand, the plaintiff wins because of the application
of constitutionally permissible rules of law to the facts, then the
existence of what might otherwise be private, impermissible motives
in filing the action do not transform the private actor into a state actor. Thus, for example, a property owner who discriminates on the
basis of race by excluding minorities is ordinarily not a state actor,
despite the existence of a motive which, if held by the state in man393
aging its own property, would be constitutionally impermissible.
The applicable common law rules make the motive of the property
owner irrelevant when determining whether there has been a
394
trespass.
If the Constitution required the property owner's motive be considered in the law of trespass, then there could be a constitutional violation by a state actor if a court (the state actor) granted relief to the
property owner either through damages or by injunction. The critical issue then becomes a substantive one: whether the Constitution's
substantive protections require the law of trespass to include an examination of the motive of the property owner and to deny relief if
the property owner is motivated by racial bias. 39 5 In this way, the
state action analysis becomes inextricably intertwined with the substantive constitutional protection being asserted. 396 A sufficiently
390. Id at 284-86.
391. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
392. Id. at 14-18.
393. It was therefore necessary to invoke the Commerce Clause in support of provisions in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 that proscribed private discrimination in accomodations and public businesses. Cf. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S.
715 (1961) (the existence of a symbiotic relationship between a private actor and the
state was sufficient to make that private actor a state actor). The Thirteenth Amendment, unlike the Fourteenth Amendment, does not require state action, and statutes
based in part upon the Thirteenth Amendment may also reach purely private conduct.
See, e.g., Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
394. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 158 (1965) (setting forth elements
of the cause of action for trespass to land).
395. Cf. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (refusing to enforce racially restrictive covenants); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967) (striking down California's
Proposition 14, which amended the California Constitution to permit private property
owners to dispose of their property in any manner they choose).
396. This is one of the central contributions of Professor Tribe's discussion of state
action in Chapter 18 of his treatise. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITU-

broad substantive constitutional principle may convert what seems to
be a situation involving private action into a situation involving state
397
action.
If this analysis is taken one step further, when a state court applying the common law fails to provide a cause of action for the interference with a private right by a purely private actor, the refusal may
be state action, subject to constitutional attack. In order for this refusal to be constitutionally impermissible, we would need to find a
rule of constitutional law that imposes upon the state the obligation
to provide a remedy for the deprivation of a private right by a private
actor. The key question then is as follows: Does a state have a constitutional obligation to provide a remedy for every infringement of
private rights? To the extent to which the Bill of Rights and the
Fourteenth Amendment are interpreted, as they were in the Civil
Rights Cases,398 as creating only immunities from government-created burdens, the answer to this question is a resounding "no." 399
The burden in these cases is created originally by a private actor; the
state is directly responsible only for failing to ease the burden after
the fact, and that creates constitutional questions dramatically different from whether the state may itself impose the burden.400 There
§ 18-6, at 1715 (2d ed. 1978) (stating that "[t]he approach to state action
advocated in this chapter provides no sudden solution to... problem[s] of substantive
constitutional law; its mission is simply to reveal how the search for state action, properly conducted, ends by identifying the precise substantive constitutional issue to be
addressed").
397. This blend of substance and state action may be the basis for the Court's recent holding in Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991), which forbids private counsel in private litigation from using race as the basis of peremptory
challenges in jury selection. In many cases, the only government participation in jury
selection at the voir dire stage is that the state has created a system in which peremptory challenges exist. The mere existence of the peremptory challenge system would
not seem to violate the Fourteenth Amendment, however. If there is a constitutional
violation, it is because the private litigant is motivated by race in the exercise of peremptory challenges. But in what way is this private decision different from a private
landowner filing a trespass action solely on account of race? The answer may be that
the Fourteenth Amendment requires, as a matter of substantive law, a peremptory
challenge system to take into account the motivation of counsel.
398. 109 U.S. 3 (1983).
399. Cf. Golden State Transit Corp. v. Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 113 (1989) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (arguing that a city's improper interference with a labor dispute
did not give rise to a cause of action for damages because the interference was improper only by virtue of the Supremacy Clause, which focuses on federalism, not private rights, the violation of which are remediable by money damages). See generally
Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some FundamentalLegal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 55-58 (1913).
400. See, e.g., Zinermon v. Burch, 110 S. Ct. 975 (1990); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S.
327 (1986); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527
(1981).
The state is partially or indirectly responsible for the burden because, by failing to
recognize a cause of action, the state has made it much more likely that the burden
would be imposed. Ordinarily, however, this sort of indirect burden is insufficient to
constitute state action; but cf Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
TIONAL LAw
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may be, after all, sufficiently important state interests to justify lim0
iting the state's responsibility for easing the burden.4 1
If, on the other hand, a declaration of rights is interpreted to guarantee to each individual the full measure of the interests identified
(i.e., to guarantee a "right"), then the State's failure to provide a
meaningful remedy for the deprivation of that right by a private actor would undoubtedly be unconstitutional state action. The state
must either compensate the injured victim from the state's own coffers or, at a minimum, permit the injured victim access to the courts
40 2
in order to file a damages action against the private actor.
The issue then is whether the Constitution requires that the state
provide a remedy for every injury. To date, the Supreme Court has
not extended the protections of the Bill of Rights or the Fourteenth
Amendment that far, although the Court has carefully avoided addressing the precise question whenever it has been raised. The Court
flirted with this issue most recently in Duke Power Co. v. Carolina
Environmental Study Group, Inc.4 03 The issue in Duke Power was
whether Congress could limit the tort liability of nuclear power producers to an arbitrary ceiling in the event a nuclear power accident
caused injuries.40 4 Challenges to the Act were brought under the
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. The critical aspect of the
court's decision was holding that the Act was merely an economic
regulation, requiring only rational basis scrutiny.405 The Act was
economic regulation, according to the Court, because Congress had
balanced the public interest in the development of new energy
sources against the public interest in compensation for injuries resulting from a nuclear catastrophe-a balancing which involved "a
legislative effort to structure and accommodate 'the burdens and benefits of economic life.' 406
401. For example, the legislatively perceived insurance crisis was in many jurisdictions a sufficient reason for limiting the availability of certain common law rights and
remedies for personal injuries. See, e.g., Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 695 P.2d
665 (Cal. 1985) (upholding $250,000 cap on noneconomic damages in medical malpractice cases); Beatty v. Akron City Hosp., 424 N.E.2d 586 (Ohio 1981) (upholding constitutionality of statute requiring medical review board proceeding prior to tort action in
medical malpractice cases); Eastin v. Broomfield, 570 P.2d 744 (Ariz. 1977) (same); Everett v. Goldman, 359 So. 2d 1256 (La. 1978).
402. See, e.g., Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 835 (N.H. 1980) (striking down tort reform measure which limited recovery of noneconomic damages to $250,000).
403. 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
404. Id at 62 (challenging the Price-Anderson Act which imposed a liability ceiling
of $560 million).
405. Id. at 83-84.
406. Id. at 83 (quoting Usury v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15 (1976)).

It seems clear that the public interest in the development of nuclear energy is primarily an economic and social concern. It is less
clear, however, that the entitlement to a remedy for injuries is only a
matter of economics. Our common law heritage is in some instances
so strong that failure to follow common law practices amounts in effect to the denial of a fundamental right, a denial which might trigger strict scrutiny. The Seventh Amendment explicitly adopts the
common law rule that requires trial by juries in suits at common law,
and the Court has respected that explicit reference. 40 7 In addition,
the Court has elevated common law practice to constitutional stature
even in the absence of a textual reference. For example, in the First
Amendment context, the Court has required criminal trials (and procedures akin to criminal trials) to be open to the press and public because such trials have historically been open to the public.4o8

The

law of defamation has of course been partially constitutionalized by
the Court in its series of decisions beginning with New York Times
09
Co. v. Sullivan.4
Nevertheless, recognizing that the common law itself changes, the
Court has several times indicated broadly that common law rights
are generally not fundamental rights and are subject to legislative
modification.41 0 It follows then that if a legislature has a legitimate
basis for its decision, it may abolish particular common law causes of
action or refuse to recognize the assertion of new causes of action. 411
In Duke Power, the Court easily found a legitimate basis for the liability limitation in Congress's dual concern for promoting nuclear
power and insuring the existence of a federal fund for compensation
412
of possible victims.
407. See, e.g., Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 417-18 (1987).
408. See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1 (1986); Globe Newspaper
Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448
U.S. 555 (1980).

409. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
410. Our cases have clearly established that "[a] person has no property, no
vested interest, in any rule of the common law." Second Employers' Liability
Cases, 223 U.S. 1, 50 (1912) (quoting Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134 (1877)).
The "Constitution does not forbid the creation of new rights, or the abolition
of old ones recognized by the common law, to attain a permissible legislative
object," Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117, 122 (1928), despite the fact that "otherwise settled expectations" may be upset thereby. Usery v. Turner Elkhorn
Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 16 (1976).
Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 88 n.32.
411. The Court in Duke Power never ruled whether a legislature could abolish an
existing cause of action without providing a reasonable substitute for the cause of action - a quid pro quo - because the Court found that the Price-Anderson Act's federal guarantee of a substantial fund for compensation was itself a benefit to potential
plaintiffs. Id., 438 U.S. at 88-92. The Court had previously used the quid pro quo rationale to uphold workers' compensation schemes which limited the amount which an
injured claimant could recover. See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932); New York
Central R.R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 201 (1917).
412. Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 84-87.
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It is appropriate at this point to make a few general observations
about federal state action jurisprudence. The Supreme Court has
generally interpreted the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment as creating only private immunities against unconstitutional
state action and not as creating private causes of action against private actors. 413 The two most important factors leading to this interpretation are: (1) recognition of our federal system of government in
which states are primarily entrusted with the responsibility of protecting private rights against private harms; and (2) a belief that bills
of rights contained in constitutions are generally intended only to act
as limitations upon the power of the government created by the Constitution. The final observation is that the existence of state action in
a particular case depends in part upon the substance of the constitutional right being asserted. A sufficiently expansive constitutional
right can convert what is private action in one context into state action in another context. The substantive constitutional right being
asserted cannot be ignored in the state action analysis.
4.

A Proposed State "State Action" Requirement

Article I of the California Constitution is the California Declaration of Rights - our version of the Bill of Rights. It now includes,
among other things, an equal protection clause,414 a due process
clause,415 a search and seizure clause,416 a cruel and unusual punishment clause, 417 a free speech provision,4 18 and a religious liberty
4 19
provision.
None of these basic provisions declaring fundamental rights indicate on their face that they are limited to situations involving state
burdens on the declared rights. For example, prior to the privacy initiative, section 1 provided that:
[a]ll men are by nature free and independent, and have certain inalienable
rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty; acquiring, possessing, and protecting property; and pursuing and obtaining
safety and happiness. 4 2 0

Section 1 contains no reference to a state action requirement. Thus,
413. Congress created a cause of action for damages in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
414. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.
415. Ld.
416. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 13.
417. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 17.
418. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2.
419. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 4.
420. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1.

the section may be read as declaring rights (as well as recognizing
other rights contained in the Declaration of Rights) that are enforceable against both private and public actors. Under this approach, for
example, the law of trespass might be viewed as based upon the article I, section 1, right to possess and protect property. The laws of
false imprisonment and battery might find their source in the rights
of liberty and safety. Section 2, which provides that "[e]very person
may freely speak, write and publish his or her sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of this right,"421 might be interpreted as creating a cause of action when one private individual
interferes with another's right to freely speak or publish. Section 7
provides that "[a] person may not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law or denied equal protection of the
laws." 422 It could be interpreted to create causes of action similar to
conversion, battery, wrongful death, false imprisonment, discrimination, and so on. Section 13 guarantees "[t]he right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable seizures and searches." 423 This section might be interpreted to
424
create a cause of action against private snooping.
The Supreme Court of California has in only a few cases addressed
itself to the question of whether the Declaration of Rights contains
an implied state action requirement or should create a cause of action
against a purely private actor. In those cases, the court has held that
the provision at issue restricts only state action despite the absence of
any explicit limitation in the Declaration of Rights.425 In one important free speech case, the court did not discuss the issue explicitly,
but by its emphasis suggested that the state free speech clause would
be invoked only if the defendant had, in effect, taken on public or
quasi-public responsibilities. 426
a. A Theory Respecting a "StateAction" Requirement in
California'sDeclarationof Rights
Before discussing the few cases that have addressed this question, a
fundamental point needs to be made. Because the California Constitution exists independently of the United States Constitution, it is
possible for the Declaration of Rights in the California Constitution
to contain a state action requirement that is different from the federal state action requirement. The choice between adopting the fed421. CAL. CONST. art I, § 2(a).
422. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7(a).
423. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 13.
424. See, e.g., Note, Rediscovering California'sDeclarationof Rights, 26 HASTINGS
L.J. 481 (1974).
425. See infra notes 437-53 and accompanying text.
426. See infra notes 447-53 and accompanying text.
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eral version of state action and no state action requirement at all is a
false dichotomy. California courts may create their own version of a
state action requirement, and, as will be seen below, the California
Supreme Court has done so in at least one instance.
Assuming that there should be any state action requirement under
a state constitution, there are good reasons to believe that such a requirement should be satisfied more easily than the federal state action requirement. As discussed above, the federal state action
requirement has been interpreted with a keen eye upon federalism
issues. As a general matter, the federal courts have been unwilling
to apply the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment against
the states except in those cases where the state may fairly be held
42 7
responsible for the burden on private interests.
Federalism concerns are absent in the context of a state constitution. Further, because states remain primarily responsible for promoting the health, safety and welfare of their citizens,42 8 it would not
be surprising if a state were to adopt a slightly broader definition of
state action providing a slightly greater degree of protection to its
citizens.
This reasoning can be carried to the extreme of abolishing any requirement of state or public action under a state constitution's declaration of rights. Yet there may be convincing reasons why a
constitution, whether state or federal, generally should not be interpreted as regulating purely private conduct.
In the first place, as a matter of American tradition, state constitutions are generally designed to limit the power of state government.429 The focus of most state constitutions is upon the structure
of state government and the relation of state government to the people. It would thus be natural to expect that a declaration of rights
contained in a state constitution pertains primarily to restrictions
43°
upon what the state may do to its citizens.
In the second place, we must remember "it is a constitution we are
interpreting." Constitutions are not drafted at the same level of detail as statutes or as judicial opinions, and caution should therefore
427. See supra notes 366-412 and accompanying text.
428. U.S. CONST. amends. IX & X.
429. See supra notes 351-52 and accompanying text where the same argument was
used to interpret the Bill of Rights as containing an implied federal action
requirement.

430. See the discussion of Barron v. Baltimore, supra, notes 352-365 and accompanying text.

be exercised in interpreting the sometimes broad generalizations contained in a constitutional declaration of rights to create privately enl
forceable rights.43
That caution should be at its zenith when a court interprets a constitutional provision as limiting not only governmental or public action, but also purely private conduct. When government limits itself
in favor of an individual's liberties, the burden of the limitation lies
primarily upon the government itself and not upon other members of
society. There is some burden on some members of society whenever
government accommodates private interests, but the burden is indirect, usually insubstantial, somewhat speculative, and is spread
throughout society.
The situation is quite different when one private person asserts a
right to recover damages from another private person or to enjoin another private person's conduct. In that sort of case, it is much more
likely that every assertion of individual rights by one private person
will directly and substantially conflict with another private person's
assertion of their own individual rights. The balancing of private interests in these cases can be more problematic than balancing private
interests against governmental interests. The harm caused by an error in the balancing process here is concentrated upon the affected
private person rather than being spread across society.
The common law system recognizes the difficulties inherent in balancing competing private interests by giving courts freedom to decide
cases upon their particular facts and to create relatively well-focused
rules that apply to particular fact situations (and do not necessarily
apply to slightly different fact situations). The same may be said
about statutes, which are typically drafted to solve a relatively specific problem. In either case whether making common law or interpreting a statute, a wrong decision is correctable by the more
democratic branches of government.
The broad provisions of a constitution, by contrast, do not give
courts the same concrete and specific guidance provided by either the
common law or statutes. The risk is accordingly greater that a court,
even the highest court in the jurisdiction, will incorrectly resolve the
balance between conflicting private interests. Since a high court's error in these cases would involve interpretation of the constitution,
the error could be corrected only in the unlikely event of a constitutional amendment or subsequent overruling by the same court. Our
constitutional jurisprudence is dotted with such catastrophic er431. This caution explains the reluctance of many courts to interpret state or federal constitutional provisions as being self-executing in the absence of implementing
statutes. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1 (1986); Bivens
v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).

[Vol. 19: 327, 1992]

California'sRight to Privacy
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

rors,432 the risk of which counsels caution.
In the third place, common law and civil law primarily regulate
private conduct, as opposed to public or governmental conduct. Indeed, until the widespread passage of tort claims acts and the abolition of governmental immunities, the common law was virtually
powerless to limit state action. It was most appropriate then for one
to look to the constitution to place limits upon the exercise of state
power.
Given that private conduct is already regulated by common law or
statute, one may fairly ask: Why should private conduct also be regulated and controlled by general constitutional provisions? Are statutes and the common law inadequate to protect private rights from
infringement by private actors? If the courts deem a particular right
sufficiently important, and there is no statutory remedy (as rights
which would be included in a declaration of rights would undoubtedly be), they can create a common law remedy against a private actor who burdens or infringes that right. If a state legislature
subsequently attempts to limit the availability of such a remedy by
enacting a statute, the passage of the statute will itself constitute
state action which is then subject to judicial review. It is thus completely unnecessary for a state court to find a constitutional basis for
the protection of private interests against invasion by private conduct. The common law and statutes are always sufficient if a state
court has the desire and will to protect private rights from private
infringement.
Assuming the validity of this last statement, one may wonder what
motivates state courts to look to a state constitution for the protection of private interests from private conduct. Two reasons, apart
433
from simple analytic confusion and sloppy thinking, stand out.
First, judges not serving on the highest court of the state may properly feel constitutionally bound to apply the common law as declared
in prior decisions from the highest court despite dissatisfaction with
the results (and even judges on the high court may feel constrained
by the principle of stare decisis to adhere to previous declarations of
common law). Faced with common law or statutory rules that reach
what are perceived to be unjust results, these judges feel pressured to
432. See, e.g., Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393
Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537
198 U.S. 45 (1905).
433. Melvin v. Reid, 297 P. 91 (Cal. 1931) (serves as
thinking); see also supra notes 344-46 and accompanying

(1856); The Slaughter-House
(1896); Lochner v. New York,
an example of such confused
text.

look elsewhere to support their judgments. 434 The broad declarations
of rights found in a state constitution are a potential gold-mine of
support.
This is an illegitimate and inappropriate response to what may
truly be outdated or unfair statutes or rules of common law. A statute which burdens rights found in the declaration of rights may be
struck down. A common law rule which is unfair or outdated should
be changed appropriately. One of the alleged strengths of the common law system is its supposed ability to adapt to changing conditions
in society. 43 5 For the common law system to retain its vitality, courts
should resist the temptation to ignore the common law system in
favor of what seems to be an easy route to a desired result.
Courts may also turn to the constitution from a distrust of the
other branches of government. By placing rights on a constitutional
footing, courts can largely insulate their judgments from attack by
the legislative or executive branches. The difficulty with this motivation is that it runs counter to separation of powers principles and
claims a degree of competence and perfection that courts may not
have. Courts do not have an inside track to truth and justice. Particularly when the issues involve a delicate balancing of public policies
and private interests, courts, somewhat insulated from the democratic process and the voters, are in a comparatively poor position to
make a proper accommodation of interests. In fact, courts often defer to legislative judgment on matters of public policy 43 6 and are reluctant to reach constitutional issues except when absolutely
required to do so. The crisis of legitimacy and risk of error were important reasons why the Supreme Court reassessed its privacy juris43 7
prudence in Bowers.
The above analysis suggests that courts should interpret a declaration of rights in a state constitution as requiring some form of state
or public action to trigger its protections. The degree of state action
required can be less than that required under the federal Constitution since federalism issues do not cloud a state court's interpretation
of a state constitution. Conceivably, the requirement could be
stricter than the federal state action requirement because a state
court can always protect private rights through development of the
common law. The few decisions by the California Supreme Court
concerning state action under the California Declaration of Rights
434. See Kennedy, supra note 248.
435. See supra note 77.
436. See, e.g., Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 401 (Cal. 1988) (indicating that the issue of providing tort-like remedies for wrongful termination was more
properly a subject for legislative resolution).
437. See supra notes 331-43 and accompanying text.
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suggest that the court has adopted an approach slightly more liberal
than federal state action requirements.
b.

Cases Involving "StateAction" Under the California
Declarationof Rights

In Kruger v. Wells Fargo Bank,438 a bank customer brought suit
against her bank for deducting from her checking account an amount
that was owing on her credit card (which was held by the same
bank).439 The complaint alleged violations of the federal and state
due process clauses. The California Supreme Court held that the
bank was a private actor for purposes of the federal constitution, and
that the Due Process Clause therefore did not apply.440
The court separately addressed the question whether the state due
process clause contained a state action requirement. An amicus brief
pointed out to the court that the state due process clause, unlike the
Fourteenth Amendment, did not explicitly require state action. 44 x
However, the court rejected this argument. First, it noted that the
state due process clause, initially adopted in 1849, tracked the language found in the Fifth Amendment. The Supreme Court of the
United States had already held in Barron v. Baltimore44 2 that the
Fifth Amendment was a limitation only upon action by the federal
government. 44 3 The California court reasoned that the Supreme
Court's earlier interpretation of the Fifth Amendment, limiting its
scope to federal governmental conduct, undercut any argument that
the court should interpret the state due process right, which was
based on the Fifth Amendment, to limit purely private conduct. 4 "
The court's analysis in Kruger is only partly complete. The
438. 521 P.2d 441 (Cal. 1974).
439. Id. at 443.
440. Id. at 442. The court later adopted its Kruger analysis of state action in a case
arising under the privacy clause. In Schmidt v. Superior Court, 769 P.2d 932 (Cal.
1989), the plaintiff claimed that a private mobile home park rule which limited residence in the park to persons 25 years or older violated, among other things, the privacy clause. Citing Kruger,the court first noted that no state action was present, since
the private rule was authorized, but not compelled, by a state statute regulating mobile
home parks. Id. at 943-44. The court's state action discussion in Schmidt is properly
treated as dicta, though it appears to have been well-considered dicta since the court
held that even if the privacy clause applied, there would be no violation. Id. at 944 n.14.
The court expressly declined to consider under what circumstances the privacy clause
might apply to private conduct. Id.
441. Id. at 366.
442. 32 U.S. 243 (1833).
443. Id.
444. Kruger,521 P.2d at 449-50.

Supreme Court in Barron interpreted a state due process clause in
the context of a federal constitution that clearly intended to preserve
a large measure of sovereign control by individual states.445 The
principles of federalism that inspired the Court in Barron are absent
in the context of a state constitution, and were absent in Kruger.
The only rationale from Barron applicable to analysis of a state constitution is Justice Marshall's argument that limitations on power
contained in a constitution should be interpreted only as a limit upon
the power of the government created by that particular constitution
unless a contrary intent is made clear and explicit.4 46 The California
Supreme Court in Kruger apparently adopted this rationale, concluding that "[t]o construe article 1, section 13, to apply to private action
would involve a judicial innovation which, as of this date, is without
447
precedent."
The Supreme Court of California next examined a state action
4 48
problem in Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center.
The issue in
Pruneyardwas whether the owner of a private shopping center could
constitutionally prohibit persons from engaging in expressive activity
on the premises unrelated to the commercial purposes of the shopping center. The plaintiffs in Pruneyard were high school students
who wanted to solicit support and signatures for a petition protesting
a United Nations resolution against Zionism. 449
In Lloyd v. Tanner,450 the Supreme Court of the United States
held that the decision by the owner of a private shopping center to
exclude persons engaging in speech activities unrelated to the business purpose of the shopping center did not constitute state action
sufficient to trigger the protections of the First Amendment.45x If
445. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
446. See supra notes 351-62 and accompanying text.
447. Kruger, 521 P.2d at 450 (subsequently followed by the court in Garfinkle v. Superior Court, 578 P.2d 925, 933-34 (Cal. 1978)).
The court might also have reasoned in Kruger that by adopting the precise language
of the federal Due Process Clause, the drafters of the state constitution intended to
incorporate into the constitution all of the limitations which had been judicially declared to exist with respect to the federal Due Process Clause. However, Barron
clearly interpreted the federal Due Process Clause in light of other provisions in the
federal Constitution that find no counterpart in the state Constitution. It is thus problematic to assert that the drafters of the state constitution intended to incorporate in
the state due process clause limitations that arose out of other provisions in the federal
Constitution.
448. 592 P.2d 341 (Cal. 1979).
449. Id. at 342.
450. 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
451. Id. at 570. The Court had previously indicated in Amalgamated Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308 (1968), that the Constitution required
the owner of a private shopping center to permit the picketing of a business within the
shopping center. Although Lloyd did not explicitly overrule Logan Valley, in Hudgens
v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 518 (1976), the Court acknowledged that Lloyd had actually
overruled Logan Valley.
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the state constitution's free speech clause contained a state action requirement identical to the federal state action requirement, then the
plaintiffs in Pruneyard should have been denied relief pursuant to

Lloyd.
In Pruneyard,the court granted relief, however, clearly indicating
that the free speech clause of the California Constitution is not limited by a state action requirement identical to the federal state action
requirement. Unfortunately, the court in Pruneyard did not explicitly discuss the issue of whether there existed a state action requirement under the free speech clause. Thus, the court in Pruneyard
does not resolve whether the free speech clause applies to all private
conduct which burdens speech or only to private conduct imbued
with public elements sufficient to trigger the protections of the Declaration of Rights. However, there are some strong hints in the
court's analysis.
In reaching its conclusion, the court in Pruneyardemphasized; as it
had in prior cases, the "public character" of the property at issue, explicitly drawing an analogy between shopping centers and public
streets, parks, and even entire downtowns.452 This suggests that the
court recognized the necessity for some form of public or state action
before the court would invoke the free speech clause. Subsequent
cases have recognized that the Pruneyard rule applies only where
private actors have taken on some of the characteristics of a public or
state actor by ownership and operation of premises that share the at45 3
tributes of a park, city street, or public business district.
The only other opinion to address the state action issue is People v.
Zelinski,454 a search and seizure case. The defendant was observed
shoplifting in Zody's Department Store by Zody's privately-employed
security personnel. Immediately after the defendant left the store,
the security guards placed the defendant under arrest pursuant to
Penal Code section 484 and asked that she accompany them back into
the store. The security guards then performed a weapons search including a search of her purse, where the defendant had hidden some
of the purloined merchandise. The guards also found in her purse a
452. 592 P.2d 341, 346-47 (Cal. 1979) (citations omitted).
453. See Laguna Publishing Co. v. Golden Rain Found., 182 Cal. Rptr. 813, 825-26
(Ct. App. 1982); H-CHH Assoc. v. Citizens for Representative Gov't, 238 Cal. Rptr. 841,
850 (Ct. App. 1987).
454. 594 P.2d 1000 (Cal. 1979). It is important to note that this case was superseded
by article I, section 28, subdivision 2, of the California Constitution (as amended by
Proposition 8). CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(d).

vial which allegedly contained heroin, and the defendant was subsequently charged with possession of a controlled substance. Her motion to supress introduction of the vial into evidence was denied, and
she then pled guilty.455
There were two issues on appeal: whether the search was reasonable, and, if not, whether the exclusionary rule applied in the context
of searches by a private person. Applying case and statutory law, the
court first held that the security guards exceeded the scope of their
authority in searching the defendant's purse. 45 6 Turning to the state
action issue, the court noted that "California cases have generally interpreted this provision [article I, section 13, the search and seizure
clause] as primarily intended to protect the people against such governmental initiative or governmentally directed intrusions." 45 7 On
the other hand, the court recognized that private security guards may
"pose a threat to privacy rights of Californians that is comparable to
that which may be posed by the unlawful conduct of police
officers."458
Ultimately, the court avoided the difficult issue of whether the
search and seizure clause applied to all private conduct by finding
that the private security guards were state actors and therefore subject to the search and seizure clause even assuming that clause contained a state action requirement. 45 9 The private security guards
were state actors for two reasons. First, the arrest and detention
were effected pursuant to a state statute.46 0 Second, the security
guards went beyond mere self-help (i.e., simply demanding return of
the merchandise) and purported to vindicate the public's interest by
holding the defendant for criminal prosecution and by searching
her.46 ' The court summarized its holding as follows: "[W]e conclude
that under such circumstances, i.e., when private security personnel
conduct an illegal search or seizure while engaged in a statutorily-authorized citizen's arrest and detention of a person in aid of law enforcement authorities, the constitutional proscriptions of article 1,
462
section 13, are applicable."
The court in Zelinski rested its analysis upon the state constitutional search and seizure provision rather than the Fourth Amend455. Zelinski, 594 P.2d at 1002.
456. Md at 1002-04.
457. d. at 1004-05.
458. Id. The court was careful not to cite the Privacy Clause in its analysis of the
case. Subsequently, the court in People v. Crowson, 660 P.2d 389 (Cal. 1983), held that
the Privacy Clause protections are not greater than those secured by article I, section
13.
459. Zelinsky, 594 P.2d at 1005-06.
460. Id. at 1006.
461. Id.
462. Id.
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ment. Yet in discussing the state action issue, the court cited both
state and federal precedent, which might suggest that its analysis was
informed by, if not governed by, federal state action law.4 6 3
Although the Supreme Court has not settled the issue, it appears
likely that a detention and search by a private security guard pursuant to a statutory merchants' privilege does not constitute state action. In the most analogous Supreme Court case, United States v.
Jacobsen,4" the Court held that a search by Federal Express employees of a damaged package did not violate the Fourth Amendment because the search was conducted by private persons.4 w This of course
is a situation far removed from an arrest and search by a department
store security guard. The lower courts have unanimously held, however, that such a detention and search does not constitute state action.4 w Thus, it appears that the California Supreme Court in
Zelinski relied upon a state action rule that is somewhat broader
than the federal rule.40 7 However, we may never know for sure because Proposition 8 requires California state courts to interpret the
state exclusionary rule consistent with the federal rule, and Zelinski
may be partially overruled. 4 8
When the privacy initiative was offered, there existed no precedent
in California for the proposition that any rights contained in the Declaration of Rights created a cause of action against purely private
conduct. To the contrary, although the issue had not been confronted
by the Supreme Court of California, lower courts and the supreme
court acted generally on the assumption that the declaration limited
only state action.
463. Id
464. 466 U.S. 109 (1984).
465. Id. at 115.
466. See, e.g., White v. Scrivner Corp., 594 F.2d 140 (5th Cir. 1979) (finding no state
action in store employee's search of purse pursuant to statutory merchants' privilege);
Iodice's Estate v. Gimbels, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 1054 (D.C.N.Y. 1976) (no state action in
detention of shoplifter); Davis v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 530 F. Supp. 799 (D.C. Ill.
1982) (same). The only authority arguably contrary appears to be Rojas v. Alexander's
Dept. Store, Inc., 654 F. Supp. 856 (E.D.N.Y. 1986). However, it is easily distinguished,
since the private guard in Rojas was also a "special patrolman" appointed by the New
York City Police Commissioner pursuant to a special statutory scheme, and the guard
made the arrest in her dual capacity as private employee and city police officer. Rojas,
654 F. Supp. at 858.
467. The Ninth Circuit in Collins v. Womancare, 878 F.2d 1145, 1154 (9th Cir. 1989),
strongly hinted that Zelinski had gone beyond federal state action principles.
468. See In re Lance, 694 P.2d 744, 753 (Cal. 1985); Collins v. Womancare, 878 F.2d
1145, 1154 (9th Cir. 1989).

IV.
A.

ARTICLE

I,

SECTION

1

AND ITS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

Restating the Problem

Despite the protection of privacy already afforded by the common
law, the civil code, and both the state and federal constitutions (an
implied right in both), the legislature proposed, and the voters
adopted, an explicit guarantee of privacy in article 1, section 1. Privacy was added to a list of "inalienable rights" that includes "enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and
protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, [and]
happiness."469
As already noted, the word "privacy" is so ill-defined as to be virtually useless for deciding concrete cases. It conceivably knows no useful limit since it may plausibly be asserted that any exercise of
private rights involves an exercise of a right of privacy. For example,
it may be asserted that requiring one to give one's name to the government is an invasion of the right to control personal information.4 70 When government taxes income, it invades privacy by
denying citizens the opportunity to spend their money in the way
they choose. The invasion is particularly pernicious since the government requires withholding by employers, thereby denying the citizens the right of civil disobedience-disobedience that fundamentally
expresses a private autonomy and independence from government.
Common law courts solved the definitional problem by placing
strict limits on the causes of action for invasion of privacy. There is
not so much a cause of action for invasion of privacy as four separate
causes of action dealing with different subjects.471 Moreover, common law courts balanced the asserted private interest against the interests of society generally,472 usually employing what could be
described as "rational basis" scrutiny.
Decisions under both the federal and state constitutions presented
a slightly more difficult problem. Ultimately, however, the penumbral theory provided one concrete limit to privacy rights. In particular, the general contours of the Bill of Rights limit the extent to
which new privacy rights may be declared.473 Although some complain that these "penumbral" rights do not deserve protection because they are not explicitly enumerated in the Constitution, at the
469. See Exhibit A. Throughout this section, citations to "Exhibits" will refer to
materials appearing in the Appendix to this Article.
470. (. Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986) (rejecting claim under Free Exercise
Clause that social security regulations requiring state welfare agency to use social security number burdened the exercise of applicant's religion because use of number
rather than name "may harm his daughter's spirit").
471. See supra notes 259-311 and accompanying text.
472. See supra notes 248-311 and accompanying text.
473. See supra notes 322-30 and accompanying text.
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very least, the penumbral rights bear some nexus to rights that are
explicitly stated in the Constitution. Because this nexus is a prerequisite to recognition of a prenumbral right, there is a limit on how far
the Court can go in creating new privacy rights. A more generalized
right to privacy appeared to exist in the early cases where the court's
reasoning was based upon the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments.
However, Bowers would appear to have largely shut that door by im474
posing a high threshold for recognition of a privacy interest.
By giving "privacy" explicit status in the California Constitution,
"privacy" under our constitution, unlike privacy under the federal
constitution, is set free from the constraints of other constitutional
protections. Indeed, traditional canons of construction would lead a
court to conclude that it must give privacy a definition different from
other protections simply to give the word some effect. The risk then
is that "privacy" may become completely untethered from any moorings whatsoever, and a reference to "privacy" in article 1, section 1
may become a convenient substitute for analysis.
A legislative history much more complete than that which has
been relied upon by the courts and commentators provides a reasoned basis for limiting the right of privacy as declared in article 1,
section 1. Because the materials making up this legislative history
are not easy to collect, and have not been cited, or reviewed by the
courts, the relevant documents have been reproduced in full in the
7
Appendix to this Article.4 5
B.

Legislative Precursorsto the Privacy Initiative

Assemblyman Kenneth Cory carried the privacy initiative in 1972
and wrote the ballot argument in favor of the initiative. The 1972
legislation was not Cory's first attempt at adding privacy to the California Constitution. His prior attempt sheds light upon the meaning
474. See supra notes 331-42 and accompanying text.
475. Researching state legislative history can be a frustrating experience, especially
for dated legislation. The privacy initiative was referred to the Assembly Committee
on Constitutional Amendments and to the Senate Judiciary Committee. Unfortunately, the State Archive's files for these two committees contain almost no useful information about the initiative. The committee reports are simply not where they
should be. It is even difficult to reconstruct the various drafts of the privacy initiative
(it was amended twice during its consideration) since the relevant volume which
would contain the drafts is inexplicably missing from the stacks at the State Library.
Much of the material relied upon in this Article and all of the significant material was
discovered by examining, at the suggestion of a helpful archivist at the State Archives,
the personal files for Assemblyman Cory, who authored the initiative. Fortunately,
Cory kept what appear to be the assembly and senate committee reports.

which should be given to article 1, section 1. It is common to interpret a statutory or constitutional provision in light of prior legislative
action directed at the same general topic.
In 1971, Representative Cory proposed Assembly Constitutional
Amendment (ACA) 69476 and a companion bill, AB 2933.477 ACA 69
proposed to add privacy to article 1, section 1.478 The companion bill,
AB 2933, contained a variety of provisions dealing with government
control over private information about individuals.479 Representative
Cory was apparently concerned about the evils associated with the
growing tendency of government to collect large amounts of private
information about people. Cory perceived government's collection
and use of such information as part and parcel of a shrinking orbit of
privacy.
The detailed provisions of AB 2933 make it clear that Cory's
predominate interest was not in purely private invasions of the privacy of another. Instead, virtually every provision in AB 2933 is directed at government collection and use of private information, and,
more particularly, with government cooperation with private business in the widespread dissemination of private information. Undoubtedly, Cory was concerned about private businesses knowing
private facts about private people, but AB 2933 was limited in its
scope to government cooperation and complicity in invading an individual's privacy.
The primary changes proposed by AB 2933 were to California's
Public Records Act.480 With only a few statutory exceptions, sections
1-3 of AB 2933 would have prevented state or local agencies from
"sell[ing] or otherwise distribut[ing] lists of information in bulk or aggregate form identifiable by name or address."48 1 This would have
protected an individual's right to be left alone and right to control
distribution of name and address. Section 3 of AB 2933 would also
have given an individual a right to examine and correct any informa48 2
tion about that individual held by a government agency.
476. See Exhibit B, Assembly Constitutional Amendment, No. 69 (1971) [hereinafter ACA 69].
477. See Exhibit C, Assembly Bill, No. 2933 (1971) [hereinafter AB 2933].
478. ACA 69, supra note 475. The bill described itself as "A resolution to propose
to the people of the State of California an amendment to the Constitution of the state,
by amending Section 1 of Article I thereof, relating to inalienable rights." Id If ACA
69 had passed and been approved by the people, article I, section 1 would have read as
follows: "All men are by nature free and independent, and have certain inalienable
rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty; acquiring,
possessing, and protecting property; and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and
privacy." Id
479. AB 2933, supra note 476.
480. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 6250-6265 (West 1980 & Supp. 1991).
481. AB 2933, supra note 476, § 3(e). See also id at § 2 (definitions of terms used).
482. Id at § 3(b).
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Even with these changes, Cory was not satisfied with the access restrictions on government-held private information. Cory was concerned that too many government agencies and too many private
entities were examining government files without adequate justification. In section 4 of AB 2933, he created a special mechanism for
detering unreasonable snooping. Subsection (a) would have required
a governmental agency to include along with an individual's record
the name and address of any government agency or private person
who had accessed the record. Under section 3 of AB 2933, as explained above, any person can request a copy of their file from any
government agency, and the file would include the name and address
of all persons and entities that had accessed the file. 483 Then, pursuant to section 4(b), that individual could request from anyone who accessed the record a statement of reasons why the record was used. 48 4
Section 4 made it a misdemeanor to refuse to provide reasons when
requested and also created a civil action for actual damages if the reasons given were false.485
Section 5 of AB 2933 directed the Intergovernmental Board on
Electronic Data Processing to report to the legislature concerning the
confidentiality and security of personal data maintained on government computer systems. 48 6 Section 6 mandated a similar report from
the Office of Management Services and designated that office "[t]o
act as the central review and coordinating body for the implementation of state policy regarding individual privacy and the security of
48 7
information."
The only changes proposed by AB 2933 that would have regulated
purely private conduct were contained in sections 7 and 8. Section
631 of the Penal Code, described above, 488 made wire-tapping a crime
in California. Section 7 of AB 2933 would have made unauthorized
connection with a computer system a crime under section 631, California's wire-tap statute, regardless of whether the computer system
was state or privately owned. 48 9 The state obviously would not be cooperating in such an invasion. Section 8 would have added a new section to the Penal Code, section 631.1, making it a crime to "attemptf
to obtain personal data of another person from any confidential com483. Id at § 3(c).
484. Id at § 4(b).
485. Id. at § 4(b), (c).
486. Id at § 5.

487. Id at § 6(f), (g).
488. See supra notes 274-77.

489. AB 2933, supra note 476, at § 7.

puterized record by fraud, bribery, or other deceit."490 Again, state
complicity is not a requirement under Section 8.
Although sections 7 and 8 do not involve state cooperation or complicity in an invasion of privacy, it is equally clear that neither section is triggered by an invasion of privacy pure and simple. Section 8
is triggered by "fraud, bribery, or other deceit." Section 7 is triggered
by "unauthorized access," which is similar to a breaking and entering. All of this conduct may be independently wrongful entirely
apart from privacy concerns.
Although ACA 69 and AB 2933 died in committee, their provisions
are important in understanding the privacy initiative which Cory successfully re-introduced in 1972. ACA 69 and AB 2933 are directed almost exclusively at the problem of government collection and use of
private information about citizens. AB 2933 also indicated a concern
with private persons and businesses invading our privacy, but, with
the exception of sections 7 and 8, the bill limits its scope to instances
in which government cooperates with business by giving business access to private information held by the government, either for free or
for remuneration. Sections 7 and 8, which do not involve state complicity or action, do not prevent the lawful collection of private information by private persons or businesses; rather, they only prevent
the collection of private information by unlawful means, such as unauthorized access, bribery, fraud, or other deceit. These sections protect privacy only indirectly and only partially; they appear to be
focused primarily on whether the means used are lawful, rather than
upon whether the information sought and disclosed is private.
ACA 69 was much more general than AB 2933, of course, since it
proposed to add the word "privacy" to the constitution, and no definition of "privacy" was given. Both ACA 69 (1971) and ACA 51 (1972)
should be read in light of AB 2933 (1971).491 AB 2933 evidences a
concern with government invasions of privacy, and government.cooperation with private business in invasions of privacy. At the very
least, then, AB 2933 should suggest that ACA 69 be limited to instances involving government invasions of privacy-either through
direct government action or through government cooperation with
private actors. Such an interpretation would be fully consistent with
federal cases interpreting the state action requirement under the
Fourteenth Amendment to include both direct state action and private state action under the auspices or with the cooperation of state
government.
If AB 2933 were the only additional piece of legislative history uncovered, a limited definition of privacy might still be unwarranted,
490. I& at § 8.

491. See irifra note 490 and accompanying text.
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but AB 2933 does not stand alone. Instead, the legislative history associated with ACA 51 itself confirms what AB 2933 only suggests.
C. ACA 51 As Initially Drafted
Representative Cory did not give up with the defeat of ACA 69 and
AB 2933 in 1971. In 1972, he again proposed an amendment, ACA 51,
to add privacy to the California Constitution.492 This time, however,
there was no associated statutory change, and ACA 51 was assigned
to the Committee for Constitutional Amendments rather than the
Judiciary Committee, which had defeated ACA 69 and AB 2933.
In addition to getting a new committee, Cory had picked up some
political support between 1971 and 1972. The 1971 privacy amendment would simply have added the word privacy to article I, section
1, which would then have read "[a]ll men ... have certain inalienable
rights, among which are . .. privacy." 493 The 1972 amendment as
originally proposed would have changed the word "men" to "persons" and would have also changed a few other constitutional provisions to make them gender neutral.494 Because of his sensitivity to
the gender issue, Cory picked up the support of women's groups, and
there was testimony in favor of ACA 51 before the Assembly Constitutional Amendments Committee by a pro-Equal Rights Amendment
law professor from Boalt Hall.
ACA 69 indicated in its descriptive title that it dealt with the general topic of "inalienable rights."495 However, the descriptive title for
ACA 51 was slightly different. As proposed, ACA 51 described itself
as "[a] resolution to propose to the people of the State of California
an amendment to the Constitution of the state, by amending Section
1 of Article I, Sections 2 and 6 of Article IV, and Section 11 of Article
IX thereof, relating to state government."4 96 The title of ACA 51,
which is properly considered as part of the legislative history, explicitly indicates that the privacy amendment related to "state government." It did not indicate that the amendment created "inalienable
rights," which conceivably might be enforceable against purely private actors. Even standing alone, the descriptive title of ACA 51
could be used to limit the scope of ACA 51 to state actors. The use of
492. Exhibit D, Assembly Constitutional Amendment, No. 51 (1972) [hereinafter
ACA 51].
493. ACA 69, supra note 475, at § 1 (emphasis added).
494. ACA 51, supra note 491.
495. ACA 69, supra note 476.
496. ACA 51, supra note 491 (emphasis added).

the phrase "state government" in the title to ACA 51 is especially significant in light of the different language in ACA 69, that could have
497
been interpreted more broadly.
D.

Consideration by the Assembly Committee on Constitutional
Amendments

ACA 51 was referred to the Assembly Committee on Constitutional Amendments. This committee produced both a staff report
and a final report. 498 The committee's report strongly indicates that
the committee thought the privacy amendment related exclusively to
government conduct. In discussing the "background" for the privacy.
initiative, the committee report noted that, although "[t]he right to
privacy does not exist per se in the Federal Constitution or any other
state constitutions . . . the courts ... have articulated a right to be
499
free from certain kinds of intrusion of government acts."
Next, in describing "federal decisions" involving the right of privacy, the report discusses only Griswold v. Connecticut,50 a case
which involved government invasions of privacy. The report further
noted that, although "no definition has been formulated of a constitutional right of privacy ... it appears, that the courts draw from the
entire Bill of Rights and various amendments, but it is not clear from
case law who is protected and from what."501 This last phrase might
suggest some room for argument. If it is not clear who is protected
and from what, then it is possible to argue that people are protected
from both public and private snooping. However, in the context of a
paragraph devoted entirely to a discussion of the federal right to privacy, it is more reasonable to reject this broad interpretation.
Only one sentence in the committee report is even arguably directed at purely private conduct. The discussion of the background
of the legislation includes a comment that "the Courts' work in the
privacy field is defining the right solely by the wrong ... (libel, unlawful search and seizure, telephone tapping, fair credit reporting act,
etc.)." 50 2 By referring to causes of action such as libel, telephone tapping, and violations of the fair credit reporting act, the parenthetical
impliedly refers to protection from private conduct since private actors are the typical defendants in such cases.
The reference remains somewhat ambiguous, however, since the
497. The title was subsequently amended in another respect, but the reference to
"state government" remained. See Exhibit K (final text as approved).

498. The staff report on ACA 51 appears in Exhibit F, and the committee report on
ACA 51 appears in Exhibit G.
499. See Exhibit G (emphasis added).
500. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
501. See Exhibit G.

502. Id
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sentence is directed primarily at defining privacy rather than
whether the privacy right in ACA 51 regulates purely private conduct. The statement's apparent meaning is that in the absence of a
clear definition of privacy itself, courts have resorted to protecting
privacy interests by identifying otherwise wrongful conduct. The
parenthetical also includes examples which define privacy solely by
the wrong committed, citing various types of wrongful conduct. Following this analysis, this parenthetical merely makes the point that
adding "privacy" to the state constitution forces courts to define it directly, rather than to continue to protect privacy by identifying conduct which is already unlawful. That is a far cry from saying that the
privacy initiative was intended to apply to purely private conduct.
Although this report, properly read, does not indicate that the privacy clause was intended to apply to purely private conduct, the report does suggest that the privacy clause was intended to do more
than simply codify existing constitutional and common law doctrines.
The report recognizes that privacy had previously been protected
only indirectly, either by reference to specific protections in the Bill
of Rights or by various common law causes of action. In light of this
recognition, the drafter of the privacy clause and the legislature must
have been aware that if the word "privacy" was added to the declaration of rights, courts would be forced to give privacy an independent
definition. Arguably, the courts could create a definition that would
in effect go no further than the federal constitutional right to privacy, but the tenor of this report suggests that the privacy clause was
intended to do something different from what had come before.
E.

The Assembly Committee's Staff Report

The legislative history includes a staff report that appears to have
been drafted for the use of the Assembly Committee on Constitutional Amendments. The staff report is a more complete analysis of
the privacy initiative than appears in the committee report.
Although less detailed, the committee's final report is a reflection of
what is in this more complete document.
The staff report is largely a review of the law of privacy with the
apparent intention of indicating (1) why the privacy amendment was
needed, and (2) what the scope of the privacy right might be. The
perceived need for the amendment originated from the absence of an
explicit guarantee of privacy in either the state or federal constitutions and a perceived concern among the people about invasions of
their privacy. The very first sentence of the analysis emphasizes that

"[t]his Constitutional Amendment puts the State on record regarding
the right of privacy."5 03
The remainder of the analysis described case-law protections of the
right of privacy, focusing entirely upon federal constitutional cases.
The memorandum first quotes from Justice Douglas' opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut, noting that the right to privacy, in Douglas'
view, "emanat[es] from the penumbral application of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth
Amendments to the Constitution." 50 4
The memorandum then turns to Stanley v. Georgia,50 5 the
Supreme Court's next significant privacy case after Griswold. Significantly, the memorandum correctly describes the holding in Stanley
as "explicitly founded upon the inherent limitations on the State's
power to inquire into the 'private' lives of its citizenry." 506 Next, the
memorandum describes Wisconsin v. Constantineau,5 7 as involving
"limitations on the ability of the State to collect and to disseminate
potentially derogatory information about individuals."508
The final paragraphs of this memorandum emphasize that the privacy initiative was intended to restrict the activities of only the state
and state actors. These final paragraphs are sufficiently important to
include them in full:
With the technological revolution and the age of cybernetics, these amendments [i.e., the Bill of Rights], as they have been traditionally viewed, do not
offer'sufficient protection against state surveillance, record collection and government snooping into our personal lives. We must, therefore, develop new
safeguards to meet the new dangers.
Proposition 11 puts the State on record that privacy is essential to our other
freedoms. It further expands the evolving view of privacy emerging from case
law. The right of privacy has emanated from our other constitutional protections. With the right of privacy explicitly written into the Constitution, it will
itself become the basis for an expansion of constitutional protections.
The growing pervasiveness of government demands our immediate attention. Proposition 11 will be a definitive statement of the necessity to control
government interference in our personal lives and bring the issue clearly
before the public and the courts. The major contribution of this amendment
is to make the public aware that its freedoms are being slowly eroded, that
this trend must be reversed. Passage of Proposition 11 will serve notice on the
Legislature and the Courts that the public will not permit the continual abrogation of their rights. The right to privacy must be clearly spelled out and
must be firmly adhered to.5 0 9

It will be noted that nowhere in these paragraphs is there even a
single indication that the privacy initiative would be interpreted to
503.
504.
505.
506.
507.
508.
509.

See Exhibit G.
Id,
394 U.S. 557 (1969).
Exhibit G (emphasis added).
400 U.S. 433 (1971).
Exhibit G (emphasis added).
Id.

[Vol. 19: 327, 1992]

California'sRight to Privacy
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

restrict purely private conduct. Instead, these paragraphs highlight a
concern only with government surveillance, government data collection, government snooping, and government interference in personal
lives. Proposition 11 was intended to "serve notice on the Legislature
and the Courts"510 that they no longer could invade our privacy; it
was not intended to serve notice upon each one of us that we could
be sued for invading someone else's privacy.
If the privacy initiative had been intended to apply to purely private conduct, one would expect the staff analysis to have commented
upon that fact, which would have been a significant extension of the
constitutional law of privacy. The report does not even remotely suggest that possibility. Indeed, the only troubling question which the
report asks is whether "this measure [would] have legal implications
beyond the readily obvious; for instance, would the right to privacy
overturn legal authority for wiretapping, etc." 511 This sentence is significant first because it indicates that the privacy amendment should
have "readily obvious" implications. The readily obvious implications
are undoubtedly the material discussed in the staff report, all of
which relate to state action. Second, the only concern expressed in
this sentence is whether the privacy right would overturn a particular form of state action that was already regulated by state statute
512
and case law, that is, wiretapping.
Although this document is only a staff analysis, it should be
weighed heavily in the balance. Along with the opinions from the
Office of Legislative Counsel, discussed below, this staff report is the
most complete legal analysis of the background leading up to the introduction of the privacy initiative. Moreover, it appears certain that
this staff analysis was used as the basis for the assembly committee's
final report. The staff analysis thus informed the assembly committee, which in turn, favorably reported the bill to the floor.
F.

The Senate JudiciaryReport

After approval of ACA 51 as amended by the assembly, the bill
made its way to the senate where it was assigned to the Senate Judiciary Committee. We have only one short document which appears
510. ACA 51, supra note 491.
511. Id.
512. The reference to wiretapping in this question cannot refer to private wiretapping, because the sentence is concerned only with "legal authority for wiretapping."
This is manifestly a reference to wiretapping by legally authorized state actors.

to have come from the Senate Judiciary Committee. 513 The report
makes only two points. First, it notes that the fundamental right to
privacy had been judicially recognized in Griswold.5 14 Second, it
questions the scope of the privacy clause:
Because all fundamental rights are not absolute in nature, what, if any, limitations would exist with respect to the right of privacy created by this Constitutional Amendment, i.e., does it extend to corporations,
criminal accused,
515
public figures, wire taps and eavesdropping, etc.?

Unfortunately, this report does nothing to answer this question.
The committee apparently had some concerns about the ultimate
scope of the privacy clause, but was not willing to enter the fray with
its own interpretation.
G.

The Ballot Arguments

In the hierarchy of materials which may appear in a complete legislative history, ballot arguments should be placed as low as individual statements by representatives reported in newspapers. 516 Under
ordinary and proper rules of statutory construction, such statements
would be ignored entirely as mere campaign statements that do not
fairly indicate legislative intent. If the ballot arguments with respect
to ACA 51 are ignored, then the legislative history described above
strongly supports the view that the privacy right contained in article
I, section 1 was intended only as a limitation upon state action.
Of course there is a long line of California decisions holding that
reliance upon ballot arguments is proper.5 17 In light of these authorities, a complete consideration of ACA 51 requires a discussion of the
ballot arguments. The ballot argument drafted by Assemblyman
Cory, interpreted in light of the legislative history discussed above,
does not support the conclusion that article I, section 1 was intended
to apply to purely private conduct.
The very first sentence of the ballot argument in favor of the proposition indicates the proper scope of the initiative: "The proliferation
of government snooping and data collecting is threatening to destroy
our traditional freedoms." 518 The remainder of the first paragraph is
similarly focused entirely upon government collection of information.
The second paragraph, which was underlined in the ballot pamphlet, contains the first reference to a private actor: "At present
there are no effective restraints on the information activities of gov513. Exhibit I, Report of Senate Judiciary Committee on ACA 51 (1972) [hereinafter Senate Judiciary Report].

514. Id, (citing Griswold, 394 U.S. at 564).
515. Id
516. See supra notes 74-75, 143-167 and accompanying text.
517. See cases cited supra note 143-44.
518. Exhibit L, Ballot Analysis & Arguments for Proposition 11 [hereinafter Ballot
Argument].
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eminent and business."5 19 Courts interpreting the privacy initiative
have latched upon the inclusion of the word "business" within the
ballot argument to support the conclusion that article I, section 1 can
apply to purely private conduct. 520
There is, however, a competing interpretation of this language that
explains why the word "business" appears in the ballot argument.
Assemblyman Cory was concerned about both purely governmental
action and about governmental cooperation with business. That is
demonstrated by AB 2933 and by documents which appear in Cory's
personal files relating to ACA 51.521 As noted above, it is no stretch
of federal state action law to conclude that a business which cooperates with the state in securing private information is a state actor
subject to the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment.5 22 Accordingly, when Cory refers to "government and business" in the ballot argument, he is arguably intending to extend the privacy right
only to those cases in which government and business act together in
invading an individual's privacy. The phrase "government and business" appears five times in Cory's ballot argument.5 23 Nowhere in
the ballot argument does Cory use the word "business" apart from
the phrase "government and business." This supports the view that
Cory intended the privacy initiative to apply only to government and
to government cooperation with business. It does not support the
view that Cory intended the privacy initiative to apply to purely private actors.
It could be contended, of course, that Cory had much more in mind
in proposing ACA 51 than he had in mind in proposing ACA 69 and
AB 2933. The ballot argument refutes that contention, however. The
519. Id.
520. See infra notes 584-92 and accompanying text.
521. See supra notes 474-76 and accompanying text.
522. See supra notes 143-67 and accompanying text.
523. Ballot Argument, supra note 517. The first reference is quoted in the text.
The other references are as follows:
(a) It prevents government and business interests from collecting and stockpiling unnecessary information about us and from misusing information gathered for one purpose in order to serve other purposes or to embarrass us.
(b) The proliferation of government and business records over which we
have no control limits our ability to control our personal lives.
(c) Even more dangerous is the loss of control over the accuracy of government and business records on individuals.
(d) Even if the existence of this information is known, few government
agencies or private businesses permit individuals to review their files and correct errors.
Id.

specific provisions of AB 2933 are sprinkled liberally throughout the
ballot argument for ACA 51. In the third paragraph, Cory states that
the amendment will prevent government and business from "misusing information gathered for one purpose in order to serve other purposes or to embarrass us."52 4 AB 2933 would have prevented county
clerks from making voter registration lists available except for "election or government purposes."52 5 The intent behind this proposed
statutory change was to prohibit government from dispensing information collected for specific purposes to a person who has an entirely
different purpose in mind. The ballot argument recalls this purpose.
In the fourth paragraph of the ballot argument, Cory observes that
"[o]ften we do not know that these records even exist and we are certainly unable to determine who has access to them." 526 AB 2933
would have permitted an individual to demand production by government agencies of any file about that individual, giving each individual
the chance to determine what records exist.5 27 AB 2933 also would
have permitted an individual to find out who had accessed their government-held files, and would have permitted that individual to demand an explanation for why the file had been accessed. 528
The very next sentence in the ballot argument warns voters that
"[e]ven more dangerous is the loss of control over the accuracy of
government and business records on individuals.... [Flew government agencies or private businesses permit individuals to review
their files and correct errors." 529 AB 2933 would have created a
mechanism by which an individual could have corrected incorrect information contained in a government-held file. 530
The next paragraph in the ballot argument, the sixth out of eight,
contains the only reference to purely private conduct. The paragraph
reads in full as follows:
The average citizen also does not have control over what information is collected about him. Much is secretly collected. We are required to report some
information, regardless of our wishes for privacy or our belief that there is no
public need for the information. Each time we apply for a credit card or a life
insurance policy, file a tax return, interview for a job, or get a drivers' license, a dossier is opened and an informationalprofile is sketched. Modern
technology is capable of monitoring, centralizing and computerizing this infor53 1
mation which eliminates any possibility of individual privacy.

The courts have seized upon the emphasized sentence in this quote as
proof positive that the privacy clause applies to purely private con524.
525.
526.
527.
528.
529.
530.
531.

Id.
AB 2933, supra note 476, at § 1.
Ballot Argument, supra note 517.
AB 2933, supra note 476, at § 3.
Id.
Ballot Argument, supra note 517.
AB 2933, supra note 476, at § 3.
Ballot Argument, supra note 517 (emphasis in original).
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duct. On first blush, such a conclusion would appear to be justified.
Cory refers in this sentence to data collection in the context of applying for a credit card, a life insurance policy, and a job. The question
remains whether these three references near the end of the ballot argument are sufficient by themselves and in context to permit a court
to ignore every other indication in the legislative history that the privacy initiative was to be limited to government conduct and government cooperation with business.
It is important to remember that the ballot argument is a campaign
statement which is intended to influence voters in favor of a particular constitutional or statutory change. Courts are permitted to take
judicial notice of the fact that campaign statements are, at times, not
accurate. The First Amendment guarantees the right to engage in a
certain amount of hyperbole in the political arena.53 2 Since the ballot pamphlet is published by the state, it seems likely that the state
could constitutionally review the contents of ballot arguments to insure accuracy.5 33 However, ballot arguments in California are not
screened carefully-the state merely warns voters that arguments
pro and con have not been reviewed by any governmental official for
accuracy.5 34 Consequently, statements in ballot arguments should
not be adopted by courts as a definitive interpretation of the legislation proposed. Ballot arguments can be drafted to mislead; courts
should not be so gullible.
The underlined sentence in the quote above undoubtedly qualifies
as a political statement designed to excite the voters into approving
the initiative. How many voters like banks and credit card companies? How many voters like insurance companies? How many voters
like to pay taxes? How many voters like job interviews? How many
voters like the Department of Motor Vehicles? The sentence reads
like a campaign speech, not like an important part of the legislative
history.
532. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Hustler Magazine,
Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988). Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695
(1990), is not to the contrary. The narrow holding in Milkovich is that a statement
couched in the language of opinion is not entitled to constitutional immunity simply by
virtue of its costume when the so-called opinion implies the assertion of an objective
fact. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2705.
533. Cf Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748 (1976) (state may regulate commercial speech that is false or misleading); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988) (school district may control content of school newspaper financed and operated by the school).
534. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 88002(f) (West 1991).

Further, it is possible to conclude that banks which issue credit
cards, insurance companies, and some private employers are sufficiently imbued with public responsibilities, that they should be
treated as state actors. This would not be an entirely unwarranted
assumption. Courts have already recognized the quasi-public nature
of insurance companies in other contexts.5 35 Banks, credit card companies, and certain private employers might also fall into that category. Lower courts in California have certainly tried in one way or
another to impose public duties upon these entities,53 although the
Supreme Court of California has clearly indicated its reluctance to
37
enter the field5

Although the reference to banks, insurance companies, and employers initially may appear to be a clear reference to purely private
conduct, on further examination, the reference is ambiguous. The
topic sentence for the paragraph indicates that the paragraph is directed primarily at the problem of "control" over private information, as opposed to the collection of that information.38 The next
three sentences simply identify ways in which information may be
gathered, either secretly or because information is required to be disclosed in order to receive certain benefits (such as a bank loan, credit,
a life insurance policy, and so forth).539 These sentences by themselves do not explicitly indicate that the collection of the information
is itself a violation of the privacy clause. That the predominate concern of the paragraph is not data collection but control over data
once collected is then confirmed by the final sentence, which warns
that "[m]odern technology is capable of monitoring, centralizing and
computerizing this information which eliminates any possibility of individual privacy."54 0 The concern is thus not with the initial collection of the information, but with the risk that information collected
for one purpose may be improperly disclosed to a central data bank
for redistribution to third parties. The central data bank that Cory
was most concerned about was government itself, which in 1972 had
the most extensive computer data banks containing private information. 541 But through the use of modern communications technology,
the distinction between the government's database and privately-held
535. See Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 390 (Cal. 1988).
536. See, e.g., Commercial Cotton Co. v. United California Bank, 209 Cal. Rptr. 551,

554 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that bank owes quasi-fiduciary duties to its
customers).
537. See discussion of employment cases in Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d
373 (Cal. 1988).
538. Ballot Argument, supra note 517.
539. 1&
540. l
541. AB 2933, supra note 476. The provisions of AB 2933 indicate that Cory's
predominate concern was with government information banks.
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databases could break down. It would be plausible to argue that the
privacy clause was intended to reach not only government databases,
but privately owned and operated databases that share some of the
54 2
salient characteristics of a government database.
The remaining paragraphs in the ballot argument confirm that
state action is the predominate focus. The first sentence in the seventh paragraph references the federal right to privacy, a right which
is good only against state actors. The second sentence recites the
"compelling interest" test which is sometimes used in federal privacy
cases. The third sentence returns to the theme of government
records by noting that "[s]ome information may remain as designated
public records but only when the availability of such information is
clearly in the public interest." The final paragraph in the ballot ar'5 43
gument simply notes the change from "men" to "people.
The rebuttal to the argument in favor of the privacy initiative and
the argument against the initiative contain little helpful information.
Responding to the campaign statement about credit cards, life insurance policies, and so forth, the rebuttal correctly notes that
when we apply for credit cards, life insurance policies, drivers' licenses, file
tax returns or give business interviews, it is absolutely essential that we furnish certain personal information. Proposition 11 does not mean that we will
no longer have to furnish it and provides no protection as to the use of the
544
information that the Legislature cannot give if it so desires.

A reasonable argument can be made that if the privacy initiative
was not intended to reach purely private conduct, then the rebuttal
would have said so. Instead, the rebuttal appears to concede that the
privacy initiative reaches private conduct, but only says that the initiative would not, in those particular instances, prevent a private business from asking necessary questions. 545 But an equally reasonable
argument is that the drafter of the rebuttal, Senator James E.
Whetmore, did not believe that a state action argument would be understood by the voters and did not believe that such an argument
would respond to the fears stirred up by Cory's argument.
Whetmore might have concluded that the best way to undermine
Cory's campaign statement was to explain why the privacy initiative
542. Cf Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 592 P.2d 341 (Cal. 1979) (applying state
Free Speech Clause to privately-owned shopping center because shopping center possessed many of the characteristics of an open street, park, or downtown business
center).
543. Ballot Argument, supra note 517.
544. Id.
545. Id

would not prevent collection of information by banks, insurance companies, and employers.
The remainder of Whetmore's rebuttal contains the sort of campaign rhetoric that courts should expect to see in ballot arguments.
Whetmore warns that the real problem with the initiative is that it
will make it more difficult to discover welfare and tax fraud. He concludes by arguing that "Proposition 11 can only be an open invitation
to welfare fraud and tax evasion and for this reason should be defeated."546 Whetmore's argument against the privacy initiative
merely restates the same basic themes found in the rebuttal.
Cory's rebuttal to Whetmore's arguments are short and sweet.
First, Cory claims that "[p]rivacy is not now guaranteed by our state
constitution." 547 This is a campaign statement in response to
Whetmore's observation that privacy is already protected both by the
constitution and by the common law. This particular campaign statement by Cory is misleading as drafted. Cory knew that privacy was
already guaranteed under the state constitution. He knew that the
California Constitution, as well as the federal Constitution, had already been interpreted to include a right to privacy. Yet Cory's rebuttal tells the voters that privacy is not now guaranteed and that his
initiative is therefore critically important. Cory's statement would
have been more accurate if he had said that privacy was not "explicitly guaranteed" by the state constitution. Some may argue that the
change is insignificant. I suspect, however, that Cory knew exactly
what he was doing when he drafted the rebuttal, and that he very
consciously left out the word "explicitly" because including that word
would have made his argument less convincing.
The remainder of Cory's rebuttal responds to Whetmore's inflammatory allegation about welfare cheats. Cory correctly says that the
privacy initiative will not prevent the government from collecting
any information it "legitimately" needs-"[i]t will only prevent misuse of this information for unauthorized purposes and preclude the
collection of extraneous or frivolous information."'5 48 Nowhere in
Cory's rebuttal does he respond to Whetmore's claims concerning
credit cards, insurance policies, or job interviews. The rebuttal deals
entirely with government issues.
In summary, the ballot arguments do not readily support the argument that the privacy initiative was intended to apply to purely private conduct in light of the other legislative history now available.
Without the additional legislative history, the single statement in the
ballot argument may have been a bright light. However, in the con546. Md
547. l
548. 1L
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text of substantial additional legislative history, that bright light is
reduced to a faint glimmer.
H.

Summary

Two conclusions appear to be supported by the legislative history
of the privacy clause. First, the legislature intended the privacy
clause to rest upon its own foundations and not be limited by other
rights (or penumbras of those rights) contained in the Declaration of
Rights. The committee reports indicate that the Legislature was well
aware of the limited extent of the federal right to privacy and that
the federal right to privacy existed only by virtue of penumbral emanations from other provisions in the Bill of Rights. The legislature
must have known that courts would attempt to give the word "privacy" a definition of its own, and that this definition might well extend beyond the scope of other provisions in the Declaration of

Rights.
Second, the legislature did not intend that the privacy clause would
apply to purely private conduct. There is virtually nothing in the legislative history that suggests so drastic a change in California's constitutional law. In the absence of a clear understanding by the
legislature that this would be the effect of the privacy clause, a court
should not assume the legislature intended such a far-reaching
change.
V.

CASES (MIs-)APPLYING ARTICLE I, SECTION 1

As Johnny Carson often says, if you buy the premise, you'll buy
the bit. The courts and commentators have bought two premises
about article I, section 1: first, that the ballot argument is an important part of the legislative history of legislative initiatives; second,
that the ballot argument is the only piece of significant legislative
history for article I, section 1. The first premise is bad law, albeit law
that is supported by a long line of supreme court decisions. Ballot arguments are a poor indication of legislative intent, and should be so
treated.
But even if the first premise were accepted, the second premise,
which has been critical to the courts' interpretation of article I, section 1, fails. I have shown above that the second premise is simply
wrong as a matter of fact-there is more to the legislative history
than the ballot arguments. Courts should now consider these portions of the legislative history, portions which suggest that the pri-

vacy right in article I, section 1 is a limited right against the
government.
In order to appreciate the magnitude of the error created by these
two misguided premises, this section reviews the leading cases decided under article I, section 1. Almost everything that the lower
courts have said about article I, section 1 is wrong, and the Supreme
Court of California has done better only because it has heard few
cases on the subject.
A.

Cases in the Supreme Court of California

The Supreme Court of California first faced the privacy clause in
White v. Davis.549 White was a taxpayers' suit brought to enjoin the
Los Angeles Police Department from using undercover agents posing
as students at the University of California at Los Angeles to collect
"police dossiers" on students when the information collected bore no
relation to any specific illegal activities. The trial court sustained a
demurrer to the complaint. In reversing, the supreme court found
that the complaint adequately pled violations of two independent
constitutional rights. First, the court held that the police activity as
alleged unconstitutionally abridged freedoms of expression and association in violation of both federal and state constitutional provisions.5 o Second, the court held that the police activity as alleged also
55
violated the recently enacted privacy clause. '
The analysis and discussion in White set the tone for virtually all
of the subsequent opinions involving the privacy clause. Virtually all
of the discussion in White was built upon the two premises identified
above. Following "long recognized" precedents, the court held that
the contents of the ballot argument were "an aid in construing legislative measures and constitutional amendments adopted pursuant to
a vote of the people."55 2 The court then adopted the second premise
by describing the ballot argument as "a statement which represents,
in essence, the only 'legislative history' of the constitutional amend3
ment available to us."55
549. 533 P.2d 222 (Cal. 1975).
550. Id. at 227-32.
551. Id. at 232-34.
552. Id. at 234 n.11.
553. Id at 234. It is worth noting that, out of an abundance of caution, the supreme
court did not in this language entirely foreclose the possibility of relying upon other
extrinsic aids. The court says that the ballot argument is "in essence" the only legislative history available. As will be seen below, the courts of appeal readily dropped that
qualification, and have adopted the unqualified position that the ballot argument is the
only legislative history for the privacy clause. See infra notes 587-89 and accompanying text.
This gives the supreme court a way out if it wants to repudiate the decisions of the
courts of appeals without reconsidering its own decision in White. For purposes of the
decision in White, it was sufficient to consider only the ballot argument. Nothing in
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The court needed the ballot argument to give some context to the
privacy clause. As the court noted, the word "privacy" by itself
evoked a potentially wide ranging set of interests. Implicitly recognizing the dangers of too broad an interpretation of "privacy," the
court suggested a narrower scope for the privacy clause, "relating to
the accelerating encroachment on personal freedom and security
caused by increased surveillance and data collection activity in contemporary society." 55 4 This narrower scope was drawn entirely out
of the ballot argument, which the court quoted at length.555 The
court declared the law to be as follows with respect to the privacy
clause:
First, the statement identifies the principal "mischiefs" at which the amendment is directed: (1) "government snooping" and the secret gathering of personal information; (2) the overbroad collection and retention of unnecessary
personal information by government and business interests; (3) the improper
use of information properly obtained for a specific purpose, for example, the
use of it for another purpose or the disclosure of it to some third party; and
(4) the lack of a reasonable check on the accuracy of existing records. Second,
the statement makes clear that the amendment does not purport to prohibit
all incursion into individual privacy but rather that any such intervention
must be justified by a compelling interest. Third, the statement indicates that
the amendment is intended to be self-executing, i.e., that the constitutional
provision, in' 5itself,
"creates a legal and enforceable right of privacy for every
Californian. " 5 6

In light of these principles, the court easily held that covert police
surveillance and data collection constituted "'government snooping'
in the extreme," and that the complaint correctly alleged the absence
of any legitimate state interest in gathering or retaining the information because the information collected did not relate to any specific
57
illegal activity.5
White was followed in the supreme court by Valley Bank v. Superior Court.558 The issue in Valley Bank was whether the privacy
clause protected a person's interest in the confidentiality of bank
the additional legislative history would contradict the ballot argument in a way that
would require a different result in White. For purposes of White, then, the ballot argument was properly, "in essence," the only relevant legislative history.
554. The complete sentence is as follows: "Although the general concept of privacy
relates, of course, to an enormously broad and diverse field of personal action and belief, the moving force behind the new constitutional provision was a more focused privacy concern, relating to the accelerating encroachment on personal freedom and
security caused by increased surveillance and data collection activity in contemporary
society." White, 533 P.2d at 233 (footnote omitted).
555. Id at 233.
556. Id at 234.
557. Id at 235.
558. 542 P.2d 977 (Cal. 1975).

records in the context of a request for those records pursuant to ordinary civil discovery procedures. 559 The bank records sought were uno
questionably relevant to a defense being asserted in the case.5
Furthermore, the Evidence Code, the exclusive source of evidentiary
privileges in California,561 did not create a privilege for confidential
bank records. Ordinarily, then, the request would have to be
honored. However, the court found, in the privacy clause, "overriding constitutional considerations . . .which impel us to recognize
some limited form of protection for confidential information given to
a bank by its customers."5 62

As it had in White, the court in Valley Bank recognized that the
scope of the privacy clause was uncertain. Unlike the court in White,
however, the court in Valley Bank did not explicitly consult the ballot argument to determine whether the privacy interest being asserted reasonably fell within the intended scope of the privacy clause.
Instead, citing a search and seizure case arising under article I, section 13, of the California Constitution, the court held that a depositer
has a reasonable expectation that confidential bank records will not
be disclosed even pursuant to a valid civil discovery request. 3 In
evaluating a privacy claim by a depositer, courts are to "indulge in a
careful balancing of the right of civil litigants to discover relevant
facts, on the one hand, with the right of bank customers to maintain
reasonable privacy regarding their financial affairs, on the other."5 8 4
To insure the depositer an opportunity to present a privacy claim, the
court held that the bank subject to the discovery request must make
reasonable efforts to notify the customer of the pendency of the proceedings and the request.5 5
The dangerous tendency to extend "privacy" to cover a myriad of
interests is clearly present in Valley Bank. Instead of consulting the
legislative history for the privacy clause, the court was quick to jump
to the conclusion that because confidential bank records are protected from unreasonable searches and seizures, they should also be
protected from civil discovery requests. The court's entire analysis is
contained in the following uninformative sentence: "Although the
amendment is new and its scope as yet is neither carefully defined
559. "In this case we consider under what circumstances a litigant may, through ordinary civil discovery procedures, obtain from a bank information disclosed to it in
confidence by a customer." d. at 979.
560. White, 533 P.2d at 234-35.
561. CAL. EvID. CODE § 911(b) (West 1966 & Supp. 1991). See, e.g., Pitchess v. Superior Court, 522 P.2d 304, 310 (Cal. 1974) (holding that "the Evidence Code ... is the

sole and authoritative arbiter of all matters which come within its purview").
562. Valley Bank, 542 P.2d at 996-97.
563. Id. at 997 (citing Burrows v. Superior Court, 529 P.2d 590 (Cal. 1974)).
564. d. at 997.
565. Id at 998.
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nor analyzed by the courts, we may safely assume the right of privacy extends to one's confidential financial affairs as well as to the
details of one's personal life."' 6
In a more rigorous analysis, nothing would be "assumed"; rather,
the issue would be whether the privacy clause, in light of its legislative history, was intended to protect the interest being asserted. If
the court had undertaken this analysis, it could plausibly have
reached the same result. As summarized in White, the ballot argument indicated a concern with "the improper use of information
properly obtained for a specific purpose; for example, the use of it for
another purpose or the disclosure of it to some third party."5 6 7 This
language would seem to naturally fit a request for civil discovery.
A more difficult question is whether the Valley Bank rule would
be consistent with a requirement of state action. On the specific facts
of Valley Bank, state action was clearly present. The bank refused to
produce the records upon request and had sought a protective order
from the trial court.56 8 The trial court ordered that the records be
produced.569 This trial court order is sufficient to establish state
5 70
action.
But the court in Valley Bank also indicated that when faced with a
discovery request for customer records, a bank is obligated to take
reasonable steps to contact the customer so the customer may decide
whether to seek a protective order. This obligation, triggered simply
by the discovery request, would result from private action, not a specific trial court order. It is problematic to imply state action under
these circumstances. At the very least, there is a reasonable argument that although a person making a civil discovery request acts
"under color of law," that person may not fairly be characterized as a
"state actor," in which case no state action would be present. 571 If
this is true, then it might appear that at least part of the Valley Bank
decision implicitly recognizes that the privacy clause applies to purely
private conduct.
566. IM, at 997 (emphasis added).

567. White, 533 P.2d at 234.
568. Valley Bank, 542 P.2d at 996.
569. Id
570. See, e.g., Carey v. Hume, 492 F.2d 631, 634-36 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Baker v. F. & F.
Investment, 470 F.2d 778, 783 (2d Cir. 1972); Cervantes v. Time, Inc., 464 F.2d 986, 99295 (8th Cir. 1972); Britt v. Superior Court, 574 P.2d 766, 773 n.3 (Cal. 1978).
571. See Flagg Brothers v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978) (finding no state action when
private party sells another's property without judicial intervention to satisfy a warehouseman's lien).

Valley Bank can be read in a way that avoids this difficulty, however. Valley Bank recognizes that a court (i.e., a state actor) may not
order disclosure of confidential bank records without considering the
customer's interests, and that if the customer's interests are sufficiently important, the court must refuse to compel the disclosure. In
order to safeguard this constitutional right, the court has created a
common law duty upon the bank to take reasonable steps to notify
the customer about a pending discovery request. In this way, Valley
Bank can be reconciled with a requirement of state action under the
572
privacy clause.
The next case to reach the supreme court under the privacy clause
573
was People v. Privitera.
The issue here was whether the privacy
clause created a constitutional right of access to drugs not approved
by the government for treatment of diseases. In particular, the defendants, who were prosecuted for distributing drugs not on the state
or federal governments' approved list of drugs, claimed that their
cancer patients had a constitutional right of access to the drug laetrile. In an extensive analysis, the court rejected the notion that such
a right could be found in the federal constitution.5 74 In a much
shorter analysis, the court came to a similar conclusion under the pri5 75
vacy clause.
In Privitera,the court returned to the type of analysis found in
White and ignored in Valley Bank. In determining whether the privacy clause supported the existence of the claimed right, the court
examined the legislative history of the privacy clause to determine
whether there existed an "intent" to create a "right of access to drugs
of unproven efficacy."S? 6 Consulting the ballot argument (which the
court again described as "in essence" the only legislative history for
the privacy clause), the court could find no evidence whatsoever
"that the voters in amending the California Constitution [intended]
to create a right of privacy.., to protect conduct of the sort engaged
in by defendants."577
The first truly significant extension of the privacy clause beyond
what the legislative history could plausibly have supported came in
City of Santa Barbarav. Adamson,578 the court's next privacy clause
case. 579 The City of Santa Barbara's zoning ordinances provided that
572. This interpretation of Valley Bank is especially appropriate in light of the
Supreme Court's own subsequent statement that the state action issue under the privacy clause is undecided. See infra notes 551-55 and accompanying text.
573. 591 P.2d 919 (Cal. 1979).
574. I& at 921-26.
575. Id at 926-27.
576. Id. at 926.
577. I. at 926-27.
578. 610 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1980).
579. A student commentator has taken the position that the court's decision in
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in certain areas, all occupants of houses must be members of a "family." "Family" was defined to include, among other things, "[a] group
of not to exceed five (5) persons, excluding servants, living together
as a single housekeeping unit in a dwelling unit."58 0 Pursuant to
these zoning laws, the City had enjoined appellants, a group of 12
adults, from living together in their single-family dwelling.
As a result of Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas5 8 l and its progeny, it
was clear that the city zoning law was constitutional under the federal constitution. Before the Supreme Court of California, the appellants challenged the ordinance only under the privacy clause,
asserting that the zoning laws violated the privacy clause's broader
protections.
It should be recalled that in White v. Davis, the court had identified the "moving force behind" the privacy clause as "a more focused
privacy concern, relating to the accelerating encroachment on personal freedom and security caused by increased surveillance and data
collection activity in contemporary society."58 2 It would require an
extraordinary feat of linguistic legerdemain to read this "focused privacy concern" as encompassing the interest in living in a house with
more than four other unrelated persons. 58 3 With little fanfare, the
court in Adamson simply ignored this language from White.
The court in Adamson did not abandon the ballot argument, however. It found support for a "right to live with whomever one wishes
or, at least, to live in an alternate family with persons not related by
blood, marriage, or adoption" in the following language contained in
the ballot argument:5 8 4
"The right of privacy is the right to be left alone. It is a fundamental and
compelling interest. It protects our homes, our families, our thoughts, our
emotions, our expressions, our personalities, our freedom of communion and
our fieedom to associatewith the people we choose."5'8 5

According to the court, the highlighted passages "evidenced the votBritt v. Superior Court, 574 P.2d 766 (Cal. 1978), involved "the scope of California privacy rights." See Note, supra note 273, at 258. The commentator is in error, however.
Britt involved claims brought under the Free Speech and Association Clauses of the
federal and state constitutions. The privacy clause was not a basis for the court's

decision.
580. Adamson, 610 P.2d at 438.
581. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
582. White, 533 P.2d at 232-33.
583. I feel obliged to credit Pierce O'Donnell, a practitioner in Los Angeles, with
the phrase "linguistic legerdemain."
584. Adamson, 610 P.2d at 439 (footnote omitted).
585. Id. (quoting Ballot Argument) (emphasis added by supreme court opinion).

ers' intent in 1972 to ensure a right of privacy not only in one's family but also in one's home." 588 From this premise, the court jumped
to its conclusion that the right to live with whomever you choose was
a right guaranteed by the privacy clause.
To describe the court's discussion as an analysis is overly charitable. The ballot argument identifies the home, the family, and the
right of association as general areas which the right to privacy may
protect. However, the ballot argument fails to suggest the extent to
which the right to privacy protects these areas. There is no indication that all aspects of home life, all aspects of family, and all rights
of association are protected by privacy interests. The ballot argument, therefore, does not answer whether the particular right being
asserted-"the right to live with whomever one wishes or, at least, to
live in an alternate family with persons not related by blood, marriage, or adoption"-is protected by the privacy clause.
The court skips this step in its analysis, a skip criticized strongly by
the three-justice dissent.58 7 Having quickly determined that the right
to live with whomever you choose is a right protected by the privacy
clause, the court then proceeds to a "strict scrutiny" analysis using
the "compelling interest" test.58 8 The court predictably strikes the
statute down under this test focusing upon the arbitrary line (ie., no
more than five unrelated persons living together) drawn by the
statute.58 9
One of the important lessons which the court learned in Adamson
was that the privacy clause provides freedom to go far beyond the
constitutional boundaries set by the Supreme Court of the United
States. In Adamson, the court reached a result under the privacy
clause contrary to the decision in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas.590
In the court's next privacy clause case, Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers,591 involving state limitations on the funding
of abortion, the court reached a result contrary to the decision in
Harris v. McRae,592 which involved federal limitations on funding
abortions.
It would stretch the truth to claim that the court heavily relied
upon the privacy clause in Myers. In fact, the California Supreme
Court had declared in People v. Belous, before the privacy clause ex586. Id, at 439.
587. 1i at 447-48 (Manuel, J., dissenting).
588. The ballot argument specifically identifies privacy as a "fundamental and compelling interest ... (which] should be abridged only when there is a compelling public
need." Ballot Argument, supra note 517. The court in White also indicated that strict
scrutiny was the appropriate form of analysis. White, 533 P.2d at 234.
589. Adamson, 610 P.2d at 440-43.
590. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
591. 625 P.2d 779 (Cal. 1981).
592. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
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isted, that the abortion decision was constitutionally protected under
both the federal and state Constitutions. 593 In theory, then, the court
could have decided Myers without citing the privacy clause. Yet the
temptation to rely upon the privacy clause was too great for the
court, hence it relied upon the "explicit constitutional status" of privacy in the California Constitution to support its holding.5 94
As it had done in Valley Bank, the court in Myers did not carefully
examine the ballot argument to determine whether the privacy
clause was intended to protect the abortion decision, much less to
give greater protection to the abortion decision than was given under
the federal constitution. Instead, the court engaged in a facile but
misleading syllogism: the right to bear children is a privacy right;
the privacy clause protects the right of privacy; therefore, the privacy
clause protects the right to bear children.
The fallacy in this argument is that it sweeps within the scope of
the privacy clause all common law and statutory causes of action that
in one way or another protect an interest which may properly be
characterized as a privacy interest. For example, the right to be free
from unwanted bodily contact is a privacy right; the privacy clause
protects the right of privacy; therefore, the privacy clause protects
the right to be free from unwanted bodily contact. Voile! The law of
5 95
battery now has an independent constitutional basis.
Or consider this: The right to be left alone is a privacy right; when
government taxes me, it invades my right to be left alone; the privacy
clause protects the right of privacy; therefore, the privacy clause pro5 96
tects me from unwanted government taxes.
As can be seen, the type of analysis engaged in by the court can
lead to the creation of a dizzying variety of privacy interests and
doubtful constitutional protections. Of course, this result is no surprise. Common law courts long have recognized that the word "privacy" has such amorphous contours, that any common law cause of
593. 458 P.2d 194 (Cal. 1969). The court in Belou had no need to distinguish between4 the scope of protection afforded under the state as opposed to the federal constitution. The court cited both state and federal cases in support of its conclusion that
the right to choose whether to bear a child was protected under both constitutions. Id.
at 203.
594. Myers, 625 P.2d at 789 (emphasis in original).
595. See, eg., People v. McDonnell, 163 P. 1046, 1056 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1917)
(holding that the state may not "deprive a person - at least a person who is not a
wrongdoer - of the right of self-defense. The right to defend life is one of the inalienable rights guaranteed by the constitution of the State. CAL. CONST. art I., § 1").
596. Does anyone believe that the Tax Code could survive strict scrutiny?

action for so-called invasions of privacy must in truth be grounded in
other interests. The definitional problem is no simpler in the context
of a constitutional right of privacy; indeed, the problem is, if anything, magnified in the constitutional context because of the judicial
branch's supremacy in matters of constitutional law. Nor is the problem made any simpler by explicitly including the word "privacy"
within the text of the constitution. The problem is not one of implicit versus explicit status; the problem is simply one of definition.
In White v. Davis, the Supreme Court of California clearly recognized these definitional dangers, noting that "the general concept of
privacy relates, of course, to an enormously broad and diverse field of
personal action and belief. '597 That is what led the court in White to
focus its attention upon the legislative history in search of "a more
focused privacy concern."598 Finding nothing explicit in the legislative history that was then available, the court in Myers simply assumed that a privacy interest was implicated. 599 White and Myers
thus represent two vastly different approaches to the interpretation
of the privacy clause.
Myers is the last significant case from the California Supreme
Court interpreting the privacy clause. There are, to be sure, several
cases subsequent to Myers in which the court relied in part upon the
privacy clause, but the cases are not as significant. In Perkey v. Department of Motor Vehicles,60 the court held that a mandatory fingerprint requirement as a condition to receipt of a driver's license did
not violate the applicant's right to privacy, but the court cited only
the Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments in its discussion.6 0 '
In Long Beach City Employees Association v. City of Long Beach,6 0 2
the court, in extended dicta covering six pages,60 3 indicated that requiring a public employee to take a polygraph examination as a condition to continued employment burdened privacy rights protected, in
part, by the privacy clause.8 s 4 The court's extended discussion was
597. White, 533 P.2d at 233.

598. Id.
599. Myers, 625 P.2d at 796. In light of the legislative history discussed above, Myers can now be put upon a more solid foundation. Belou had already been decided,
and the committee reports, although not citing Beous, highlighted Griswold (which
the court relied upon in Beous).
600. 721 P.2d 50 (Cal. 1986).
601. Id. at 53. An issue was raised in the case whether the Department of Motor
Vehicle's practice of permitting public access to its fingerprint file, upon payment of a
fee, violated the privacy clause. The court did not have to decide this issue, however,
since it interpreted the Information Practices Act of 1977, which was enacted to implement the privacy clause, as forbidding DMV's practice. Id. at 53-54.
602. 719 P.2d 660 (Cal. 1986).

603. Id. at 663-66.
604. In reaching this conclusion, the court noted that the ballot argument indicated
that privacy "'protects our homes, our families, our thoughts, our emotions, our expressions, our personalities."' Id. at 663 (emphasis in Supreme Court opinion). Ac-
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dicta because the court ultimately struck down the requirement
under the equal protection clause rather than under the privacy
clause.605 Finally, in Vinson v. SuperiorCourt,606 the court discussed
whether a plaintiff had a privacy interest in the details of her prior
sexual history. In the context of a sexual harassment and intentional
infliction of emotional distress suit the court strongly suggested that
a privacy right existed.607 The case was ultimately decided on the basis of a recently enacted amendment,to the Civil Procedure Code limited discovery of prior sexual history in such cases by requiring,
among other things, a showing of "specific facts showing good cause
for that discovery. '608
B. Applying the Privacy Clause to Purely Private Conduct and
Actors
Even if the decisions above are contrary to .the intent of the privacy
clause, the damage done is slight. The cases all involve the relationship of government to the people. Although a few of the decisions
have far reaching social implications, such as the decisions involving
the right to procreative choice, 609 the bulk of the decisions relate to
less controversial subjects.
Much more significant than any of these decisions, however, is the
holding by several courts of appeals that the privacy clause regulates
private actors as well as the state. With these holdings, the scope of
the privacy clause is dramatically widened to potentially encompass
the full range of civil disputes among private persons. To date, the
Supreme Court of California has addressed this issue only by noting
decisions by the lower courts with neither approval nor
610
disapproval.
cording to the court, polygraph examinations burden a privacy interest in "exclud[ing]
others from our mental processes" because "[a] polygraph examination is specifically
designed to overcome this privacy by compelling communication of 'thoughts, sentiments, and emotions' which the examinee may have chosen not to communicate." Id,

at 663.
605. 1L at 666 n.12 (stating that "[s]ince [plaintiff] relies primarily on its contention
that Bureau employees were denied equal protection, we need not decide at this juncture whether their right of privacy was improperly violated ..
"). See also i& at 672
(Bird, C.J., concurring) (concluding that compulsory polygraph testing violates right to
privacy).
606. 740 P.2d 404 (Cal. 1987).
607. Id at 410-11.
608. 1& at 411 (discussing CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 2036.1).
609. Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers, 625 P.2d 779 (Cal. 1981).
610. Schmidt v. Superior Court, 769 P.2d 932, 944 n.14 (Cal. 1989):

Extending the privacy clause to purely private conduct would not
be controversial if the results reached in the cases were essentially
consistent with the results reached pursuant to a statute or the common law. It appears clear, however, that the courts of appeal in California are using the privacy clause to reach results that are contrary
to the results which would be reached under a statutory or common
law analysis. The courts are thus engaging in precisely the sort of illegitimate decision-making identified above.
It should come as no surprise that the results being reached under
a privacy clause analysis go far beyond what is known to the common
law or what is required by statute. Having found that the privacy
clause applies and that the defendant's conduct burdens the plaintiff's interest in privacy, these courts mechanically apply language
found in the ballot argument to the effect that only a "compelling interest" can justify burdening the right to privacy. The "compelling
interest" test, which usually goes hand-in-hand with strict scrutiny, is
virtually impossible even for the government to satisfy when defending a public statute enacted by the legislature.611 Needless to say, a
private person will have extraordinary difficultly in establishing a
"compelling interest" in anything the person does.612 The "compelling interest" test loads the scales heavily in favor of the plaintiff,
dramatically altering the balance achieved by the common law and
613
statutes in adjusting the competing rights of private parties.
Extending the privacy clause to purely private conduct was accomplished in Porten v. University of San Francisco.614 The plaintiff in
Porten was a student at the University of San Francisco ("USF") who
had applied to the State Scholarship and Loan Commission for a
loan. The complaiat alleged that the University, a private school,
sent to the Commission, a state agency, a copy of the grades the applicant had received at Columbia University before transferring to
USF, despite a promise by USF not to disclose the grades and despite
the alleged absence of a request from the Commission for the
611. "When expressed as a standard for judicial review, strict scrutiny is, in Professor Gunther's formulation, 'strict' in theory and usually 'fatal' in fact." LAURENCE H.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTION LAw § 16-6, at 1451 (2d ed. 1988).
612. Certain situations can be imagined when a private person would have a compelling interest in adopting a particular course of conduct. A private person no doubt
has a compelling interest in self-preservation. See, e.g., People v. McDonnell, 163 P.
1046, 1057 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1917) (grounding the right of self-defense in article I,
section 1). Therefore, a private person is able to invade even the privacy of someone's
bedroom if that is the only way to avoid being killed by a pursuer.
613. See supra notes 249-301 and accompanying text.
614. 134 Cal. Rptr. 839 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976). The court in Porten did not need to
apply the "compelling interest" test. Thus, the first case to extend the privacy clause
to purely private conduct did so without being forced to confront the analytical
problems created by the extension.
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grades. 6 15 The superior court dismissed plaintiff's pro per complaint
for breach of a confidential relationship after sustaining a
6 16
demurrer.
The demurrer was properly sustained insofar as the complaint
rested upon the common law or statutes. There simply was no statute which even remotely addressed the facts raised in the complaint.6 17 The only plausible common law privacy theories were
public disclosure of private facts and breach of confidential relationship.6 ' 8 Public disclosure had been interpreted by prior cases to require widespread communication. 19 Therefore, the elements for
public disclosure of private facts were not met because the grades
were disclosed only to the Commission. 62 0 Breach of confidential relationship, which the plaintiff had originally pled but subsequently
abandoned, was unavailable because there was no evidence of a confidential relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant.6 2 1
There was an unenforceable assurance given by the defendant to the
plaintiff that the grades would not be disclosed. However, there was
not the sort of confidential relationship that imposed upon the defendant a duty of nondisclosure.
The court of appeals reversed. 622 The court agreed that there was
no statutory or common law cause of action.62 3 However, it found
that the complaint alleged a prima facie violation of the privacy
clause.624 One would expect that the first case to extend the privacy
clause to purely private conduct would have contained a discussion of
that significant extension. However, the court did not satisfy this expectation. Instead, the court's entire discussion of the state action issue is contained in the following passage, as though the issue were
either already decided or perfectly clear:
Privacy is protected not merely against state action; it is considered an inalienable right which may not be violated by anyone. The language of the election
615. Id, at 840, 843 n.6.
616. Id at 840.
617. Id
618. Id, The other three common law privacy theories were clearly inapplicable.
The defendant did not misappropriate the plaintiff's name or likeness, the defendant
did not intrude upon the plaintiff's solitude, and the defendant did not place the plaintiff in a false light. Indeed, quite the opposite was true.
619. See, e.g., Schwartz v. Thiele, 51 Cal. Rptr. 767, 770-71 (Cal. Ct. App. 1966) (citing Santieseban v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 306 F.2d 9, 11 (5th Cir. 1962)).
620. Porten, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 841.
621. See id&at 840.
622. Id, at 844.
623. Id. at 841.
624. Id. at 843.

brochure argument refers to "effective
restraints on the information activities
625
of government and business."

Despite the citations to the voters pamphlet, one case, and a student note in the Hastings Law Journal, the issue had not been settled. As discussed in detail above, the phrase "government and
626
business" which appears in the Voters Pamphlet is ambiguous.
The phrase may suggest that the privacy clause applies to purely private conduct and not merely to that private cooperation with the
state which so links the two that state action is implied. The court of
appeals in Porten adopted the former construction without
62 7
discussion.
The court in Porten relied upon Annenberg v. Southern California
6 28
which did not arise under the privacy
DistrictCouncil of Laborers,
clause. Annenberg involved the right of a domestic servant to picket
his employer's private residence, which was also the servant's place
of employment. The employer had successfully sought a preliminary
injunction from the superior court upon a showing that the pickets
involved "disturbances, coercion and harassment." 629 In reversing,
the court of appeals noted that resolution of the issue involved a balancing of the employee's right to picket peacefully against the homeowner's right to privacy. 63 0 This unexceptional observation was well
supported by a plethora of cases involving picketing private residences. 63 ' As additional support for this holding, and to support the
statement that the "right to privacy, if not becoming more important,
is, at least, receiving better recognition," 632 the court cited to the pri-

vacy clause in a string cite along with Griswold v. Connecticut,633 Roe
v. Wade,6 4 and People v. Cahan.635 The cite was the court's only ref625. I& at 842 (citing Annenberg v. Southern Cal. Dist. Council of Laborers, 113
Cal. Rptr. 519 (1974)); CALIFORNIA VOTERS PAMPHLET 26 (1972); Lawrence M. Newman, Note, Rediscovering the CaliforniaDeclaration of Rights, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 481
(1974).
626. CALIFORNIA VOTERS PAMPHLET, supra note 625, at 26. See also supra notes
518-624 and accompanying text.
627. Porten, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 843.
628. 113 Cal. Rptr. 519 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974).

629. Id at 521.
630. Id at 523-24.
631. Id at 522. The court cites the following cases which balanced the rights of the
employees against the rights of the private homeowner in the context of private residence picketing: State v. Zanker, 229 N.W. 311 (Minn. 1930); State v. Perry, 265 N.W.
302 (Minn. 1936); People v. Kaye, 1 N.Y.S.2d 354 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1937); Petrucci v. Hogan, 27 N.Y.S.2d 718 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1941); Hebrew Home & Hosp. for Chronic Sick, Inc.
v. Davis, 235 N.Y.S.2d 318 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1962); Pipe Machinery Co. v. DeMore, 76

N.E.2d 725 (Ohio Ct. App. 1947).
632. Annenberg, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 524.
633. 381 U.S. 479 (1964).
634. 410 U.S. 113 (1972).
635. 282 P.2d 905 (Cal. 1955). The entire paragraph leading up to the string cite
reads as follows: "On the other hand, we have the unquestioned right of the householder or the home owner to privacy, to a sanctuary reasonably secure from outside
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erence to the privacy clause.
The fleeting reference to the privacy clause in Annenberg was
transmogrified by the court in Porten to stand for the proposition
that the privacy clause creates "an inalienable right which may not
be violated by anyone." 636 Annenberg established no such thing. The
injunction in Annenberg was not based upon the privacy clause. It
was based upon principles of labor law and nuisance. 637 The privacy
interest related only to a balancing of interests made necessary by
the defendants' claim that their picketing activity was constitutionally exempt from regulation by the state by virtue of the rights of
speech and association.636 The defendants claimed that the state
could not enjoin their conduct because of their constitutional rights,
and the court then balanced those constitutional rights against the
privacy interest of the homeowner. The court in Annenberg did not
cite the privacy clause to establish a cause of action against the picketers. Rather, it cited the privacy clause for the simple proposition
that the right of privacy has received increasing recognition by the
law.639
Porten's reliance upon Annenberg is completely
unwarranted.
The Porten court's reliance upon footnote 138 in a student note
published in the Hastings Law Journal is only marginally justified.
The student note is titled "Rediscovering the California Declaration
of Rights,"640 and the note is written with the general purpose of discussing the extent to which rights guaranteed under the state constitution may be broader than analogous rights guaranteed under the
federal constitution. In the course of a discussion of impermissible
searches and seizures, the note proposes that the privacy clause
might be used as the basis for a cause of action by one private citizen
against another private person for an unreasonably intrusive search,
notwithstanding the existence of a civil tort cause of action for the
same wrong.641 Later the student author sees the clause as a trigger
intrusion, and to a sheltered place for the family. As our society desperately attempts
to drown itself in overpopulation, this right of privacy, if not becoming more important, is, at least, receiving better recognition. It has been judicially declared that this
right of privacy is well within the penumbra of the Bill of Rights. (California Constitution, art. 1, section 1; see Griswold v. Connecticut .... )." Annenberg, 113 Cal. Rptr.
at 524.
636. Porten, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 842.
637. Annenberg, 113 Cal, Rptr. at 523-24.
638. Id
639. 1& at 524.
640. See Newman, supra note 625.
641. 1d. at 503.

for application of an exclusionary rule in cases where the searcher
has turned over the fruits of the search to government authorities for
use in a criminal proceeding.4 2
The author of the note recognized that there was a state action issue involved in applying the privacy clause to purely private conduct.
Footnote 138, cited by the Porten court, was intended to supply the
relevant argument and authorities in support of the position that the
privacy clause applied to purely private actors. Footnote 138 provides, in relevant part, as follows:
This section [article I, section 1] is, of course, a part of California's bill of
rights, a document primarily aimed at limiting government power. However,
the right to privacy is not by its terms limited to state action. Current case
law indicates the right to privacy will protect citizens against all persons, not
643
just government officials.

This argument falls apart under scrutiny. First, the author relies
upon Annenberg, which does not stand for the proposition that the
privacy clause applies to purely private conduct.644 Second, the author suggests that the absence of any language in the privacy clause
explicitly limiting its application to state actors means that the privacy clause may apply to purely private actors. Yet the author recognizes that California's bill of rights is generally aimed at limiting
only government power. 645 Further, many of those provisions do not
by their terms contain a state action requirement, yet the Supreme
Court of California has, in at least one case, imposed such a requirement.6 46 The student note thus fails to adequately support the
Porten court's conclusion that the privacy clause applies to purely

private conduct.
Although the holding in Porten clearly rests upon shaky ground,
the courts of appeal and subsequent commentators have accepted
Porten as a proper interpretation of the privacy clause. 647 One of the
most complete recent discussions of the issue is contained in Wilkinson v. Times MirrorCorp., a drug testing case arising in the context
of a private employer. 4 8 The issue was whether the privacy clause is

violated when a private employer requires prospective employees to
642. Id. at 504.
643. 1d at 504 n.138 (citing Annenberg, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 519).
644. See aupra notes 635-43 and accompanying text.
645. Newman, supra note 625, at 491-92.
646. Kruger v. Wells Fargo Bank, 521 P.2d 441 (Cal. 1974).
647. See, e.g., Wilkinson v. Times Mirror Corp., 264 Cal. Rptr. 194 (Cal. Ct. App.
1989). It should be remembered that Porten could be decided the same way even if a
state action requirement were read into the privacy clause. Although the University of
San Francisco is a private institution, even a private university could arguably satisfy a
state action requirement only somewhat more liberal than the federal state action requirement. See discussion of Pruneyard,supra notes 447-52 and accompanying text.
648. Wilkinson, supra note 647. See David F. Linowes & Ray C. Spencer, Privacy:
The Workplace Issue of the '90s, 23 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 591 (1990) (discussing invasions of privacy by private employers).
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undergo urinalysis as a condition to an offer of employment. 649
The court began its analysis of the state action issue by incorrectly
noting that "courts have recognized the ballot argument in support of
the amendment as its only available legislative historiy."6.0 To support this statement, the court cited White v. Davis6 51 and People v.
Privitera.652 Yet those cases said only that the ballot argument "represents, in essence, the only 'legislative history' of the constitutional
amendment available to us."653 In fact, as revealed above, there is a
rich legislative history for the privacy clause which goes far beyond
the ballot argument and, equally important, makes it possible to understand the ballot argument.
The court's review of the ballot argument focuses predictably upon
the references to "business" and the explicit mention of applications
for credit cards and life insurance policies. The court concludes its
analysis of the ballot argument as follows:
If the collection and retention of information by private businesses were intended to be excluded from the reach of the amendment, the ballot argument
would not have mentioned credit card applications and insurance policies.
The argument's repeated references to information-gathering activities by
both government and business lead inexorably to the conclusion that the
amendment was intended to reach both governmental and nongovernmental
conduct. 6 4

In light of the complete legislative history, these references are
unconvincing. 5
The court next turns to the cases, and finds that although the
649. Wilkinson, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 196. There are no civil statutes which prohibit
this practice, and it seems apparent that the common law does not proscribe drug testing by urinalysis either as a condition for the offer of employment or as a condition for
continued at-will employment. Drug testing in these circumstances is viewed by the
common law as a voluntary act of consent by the prospective or current employee.
The fact that the applicant or employee who refuses to take the test will not be offered
continued employment does not vitiate the applicant's or employee's consent.
The Supreme Court upheld government-mandated drug testing of employees in a
regulated industry when on-the-job drug use could have serious safety consequences.
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989). The Court also upheld testing of certain employees in the customs service. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989). These results in these cases are an
additional reason why California courts have turned to the privacy clause to justify
contrary results.
650. 264 Cal. Rptr. at 197-98.
651. 533 P.2d 222 (Cal. 1975).
652. 591 P.2d 919 (Cal. 1979).
653. White, 533 P.2d at 234 (emphasis added). Privitera,591 P.2d at 926 (quoting
White, 533 P.2d at 234).
654. Wilkinson, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 198.
655. See supra notes 468-545 and accompanying text.

Supreme Court of California has not addressed the issue except by
way of dicta, the courts of appeal and one federal district court have
6
unanimously applied the privacy clause to purely private conduct. W
Each of the cases cited relied upon Porten and the ballot argument.6 5 7

The court also notes that "[m]any commentators" have

come to the same conclusion.6 58 Each of those commentators relied
again upon Porten, subsequent cases and the ballot argument.6 5 9 Finally, the court incorrectly relies upon Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center660 for the proposition that "a conclusion that this state's
Constitution provides some protection for its citizens against private
conduct breaks no new legal ground." 66 ' This, of course, overstates
the holding in Pruneyard, which involved quasi-public action. 66 2
Further, the court in Porten failed to consider whether the circumstances that led the court in Pruneyard to extend the state free
speech clause to a large shopping center were present in the context
of a suit against The Times Mirror Company, a private employer engaged in publishing and television broadcasting.66 3
Wilkinson is one of the few cases where the court of appeals held
that there was no constitutional violation even though the privacy
8
clause applied.w
4 The court reached this holding by explicitly aban656. Wilkinson, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 199-200.
657. See Cutter v. Brownbridge, 228 Cal. Rptr. 545, 549 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986); Chico
Feminist Women's Health Ctr. v. Scully, 256 Cal. Rptr. 194, 200 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989);
Chico Feminist Women's Health Ctr. v. Butte Glenn Med. S., 557 F. Supp. 1190, 1202-03
(E.D. Cal. 1983).
658. Wilkinson, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 200.
659. KuRT H. DECKER, EMPLOYEE PRIVACY LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 3.10-3.11, at 130-

32 (1987); Patricia A. Hunter, Note, Your Urine or Your Job: Is Private Employee
Drug Urinalysis Constitutional in California, 19 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1451, 1482-83
(1986); Allison Rose, Comment, Mandatory Drug Testing of College Athletes: Are Athletes Being Denied Their ConstitutionalRights, 16 PEPP. L. REV. 45, 58 n.129 (1988).
660. Wilkinson, 592 P.2d 341 (Cal. 1979).
661. 264 Cal. Rptr. at 200.
662. See supra notes 452-68 and accompanying text. Pruneyarddoes not necessarily stand for the proposition that the California Constitution protects citizens against
all purely private conduct. Pruneyard stands only for the proposition that the free
speech clause of the California Constitution applies to certain private owners of shopping centers which, from the perspective of the public, are like public streets, parks
and downtown business districts. There are significant reasons to believe that most
private employers are not sufficiently public to make it fair to characterize their conduct as state or government action. See infra notes 602-606 and accompanying text.
663. Wilkinson, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 194. Cf. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d
373, 393 (Cal. 1988) (stating that in the court's view, "the underlying problem in the
line of cases relied on by plaintiff lies in the decisions' uncritical incorporation of the
insurance model into the employment context, without careful consideration of the
fundamental policies underlying the development of tort and contract law in general
or of significant differences between the insurer/insured and employer/employee
relationships").
664. See also Miller v. Murphy, 191 Cal. Rptr. 740, 744-45 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (upholding ordinance which required pawnbrokers to obtain customers' fingerprints).
There are a number of cases which hold that the privacy clause's protections are
triggered only if the plaintiff has a personal and objectively reasonable expectation of
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doning the "compelling interest" test and applying something akin to
the "rational basis" test, asking only "whether the challenged conduct is reasonable."665 According to the court, "even if challenged
conduct has some impact on the right of privacy, as long as that right
is not substantially burdened or affected, justification by a compelling
interest is not required." 66 6
Although the court's language here suggests that it is creating a
two-tiered analysis-if an insubstantial burden, then rational basis, if
a substantial burden, then compelling interest-other language in the
opinion suggests a sliding scale approach.6 6 7 Thus, in introducing its
actual analysis, the court asks: "Did [the defendant's] request so substantially burden plaintiffs' right of privacy that the request was constitutionally unreasonable and therefore impermissible?"68
Focusing primarily upon the plaintiff's status of job applicant, as
opposed to an existing employee, the court held that his interest in
privacy was not substantially burdened by requiring the applicant to
reveal whatever private information would be disclosed by drug and
alcohol testing. The holding also required that the testing take place
during an ordinary physical examination, and the circumstances surrounding the testing minimize the intrusion upon the applicant's privacy. 66 9 In light of Foley v. Interactive Data Corp.,6 70 the court's
privacy. See, e.g., Chico Feminist Women's Health Ctr. v. Scully, 256 Cal. Rptr. 194
(Cal. Ct. App. 1989); Alarcon v. Murphy, 248 Cal. Rptr. 26, 29 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988);
People ex rel. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Superior Court, 210 Cal. Rptr. 695, 703-04 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1985); Stackler v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 164 Cal. Rptr. 203 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1980); Armenta v. Superior Court, 132 Cal. Rptr. 586, 588 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976). In
one sense, these cases implicitly reject the "compelling interest" test because the defendant's conduct need merely be reasonable. Only if the defendant's conduct were
unreasonable could the plaintiff have a reasonable expectation of privacy.
665. Wilkinson, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 203.
666. Id. In reaching this conclusion, the court relied heavily upon the supreme
court's decision in Schmidt v. Superior Court, 769 P.2d 932 (Cal. 1989). The court in
Schmidt did not articulate the standard enunciated by the Wilkinson court. Indeed,
the court in Schmidt did not clearly articulate any standard for its decision. It does
appear, however, that the Wilkinson court correctly interprets Schmidt as requiring
something less than a "compelling interest," although what that something is is not
clear from Schmidt.
667. The difference between two-tiers of scrutiny and a sliding scale may be only
semantic. Various justices of the Supreme Court of the United States have noted that
the two- or three- tiers of constitutional review employed by the Court in assessing
equal protection challenges may be more accurately described as a sliding scale, in
which the benefits of particular governmental action are compared with the burdens
on private rights. See, e.g., San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973)
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
668. Wilkinson, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 203.
669. Id. at 203-04.

reliance upon the distinction between a prospective employee and an
existing employee would appear doubtful, at least in the context of
an at-will employee.671
The approach adopted in Wilkinson mirrors a common law approach in which the interests of both parties are balanced against
each other without giving any one interest overwhelming weight.
Having adopted a test that approximates a common law balancing of
interests, it should come as no shock that the result reached in Wilkinson is the result that probably would be reached by a common
law court. The prospective employee's consent to the test, which in
context is not a consent rendered under duress, makes the employer's conduct privileged.
In stark contrast to Wilkinson, is the decision by the California
Court of Appeal for the Sixth Appellate Distiict in Hill v. National
Collegiate Athletic Association. 672 The drug testing program in Hill
was implemented by the NCAA and Stanford University. Both Stanford and the NCAA are private actors for federal constitutional purposes. 6 7 3 Relying upon Porten and other cases, the court in Hill held
that the absence of state action was no bar to the action.6 7 4
Unlike the court in Wilkinson, the court in Hill brought the full
weight of "strict scrutiny" and the "compelling interest" test to bear
upon the drug testing program.6 7 5 The program naturally collapsed
under the heavy weight for a variety of interconnected reasons. The
NCAA advanced only two rationales for the program: to promote
athlete health and fair competition.67 6 Athlete health was rejected as
a compelling justification because, among other reasons, (1) the
670. 765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988)
671. Id. Strictly speaking, Foley dealt only with the tort of wrongful discharge, and
nothing in Foley would suggest any limitation upon a cause of action under the privacy
clause. The predominate import of Foley seems to be that an at-will employee is little
better than a prospective employee - neither one has a significant, legally protectable
interest, with the single exception of a cause of action under Tameny for termination
in violation of public policy. Therefore, the court in Luck v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co., 267 Cal. Rptr. 618 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990), recognized the implications of
Foley by denying recovery of tort damages for wrongful discharge despite finding that
the private employer's drug testing program resulted in a significant burden upon the
plaintiff's privacy interests. The court permitted recovery on a contract theory for bad

faith breach of contract and based the finding of bad faith upon the Privacy Clause.
672. 273 Cal. Rptr. 402 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
673. See, e.g., NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179 (1988). As noted above, there may
exist a different state action analysis under state law, and the Supreme Court of California should, in its review of Hill, begin its analysis by discussing whether either
Stanford or the NCAA should be considered a state actor under the state constitution.
See supra notes 416-67 and accompanying text.
674. Hill, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 408.
675. Id. at 410 n.7. The court acknowledged Wilkinson's rational basis standard in
a footnote, but did not explain why the intrusion in Hill was more substantial than the
intrusion in Wilkinson.
676. Id. at 417-21.
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NCAA could not prove that drug use was any more prevalent among
athletes than the population generally, (2) there was no evidence to
suggest that drug use had contributed to any competition-related injury, and (3) there were many substances not on the list of banned
substances that could be even more harmful to athletes (e.g., alcohol
and cigarettes). 677 The court rejected the second reason-fair competition-because the NCAA failed to prove that use of any substance
678
on the banned list gave any athlete a competitive advantage.
Even if there had been a compelling need for the program, the
court still may have struck it down because all drug testing programs
are prone to significant errors of both overinclusion and underinclusion in virtually all aspects of their operation. 679 The court noted the
following problems, among others: (1) the list of banned drugs does
not include many harmful drugs;68 0 (2) the list of drugs includes
some over-the-counter or prescription drugs that may, in proper circumstances, actually be necessary for the athlete's health;681 (3) the
testing program only affects post-season tournament play rather than
year-round competition; 68 2 (4) athletes are disqualified not because of
actual use of drugs, but only because of a positive NCAA drug test
result (ie., a negative NCAA test result will be followed even if the
school's own test result is positive and even if the student has confessed to drug use); 683 and (5) significant errors in the testing process
itself are likely to occur (with both false positives and false
negatives). 68 4
The problem with both Wilkinson and Hill from the perspective of
judicial administration is that both courts rely explicitly upon a delicate balancing of private interests in reaching their conclusions. The
courts have no other choice because the privacy clause is devoid of
substantive content. It identifies an interest, but nowhere indicates
how that interest is to be balanced against competing interests.
Under the privacy clause, a court has no choice but to balance the interests being asserted in an essentially ad hoc manner in every case.
677. Id. at 415-16.
678. There was in fact expert testimony to the effect that "there was no scientific
evidence to show that anabolic steroids would enhance performance in any athlete."
Id at 421-22.
679. Id
680. Id at 411-12.
681. Id at 412.
682. Id at 412-13.
683. Id
684. Id at 414-15.

That is the ultimate nature of a balancing approach to decisionmaking.
By contrast, the common law rules applicable to the facts in Wilkinson and Hill are both well-established and relatively easy to apply
because they are comparatively specific. Undoubtedly, the rules
themselves have been crafted in an effort to balance competing interests, but the balancing has been done in the formulation of the rule
itself, and it then becomes less critical in every case to reappraise the
balance.
The evils associated with an ad hoc balancing of private interests
are amplified when one interest is singled out for special treatment
and protection. By invoking strict scrutiny and a compelling interest
test, the court in Hill has dramatically altered the balance that had
been achieved at common law. Indeed, under a strict scrutiny analysis, little attempt is made to balance interests. Instead, the interest in
privacy is permitted to trump almost all other interests.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The significant body of authorities that now support the proposition that the privacy clause applies to purely private conduct are teetering perilously upon a single slim reed: that the ballot argument,
supposedly the only piece of legislative history available, mentions
"business" and refers to credit card and life insurance policies. When
this reed is cut down to size by an analysis of the complete legislative
history, the entire set of case authorities and commentary comes
crashing down. The Supreme Court of California should use Hill to
accomplish this demolition.
In subsequent cases involving state action, the courts should pay
greater attention to the legislative history for the privacy clause and
should heed the warning in White v. Davis that, in the absence of
some significant limitations, "privacy relates . . .to an enormously
broad and diverse field of personal action and belief."685 The legislature was aware that by adding the privacy clause to the constitution,
the interest in privacy was being given an independent footing. This
suggests that the privacy clause is properly interpreted as protecting
something more than, or at least different from, the federal constitutional right to privacy.
The challenge is one of finding an appropriate limitation. Two possibilities stand out for future development. First, the legislative history-including the ballot arguments-suggests a primary concern
with the improper collection and distribution of personal informa685. White, 553 P.2d at 233.
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The privacy clause could be limited to that type of privacy
interest, to the exclusion of other asserted privacy interests, such as
the interest in living with whomever one chooses.687 Second, the
California Supreme Court could attempt to define "privacy" narrowly (e.g., as involving only "fundamentalprivacy interests"). This
would be something like what the U.S. Supreme Court has attempted
to do in its interpretation of the federal right to privacy. 68s The
Supreme Court was of course interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of "liberty" by drawing upon cases defining "liberty." The California Supreme Court does not have this luxury and
must instead formulate a free-standing definition of "privacy." This
will not be an easy challenge to meet, and the fact that the court has
so far failed to offer such a definition in its privacy clause cases suggests that the court is wary of making the attempt.
tion.686

686. Of course the legislative history also includes references to Griswold v. Connecticut, suggesting that the privacy clause's scope is broader than improper collection
and misuse of information.
687. City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson, 610 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1980). Adamson, which
was based entirely upon the privacy clause, should accordingly be overruled. Under
this test, it would appear that the privacy clause would also not protect a woman's constitutional right to seek abortion, the restriction of which by state law would not seem
to involve misuse or improper collection of information by the government. This is not
to say that the abortion funding decision in Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights
v. Myers, 625 P.2d 779 (Cal. 1981), must be overruled. The privacy clause was not the
centerpiece of the decision in Myers, and Myers could well be decided the same way
without the benefit of the privacy clause.
688. See the discussion of Bowers, supra text accompanying notes 331-343.

APPENDIX
EXHIBIT A.
Article I, Section 1, Prior to Amendment.
All men are by nature free and independent, and have certain inalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life
and liberty; acquiring, possessing, and protecting property; and pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness.
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EXHIBIT B.
Assembly Constitutional Amendment No. 69 (1971).
Assembly ConstitutionalAmendment No. 69-A resolution to propose
to the people of the State of California an amendment to the Constitution of the state, by amending Section 1 of Article I thereof, relating to inalienablerights.
LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST
ACA 69, as introduced, Cory (Jud.). Inalienable rights.
Amends Sec. 1, Art. I, Cal. Const.
Includes pursuing and obtaining of privacy among inalienable

rights.
Vote2/3; Appropriation-No; Fiscal Committee-No.
Resolved by the Assembly, the Senate concurring,the Legislature of
the State of California at its 1971 Regular Session commencing on the
fourth day of January, 1971, two-thirds of the members elected to
each of the two houses of the Legislature voting therefor, hereby proposes to the people of the State of California that the Constitution of
the state be amended by amending Section 1 of Article I thereof, to
read:
Section 1. All men are by nature free and independent, and have
certain inalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty; acquiring, possessing, and protecting property; and pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness, and privacy.

EXHIBIT C.
Assembly Bill No. 2933 (1971).
An act to add Section 456.8 to the Elections Code, to amend Sections
6252, 6253, and 11731 of, and to add Section 6253.5 and 11702 to, the
Government Code, and to amend Section 631 of, and to add Section
631.1 to, the Penal Code, relating to personal data.
LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST
AB 2933, as introduced, Cory (Jud.). Personal data.
Amends, adds, various secs., Ed.C., Gov.C., Pen.C.
Specifies that a county clerk can only make voter registration information available for election or governmental purposes.
Provides every person has right to read and copy any record or
writing, whether public or confidential, pertaining directly to him
and to add to or correct any such record or writing on presenting
specified information.
Requires recording on such records of date, name, and address of
person using record and requires such person to respond in writing to
written request of person whose record is inspected stating reason for
inspection.
Makes failure to so respond a misdemeanor.
Makes giving of false reasons in response to such request a misdemeanor and subjects person giving false reasons to civil liability to
person whose record inspected.
Requires state agencies to file statement of all personal information maintained in computer systems with Office of Management
Services on July 1, 1972, and to update statement every six months.
Directs such office to report annually to Legislature on efforts to
maintain privacy for personal data held in computer files by the
state.
Prohibits, with specified exceptions, the selling or distributing by
state or local agencies of lists of information which contain names or
addresses.
Makes certain eavesdropping on computer systems punishable by
criminal penalties.
Makes certain attempts to obtain personal data of another from
confidential computerized record a felony.
Vote-Majority; Appropriation-No; Fiscal Committee-Yes.
The people of the State of Californiado enact as follows:
SECTION 1. Section 456.8 is added to the Elections Code, to read:
456.8 A county clerk may make voter registration information
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available, as authorized in this chapter, to any person only for election or government purposes.
SEC. 2. Section 6252 of the Government Code is amended to read:
6252. As used in this chapter:
(a) "State agency" means every state office, officer, department,
division, bureau, board, and commission or other state agency, except
those agencies provided for in Article IV (except Section 20 thereof)
or Article VI of the California Constitution.
(b) "Local agency" includes a county; city, whether general law or
chartered; city and county; school district; municipal corporation; district; political subdivision; or any board, commission or agency
thereof; or other local public agency.
(c) "Person" includes any natural person, corporation, partnership, firm, or association.
(d) "Public records" includes any writing containing information
relating to the conduct of the public's business prepared, owned,
used, or retained by any state or local agency regardless of physical
form or characteristics.
(e) "Writing" means handwriting, typing, printing, photostating,
photographing, and every other means of recording upon any form of
communication or representation, including letters, words, pictures,
sounds, or symbols, or combination thereof, and all papers, maps,
magnetic or paper tapes, photographic films and prints, magnetic or
punched cards, discs, drums, and other documents.
(f) "Governmental agency" includes any federal, state, local or
other government agency within or without the United States.
(g) "Reports of intelligence information" do not include reports
maintained by the Military Department.
SEC. 3. Section 6253 of the Government Code is amended to read:
6253. (a) Public records are open to inspection at all times during the office hours of the state or local agency and every citizen has
a right to inspect any public record, except as thereafter provided.
Every agency may adopt regulations stating the procedures to be followed when making its records available in accordance with this
section.
(b) Every person, upon proof identification,shall have the right
to read and copy any public or confidential record or writing kept by
a state or local agency which pertains directly to him to determine
whether the information in such record is correct. The agency shall
correct all errors in such record within 30 days after receiving from

such person proof of the correct information satisfactory to the
agency.
(c) Any state or local agency with computerized confidential
records in existence on the effective day of the amendments to this
section enacted at the 1971 Regular Session of the Legislature shall
provide such record of use or request as described in this section, by
January1, 1974; all computerized installationscoming into existence
after such date shall provide such record of use or request as of the
date of their origin.
(d) All state agencies shall file a statement of all personal information maintained in computer systems with the Office of Management Services on July 1, 1972, and update such statements every six
months thereafter.
(e) No state or local agency may, except as provided in Section
1811 of the Vehicle Code, Sections 456.5, 456.6, 456.8, 457, and 459 of
the Elections Code, and Section 9407 of the Uniform Commercial
Code, sell or otherwise distribute lists of information in bulk or in
aggregateform identifiable by name or address. No provision of this
section is intended to prevent inspection or other use of any public
record in accord with the other sections of this chapter.
SEC. 4. Section 6253.5 is added to the Government Code, to read:
6253.5 (a) When any governmental agency or person reads, copies, corrects, or otherwise requests any record of the state or local
agency relating to any person, the state or local agency maintaining
such records shall record with the record of the person whose record
was so used the name and business address (if applicable) or home
address of the person so using the record and the date of such use.
The state or local agency shall verify the name and address of the
person so using the record by requiring such person to produce appropriate means of identification.
(b) The person whose record was used as described in subdivision
9a) may make a written request of the person so using the record to
state the reason or reasons why the record was so used. Any person
so using the record who fails to so respond in writing within 30 days
of the mailing of the written request to the person making the written request is guilty of a misdemeanor.
(c) Any person required by subdivision (b) to respond to a written
request of the person whose record was used in the manner described
in subdivision (a) who states false reasons in such response for such
record use is guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be liable to the person making such request in a civil action for actual damages, reasonable attorney's fees and court costs.
SEC. 5. Section 11702 is added to the Government Code, to read:
11702. The Intergovernmental Board on Electronic Data Process-
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ing shall report annually to the Legislature on its efforts to protect
confidentiality and security of personal data maintained in computerized intergovernmental information systems.
SEC. 6. Section 11731 of the Government Code is amended to read:
11731. The functions of the Office of Management Services are:
(a) To develop a short-range master plan to operate until June 30,
1969, and a long-range Maintain a master plan that will provide optimum utilization of electronic data processing systems for state
government.
(b) To develop recommendations to be submitted to the State
Electronic Data Processing Policy Committee concerning electronic
data processing policies, procedures and standards; administer state
policy as adopted in the Long-Range Electronic Data Processing
Master Plan.
(c) To maintain continued evaluation of operational effectiveness
and performance (including costs) of electronic data processing applications in state government;.
(d) To serve as general adviser to the state on policy and planning
matter pertaining to information systems and data processing; and.
(e) To work closely with the Intergovernmental Board on Electronic Data Processing, including assisting in the development of
statewide policies for intergovernmental information exchange. In
addition, to provide facilities and services to the Intergovernmental
Board on Electronic Data Processing as mutually agreed upon by the
Office of Management Services and the intergovernmental board.
(9 To report annually to the Legislature on its efforts to protect
the confidentiality and security of personal data maintained in computer files by the State of California
(g) To act as the central review and coordinatingbody for the implementation of state policy regardingindividualprivacy and the security of information.
SEC. 7. Section 631 of the Penal Code is amended to read:
631. (a) Any person who, by means of any machine, instrument,
or contrivance, or in any other manner, intentionally taps, or makes
any unauthorized connection with, whether physically, electrically,
acoustically, inductively, or otherwise, with any telegraph or telephone wire, line, cable, or instrument, including the wire, line, cable,
or instrument of any internal telephonic communication system or
computer system, or who willfully and without the consent of all parties to the communication, or in any unauthorized manner, reads, or

attempts to read, or to learn the contents or meaning of any passage,
report, or communication while the same is in transit or passing over
any such wire, line, cable, or is being sent from, or received at any
place within this state; or who uses, or attempts to use, in any manner, or for any purpose, or to communicate in any way, any information so obtained, or who aids, agrees with, employs, or conspires with
any person or persons to unlawfully do, or permit, or cause to be
done any of the acts of things mentioned above in this section, is punishable by a fine not exceeding two thousand five hundred dollars
($2,500), or by imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding one
year, or by imprisonment in the state prison not exceeding three
years, or by both such fine and imprisonment in the county jail or in
the state prison. If such person has previously been convicted of a violation of this section or Section 632 or 636, he is punishable by fine
not exceeding ten thousand dollars ($10,000), or by imprisonment in
the county jail not exceeding one year, or by imprisonment in the
state prison not exceeding five years, or by both such fine and imprisonment in the county jail or in the state prison.
(b) This section shall not apply (1) to any public utility engaged
in the business of providing communications services and facilities, or
to the officers, employees or agents thereof, where the acts otherwise
prohibited herein are for the purpose of construction, maintenance,
conduct or operation of the services and facilities of such public utility, or (2) to the use of any instrument, equipment, facility, or service
furnished and used pursuant to the tariffs of such a public utility, or
(3) to any telephonic communication system used for communication
exclusively within a state, county, city and country, or city correctional facility.
(c) Except as proof in an action or prosecution for violation of
this section, no evidence obtained in violation of this section shall be
admissible in any, judicial, administrative, legislative or other
proceeding.
SEC. 8. Section 631.1 is added to the Penal Code, to read:
631.1 Any person attempting to obtain personal data of another
person from any confidential computerized record by fraud, bribery,
or other deceit shall be guilty of a felony.
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EXHIBIT D.
Assembly Constitutional Amendment No. 51 (Feb. 16, 1972).'
Feb. 16, 1972
Req. #2332
Assembly Constitutional Amendment No. -. A resolution to
propose to the people of the State of California an amendment to
the Constitution of the state, by amending Section 1 of Article I,
Sections 2 and 6 of Article IV, and Section 11 of Article IX
thereof, relating to state government.
Resolved by the Assembly, the Senate concurring,that the Legislature of the State of California at its 1972 Regular Session commencing on the third day of January, 1972, two-thirds of the members
elected to each of the two houses of the Legislature voting therefor,
hereby proposes to the people of the State of California that the Constitution of the state be amended as follows:
First-That Section 1 of Article I be amended to read:
Section 1. All men persons are by nature free and independent,
and have certain inalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty; acquiring, possessing, and protecting property; and pursuing and obtaining safety and, happiness,
and privacy.
Second-That Section 2 of Article IV be amended to read:
Sec. 2. (a) The Senate has a membership of 40 Senators elected
for 4-year terms, 20 to begin every 2 years. The Assembly has a
membership of 80 Assemblymen and Assemblywomen elected for 2year terms.
(b) Election of Assemblymen and Assemblywomen shall be on
the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November of even-numbered years unless otherwise prescribed by the Legislature. Senators
shall be elected at the same time and places as Assemblymen and
Assemblywomen.
(c) A person is ineligible to be a member of the Legislature unless he such person is an elector and has been a resident of his the
district to be represented by the person for one year, and a citizen of
the United States and a resident of California for 3 years, immediately preceding his the person's election.
1. This version found in Assemblyman Cory's files is dated February 16, 1972,
and contains a stamp at the top "AUTHOR'S COPY." Assemblyman Cory introduced
his bill on March 13, 1972. Final Calendar of Legislative Business, Regular Session
1972, p. 864.

(d) When a vacancy occurs in the Legislature the Governor immediately shall call an election to fill the vacancy.
Third-That Section 6 of Article IV be amended to read:
Sec. 6. For the purpose of choosing members of the Legislature,
the State shall be divided into 40 Senatorial and 80 Assembly districts
to be called Senatorial and Assembly districts. Such districts shall be
composed of contiguous territory, and Assembly districts shall be
nearly equal in population as may be. Each Senatorial district shall
choose one Senator and each Assembly district shall choose one
member of Assembly. The Senatorial districts shall be numbered
from one to 40, inclusive, in numerical order, and the Assembly districts shall be numbered from one to 80 in the same order, commencing at the northern boundary of the State and ending at the southern
boundary thereof. In the formation of Assembly districts no county,
or city and county, shall be divided, unless it contains sufficient population within itself to form two or more districts, and in the formation of Senatorial districts no county, or city and county, shall be
divided, nor shall a part of any county, or city and county, in forming
any Assembly or Senatorial district. The census taken under the direction of Congress of the United States in the year 1920, and every
ten years thereafter, shall be the basis of fixing and adjusting the legislative districts; and the Legislature shall, at its first regular session
following the adoption of this section and thereafter at the first regular session following each decennial Federal census, adjust such districts, and reapportion the representation so as to preserve the
Assembly districts as nearly equal in population as may be; but in the
formation of Senatorial districts no county or city and county shall
contain more than one Senatorial district, and the counties of small
population shall be grouped in districts of not to exceed three counties in any one Senatorial district; provided, however, that should the
Legislature at the first regular session following the adoption of this
section or at the first regular session following any decennial Federal
census fail to reapportion the Assembly and Senatorial districts, a
Reapportionment Commission, which is hereby created, consisting of
the Lieutenant Governor, who shall be chairman, and the Attorney
General, State Controller, Secretary of State and State Superintendent of Public Instruction, shall forthwith apportion such districts in
accordance with the provisions of this section and such apportionment of said districts shall be immediately effective the same as if
the act of said Reapportionment Commission were an act of the Legislature, subject, however, to the same provisions of referendum as
apply to the acts of the Legislature.
Each subsequent reapportionment shall carry out these provisions
and shall be based upon the last preceding Federal census. But in
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making such adjustments no persons who are not eligible to become
citizens of the United States, under the naturalization laws, shall be
counted as forming a part of the population of any district. Until
such districting as herein provided for shall be made, Senators and,

Assemblymen, and Assemblywomen shall be elected by the districts
according to the apportionment now provided for by law.
Fourth-That Section 11 of Article IX be amended to read:
Sec. 11. All property now or hereafter belonging to "The California School of Mechanical Arts," an institution founded and endowed
by the late James Lick to educated males and females persons in the
practical arts of life, and incorporated under the laws of the State of
California, November twenty-third, eighteen hundred and eighty-

five, having its school buildings located in the city and county of San
Francisco, shall be exempt from taxation. The trustees of said institution must annually report their proceedings and financial accounts
to the Governor. The Legislature may modify, suspend, and revive at
will the exemption from taxation hereby given.

EXHIBIT E.
Testimony before Assembly Constitutional Amendments
Committee (April 24, 1972).
Testimony of Cheriel Moench Jensen of ACA 5 before the Assembly
Constitutional Amendments Committee
April 24, 1972
Much of the following testimony was prepared by Mary Dunlap, attorney from Bolt Hall [sic], who has the flu and could not be here to
present it herself.
There are two basic changes in Assembly Constitutional Amendment No. 51 which will be dealt with separately and then their relationship to each other and their timeliness will be described.
CHANGE THE TERM "MEN" TO "PERSONS" AND
CHANGE THE TERM "ASSEMBLYMEN" TO "ASSEMBLYMEN" AND "ASSEMBLYWOMEN"
Webster defines "Man:...) la) a human being; especially an adult
male human..." (emphasis in original)
The ambiguity that accompanies the use of the term "man" is incorporation in our Constitution as presently worded. This ambiguity
is inconsistent with the Constitutional right of equal protection. The
California Supreme Court (Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby 485 P.2d 529
(1971) ruled that sex was a "suspect" classification. The state has
never shown compelling interest to so classify. The United States
Supreme Court (Reed v. Reed 30 L. Ed. 2d 225) ruled that, "To give
mandatory preference to members of one sex over members of the
other.. .is to make the very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment..."
Therefore, whether the Equal Rights Amendment is ratified or
not, the equal protection clause partially covers this area and the
change we propose would bring the California Constitution up to
date.
There is no gender clause in either the California Constitution or
the United States Constitution. Therefore, any reference to a particular sex does not automatically mean the sex as well. We can be reasonably certain that those who drafted the California Constitution
did not intend this Article I, Section 1 to include women. For example, the ownership and possession of property protections in Article I,
Section 1 were never read to expand the common law rights of women with respect to property. Such rights were extremely limited
before the passage of the Married Women's Property Acts in this
country. Even after these acts were passed, the state legislature continued to pass laws that restricted and disenfranchised women.
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These laws were never found unconstitutional under Article I, Section 1.
It was not until 1875 that even the United States Court recognized
that women were "persons" and that they had always been citizens
but in this same case (Minor v. Happersett 21 Wall 162, 22 L. Ed. 627
(1874 U.S.) the court ruled that the fact of their citizenship did not
entitle women, by virtue of the privileges and immunities clause to
the right to vote.
An example of the exclusionary treatment of women is:
Article X, Section 1 of the California Constitution which allows
for punishment, treatment, supervision, custody and care of females in a manner and under circumstances different from men
similarly convicted. Such differential treatment effects safety,
happiness, freedom and independence, life and liberty.*
This shows that the framers did mean only men because men were
the only citizens.
Examples of private actions excluding women from these rights include but are not limited to:
A woman 'who has been refused admission to a hospital because
her husband cannot sign the permission form does not have the
right to obtain safety or defend her life. This is common
practice.
A woman who has been denied automobile insurance because of
her husband's bad driving record has been denied the entire list
of rights under the Section under discussion.
A married woman who is not allowed to purchase stock without
her husband's consent has been denied the right to acquire and
protect property.
While it would be more comfortable and efficient to rely upon the
good faith of government to preserve and protect these basic rights in
Article I, Section 1 for all persons, the history of the legal status for
women proves that course to be unsafe.
The change of the term "men" to "persons" is easily accomplished
but is not, as a function of that ease, a petty matter. Such a change
would provide the theoretical basis upon which fundamental rights in
law and practice could be extended to all persons. To perpetuate the
present wording on this point would afford leeway to those who, now
and in the future, may misunderstand or misrepresent the relation of
women to fundamental rights. Thus it is a minuscule change, but a
crucial one.
May it also be mentioned before proceeding to the next point that

the Equal Rights Amendment refers only to rights under the law. As
we have seen there are many practices involving fundamental rights
that fall outside the scope of the law but are in some ways more important to the individual such as the right to defend one's own life by
being able to sign into a hospital. Changing this part of the Constitution could have a persuasive effect in those areas.
"PURSUING AND OBTAINING... PRIVACY"-ADDED TO
ARTICLE I, SECTION 1.
The right to pursue and obtain privacy is not spelled out in either
the state or the federal constitutions but has a firm basis as established by the United States Supreme Court.
Webster defines "Privacy... ) 1) the quality or condition of being
private; withdrawal from public view or company; seclusion. 2)
secrecy."
Webster defines "Private... belonging to oneself, not public or of
the state. .. "
The Supreme Court has defined privacy as a basic right and has
furnished us with more complete definitions. To quote Justice
Douglas:
"[S]pecific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras,
formed by emanations from those guarantees that give them life
and substance. Various guarantees create zones of privacy. The
right of association contained in the penumbra of the First
Amendment is one, as we have seen. The Third Amendment in
its prohibition against the quartering of soldiers 'in any house' in
time of peace without the consent of the owner is another facet
of that privacy. The Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms the
'right of the people to be secure in their person, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.' The
Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incriminating Clause enables the
citizen to create a zone of privacy which the government may not
force him to surrender to his detriment. The Ninth Amendment
provides: 'The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by
the people.'
"The Fourth and Fifth Amendments were described in Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630, 6 S. Ct. 524, 532, 29 L. Ed. 746, as
protection against all governmental invasions 'of the sanctity of a
man's home and the privacies of life.'"
Marriage is described in Griswold v. Connecticut as containing a
right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights.. .". Even more specifically "the constitutional right of privacy inheres in the individual, not
in the marital couple." (Above Court Citations from Griswold v.
Connecticut 381 U.S. 479, 85 S. Ct. 1678, 14 L. Ed. 2d 510.)
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The Court in Stanley v. Georgia 394 U.S. 564, 89 S. Ct. 1247 helps to
further define the right of privacy:
"Also fundamental is the right to be free, except in very limited
circumstances, from unwanted governmental intrusions into
one's privacy.
"The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions
favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and
satisfactions of life are to be found in material things. They
sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their
emotions, and their sensations. They conferred, as against the
government, the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive
of rights and the right most valued by civilized man."
The Courts have broadly defined the right of privacy. No right can
be interpreted as absolute, however. We have the well-established
right to freedom of speech but that right does not allow us to slander
other persons, to yell fire in a crowded theater or to disturb the peace
because these actions would, in the balancing test, infringe on rights
possessed by others. There would have to be two tests used by the
legislature and -the courts in defining this right to pursue and obtain
privacy. The first would be a balancing test and the second would be
the test of "compelling interest" that the state might have. The
"Government is instituted for the protection, security and benefit of
the people" (emphasis added) and therefore enumerating the people's
right to pursue and obtain privacy would not only not take away any
powers the government now has, it would be carrying out the responsibility set forth in Article I, Section 2 of the California Constitution.
THE RELATIONSHIP OF CHANGING
"MEN" TO "PERSONS" AND OF ADDING THE
RIGHT TO PURSUE AND OBTAIN PRIVACY
With the pending passage of the Equal Rights Amendment many
persons have been worried that some basic aspects of privacy would
be jeopardized because the Separate-But-Equal doctrine was abandoned in Brown v. Board of Education 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Although
the Supreme Court has held that persons have a right to privacy the
people charged with carrying out the law are not necessarily familiar
with the court's decisions. It is important then that the right to pursue and obtain privacy be understood by the people lest individuals

take it upon themselves to deprive others of privacy in the name of
equality.
"One important part of the right of privacy is to be free from official coercion in sexual relations. This would have a bearing on
the operation of some aspects of the Equal Rights Amendment.
Thus, under current mores, disrobing in front of the other sex is
usually associated with sexual relationships. Hence the right of
privacy would justify policy practices by which a search involving
the removal of clothing would be performed only by a police officer of the same sex as the person searched. Similarly the right
of privacy would permit the separation of the sexes in public rest
rooms, segregation by sex in sleeping quarters in prisons or similar public institutions, and appropriate segregation of living conditions in the armed forces." (Yale Law Journal, Vol. 80:871,
1971)
Such facilities of course would have to be equal in both quality and
convenience.
Even more important than facilities and official treatment is the
fact that some people think that the laws prohibiting various types of
sexual assault are couched in terms which would make them unconstitutional. With the right to pursue and obtain privacy spelled out
these criminal statutes would have a firmer basis on which to be revised on non-sexist terms and would be more likely to stand if they
were not revised in time.
Because the principles herein described carry such importance for
at least half of the people we hope this committee will not treat them
lightly.
*Further examples of the exclusionary treatment of women are:
A married woman who cannot control her half of the community
property within a marriage cannot protect her property. The United
States Supreme Court has ruled that she is liable for the tax on such
property even though she may lack any control of it even to the extent of knowledge about its existence.
A married woman who cannot retain her domicile is not able to
pursue and obtain safety and happiness and more importantly may be
disenfranchised altogether in such a way that she has no choice of
the law which affects her or her voice in her government.
A married woman who has been denied the right to set up a business separate from her husband and has therefore been denied the
right to earn a living the way she wishes has been denied the right to
acquire property.
Once a married woman has deposited her own paycheck into the
joint bank account her husband becomes the sole manager of such
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money. Thereby the laws have denied her the right to protect her
half of such community property.
The requirement that females have a higher grade point average
than males to attend such institutions as Lowell High School in San
Francisco denies to them ultimately the right to acquire property as
such action may have a substantial effect on future education and
employment.

EXHIBIT F.
Staff report of Assembly Constitutional Committee (?) on ACA
51 (before April 24).2
ACA 51 - PRIVACY
Staff Analysis
John Billett
Make privacy an inalienable right guaranteed
by the Constitution.
History:
The measure is similar to ACA 69 (1971)
session which was defeated in the Assembly
Judiciary Committee along with a companion
bill, AB 2933.
Legislative Counsel: Miss Roth
Analysis:
Adds pursuing and obtaining privacy to the
inalienable rights mentioned in the State
Constitution. Already in this category are
pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness.
In addition, it substitutes "persons" for "men" in
Section 1 of Article I of the State Constitution.
Comment:
This Constitutional Amendment puts the
State on
record regarding the right of privacy. At a
time when people are becoming increasingly
uneasy about potential and real abuses of
privacy, it would be highly desirable for the
California Constitution to state that individuals are entitled to privacy. The right to
privacy has been upheld in the Supreme
Court case of Griswold v. Connecticut.
Question:
Would this measure have legal implications
beyond the readily obvious; for instance,
would the right to privacy overturn legal
authority for wiretapping, etc.
Staff:
Milner
Source:
Purpose:

2. This document does not clearly indicate that it is a staff report submitted to
the Assembly Constitution Amendement's committee. There is, however, strong
circumstantial evidence that supports such a conclusion. The staff report picks up
specific quotes from the testimony before the Committee. Indeed, someone, probably
the person who drafted the staff report, actually wrote on the written testimony
"Insert 1" and "2" beside quotes that appear in the staff report. There is no date on
the staff report, but the Assembly Committee's report was drafted no later than April
24 (see Exhibit G), and the staff report was undoubtedly drafted prior to the
committee report.
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THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY - CASE LAW
The right to pursue and obtain privacy is not spelled out in either
the State or the Federal Constitutions but has a firm basis as established by the United States Supreme Court and other case law.
In Griswold v. Connecticut (1965), the U.S. Supreme Court recognized the constitutional right of privacy emanating from the penumbral application of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the First,
Third, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Amendments to the Constitution.
Justice Douglas; wrote:
"[S]pecific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras,
formed by emanations from those guarantees that give them life
and substance. Various guarantees create zones of privacy. The
right of association contained in the penumbra of the First
Amendment is one, as we have seen. The Third Amendment in
its prohibition against the quartering of any soldiers 'in any
house' in time of peace without the consent of the owner is another facet of that privacy. The Fourth Amendment explicitly
affirms the 'right of the people to be secure in their person,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures.' The Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incriminating Clause
enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which the government may not force him to surrender to his detriment. The
Ninth Amendment provides: 'The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage
others retained by the people.'
"The Fourth and Fifth Amendments were described in Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630, 5 S.Ct. 524, 532, 29 L. Ed. 746, as
protection against all governmental invasions 'of the sanctity of a
man's home and the privacies of life.'
(1. Griswold v. Connecticut 381 U.S. 479, 85 S. Ct. 1678, 14 L Ed 2d

510.)
With Stanley v. Georgia, the right of privacy had become a constitutional imperative. The decision in the "Stanley" case was explicitly
founded upon the inherent limitations of the State's power to inquire
into the "private" lives of its citizenry.
"Also fundamental is the right to be free, except in very limited
circumstances, from unwanted governmental intrusions into
one's privacy.
"The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions
favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the sig-

nificance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and
satisfactions of life are to be found in material things. They
sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their
emotions, and their sensations. They conferred, as against the
government, the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive
of rights and the right most valued by civilized man."
More recently, in Wisconsin v. Constantineau (1971), the supreme
Court recognized limitations on the ability of the State to collect and
to disseminate potentially derogatory information about individuals.
When our Constitution was drafted, physical searches and seizures
and interrogation constituted the primary forms of governmental
surveillance. Our privacy was protected then by the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures and the Fifth
Amendment protection against compulsory self-incrimination. (2.
Stanley v. Georgia 394 U.S. 564, 89 S. Ct. 1247)
With the technological revolution and the age of cybernetics, these
amendments, as they have been traditionally viewed, do not offer sufficient protection against state surveillance, record collection and
government snooping into our personal lives. We must, therefore,
develop new safeguards to meet the new dangers.
Proposition 11 puts the State on record that privacy is essential to
our other freedoms. It further expands the evolving view of privacy
emerging from case law. The right of privacy has emanated from our
other constitutional protections. With the right of privacy explicitly
written into the Constitution, it will itself become the basis for an expansion of constitutional protections.
The growing pervasiveness of government demands our immediate
attention. Proposition 11 will be a definite statement of the necessity
to control- government interference in our personal lives and bring
the issue clearly before the public and the courts. The major contribution of this amendment is to make the public aware that its freedoms are being slowly eroded, that this trend must be reversed.
Passage of Proposition 11 will serve notice on the Legislature and the
Courts that the public will not permit the continual abrogation of
their rights. The right to privacy must be clearly spelled out and
must be firmly adhered to.

[Vol. 19: 327, 1992]

California's Right to Privacy
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

EXHIBIT G.
Report of Assembly Constitutional Committee on ACA 51
3
(April 24, 1972).
STAFF ANALYSIS: ACA 51 (Cory), as introduced March 13, 1972
SUBJECT: Adds privacy to inalienable rights ....
changes

Makes technical

SUMMARY. Amends existing Art. I (Declaration of Rights) to include pursuing and obtaining "privacy" among the State Constitution's inalienable rights.
Changes masculine words such as "he," "his," and "males" to persons
and adds the word Assemblywomen to the existing sections where
the word "Assemblymen" is presently used.
BACKGROUND: The right to privacy does not exist per se in the
Federal Constitution or any other state Constitutions .... the courts,
however, have articulated a right to be free from certain kinds of intrusion of governmental acts.. .the Courts' work in 'the privacy field
is defining the right solely by the wrong... (libel, unlawful search
and seizure, telephone tapping, fair credit reporting act, etc.).
Author carried similar measure last session as a companion to his
personal data bill, regulating use of and access of personal data by
public agencies.
FEDERAL DECISIONS: Best known of so-called "right to privacy"
cases is Griswold v. Conn. 381 U.S. 479 (1965), in which the Supreme
Court struck down Connecticut's anti-contraceptive statute on
ground that it -violated a couple's right to privacy.. .the court articulated that the fear of governmental voyeurism was though to be almost as destructive of personality as would be a physical intrusion.
However, to date no definition has been formulated of a constitutional right of privacy.. .it appears, that the court draws from the entire Bill of Rights and various amendments, but it is not clear from
case law who is protected and from what.
COMMENT: "Persons," according to sec. 17 of Code of Civil Procedure, includes a corporation as well as a natural person. Does the author wish to extend inalienable rights to the corporate person?
3. This report was typed on letterhead of the Assembly Committee on
Constitutional Amendments and is quite clearly that committee's report. The bill was
reported from committee to the Assembly floor on April 27, only three days after the
date which is stamped on this report.

EXHIBIT H.
Proposed by Amendment by Assembly Constitutional
Committee to ACA 51 (April 26, 1972).
April 26, 1972
Req. # 9582
AMENDMENTS TO ASSEMBLY CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT NO. 51
AMENDMENT 1
In line 4 of the title of the printed measure, strike out ", Sections 2
and 6 of Article IV, and ", and in line 5 strike out "Section 11 of Article IX".
AMENDMENT 2
On page 1, strike out lines 7 and 8 and insert: Constitution of the
state be amended by amending Section 1 of Article 1 thereof to read:
AMENDMENT 3
On page 2, strike out lines 2 to 40, inclusive, on page 3, strike out
lines 1 to 40, inclusive, and on page 4, strike out lines 1 to 18,
inclusive.4
4. The effect of this amendment was to remove from ACA 51 all changes except
adding the word "privacy" to Article I, Section 1.
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EXHIBIT I.
Report of' Senate Judiciary Committee(?) on ACA 51 (June 7,
1972).5
ACA 51 (Cory)
As amended May 1
Constitution
RIGHT OFPRIVACY
HISTORY
Source: Constituent
Prior Legislation: ACA 69 (1971) - held in Assembly Committee on
Judiciary
Support: Unknown
Opposition: No known
DIGEST
Provides that all persons, rather than men, have certain inalienable
rights among which is the right to pursue and obtain privacy (Sec. 1,
Art. I, Const.).
PURPOSE
Establish the inalienable right to privacy as a right guaranteed to
citizens of this state by the California Constitution.
COMMENT
1.

The U.S. Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut (381, U.S.
479, 1965) upheld the right of privacy as applied to the marriage
relationship by declaring this right to be within the penumbra of
several fundamental constitutional guarantees.
2. Because all fundamental rights are not absolute in nature, what,
if any, limitations would exist with respect to the right of privacy
created by this Constitutional Amendment, i.e., does it extend to
corporations, criminal accused, public figures, wire taps and
eavesdropping, etc.?
5. There is strong circumstantial evidence to establish that this document is the
Senate Judiciary Committee's report.

EXHIBIT J.
Amendment by Senate Judiciary Committee to ACA 51 (June
7, 1972).
[The volume in the State Archives which contains this amendment
was missing. It is possible to reconstruct the amendment, however,
by comparing the final text with the text as amended by the
Assembly Constitutional Committee. The amendments changes a
reference to "Article 1" to "Article I" and substituted the word
"people" for "persons."]
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EXHIBIT K.
The Privacy Clause as Finally Approved, Resolution Chapter
56 (July 5, 1972).
RESOLUTION CHAPTER 56
Assembly ConstitutionalAmendment No. 51 - A resolution to
propose to the people of the State of Californiaan amendment to the
Constitution of the state, by amending Section 1 of Article I thereof,
relating to state government.
[Filed with Secretary of State July 5, 1972.]
Resolved by the Assembly, the Senate concurring,That the Legislature of the State of California at its 1972 Regular Session commencing on the third day of January, 1972, two-thirds of the members
elected to each of the two houses of the Legislature voting therefor,
thereby proposes to the people of the State of California that the
Constitution of the state be amended by amending Section 1 of Article I thereof to read:
SECTION 1. All people are by nature free and independent, and
have certain inalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying
and defending life and liberty; acquiring, possessing, and protecting
property; and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy.

EXHIBIT L.
Ballot Analysis and Arguments.
Title
RIGHT OF PRIVACY. Legislative Constitutional Amendment.
Adds right of privacy to inalienable rights of people. Financial
impact: None.
General Analysis by the Legislative Counsel
A "Yes" vote on this legislative constitutional amendment is a vote
to amend the Constitution to include the right of privacy among the
inalienable rights set forth therein.
A "No" vote is a vote against specifying the right of privacy as an
inalienable right.
For further details, see below.
Detailed Analysis by the Legislative Counsel
The Constitution now provides that all men are by nature free and
independent, and have certain inalienable rights, among which are
those of enjoying and defending life and liberty; acquiring, possessing
and protecting property; and pursuing and obtaining safety and
happiness.
THIS MEASURE, if adopted, would review the language of this section to list the right of privacy as one of the inalienable rights. It
would also make a technical nonsubstantive change in that the reference to "men" in the section would be changed to "people."
Cost Analysis by the Legislative Analyst
The right to privacy, which this initiative adds to other existing
enumerated constitutional rights, does not involve any significant fiscal considerations.
Argument in Favor of Proposition11
The proliferation of government snooping and data collecting is
threatening to destroy our traditional freedoms. Government agencies seem to be competing to compile the most extensive sets of dossiers of American citizens. Computerization of records makes it
possible to create "cradle-to-grave" profiles on every American.
At present there are not effective restraints on the information activities of government and business. This amendment creates a legal
and enforceable right of privacy for every Californian.
The right of privacy is the right to be left alone. It is a fundamental and compelling interest. It protects our homes, our families, our
thoughts, our emotions, our expressions, our personalities, our freedom of communion, and our freedom to associate with the people we
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choose. It prevents government and business interests from collecting and stockpiling unnecessary information about us and from misusing information gathered for one purpose in order to serve other
purposes or to embarrass us.
Fundamental to our privacy is the ability to control circulationof
personal information. This is essential to social relationships and
personal freedom. The proliferation of government and business
records over which we have no control limits our ability to control
our personal lives. Often we do not know that the records even exist
and we are certainly unable to determine who has access to them.
Even more dangerous is the loss of control over the accuracy of
government and business records on individuals. Obviously, if the
person is unaware of the record, he or she cannot review the file and
correct inevitable mistakes. Even if the existence of this information
is known, few government agencies or private businesses permit individuals to review their files and correct errors.
The average citizen also does not have control over what information is collected about him. Much is secretly collected. We are required to report some information, regardless of our wishes for
privacy or our belief that there is no public need for the information.
Each time we apply for a credit card or a life insurance policy,file a
tax return, interview for a job, or get a drivers' license, a dossier is
opened and an informationalprofile is sketched Modern technology
is capable of monitoring, centralizing and computerizing this information which eliminates any possibility of individual privacy.
The right of privacy is an important American heritage and essential to the fundamental rights guaranteed by the First, Third, Fourth,
Fifth and Ninth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. This right
should be abridged only when there is a compelling public need.
Some information may remain as designated public records but only
when the availability of such information is clearly in the public
interest.
Proposition 11 also guarantees that the right of privacy and our
other constitutional freedoms extend to all persons by amending Article I and substituting the term "people" for "men." There should be
no ambiguity about whether our constitutional freedoms are for
every man, woman and child in this state.
KENNETH CORY
Assemblyman, 69th District
GEORGE R. MOSCONE

State Senator, 10th District
Rebuttal to Argument in Favorof Proposition 11
To say that there are at present no effective restraints on the information activities of government and business is simply untrue. In addition to literally hundreds of laws restricting what use can be made
of information, every law student knows that the courts have long
protected privacy as one of the rights of our citizens.
Certainly, when we apply for credit cards, life insurance policies,
drivers' licenses, file tax returns or give business interviews, it is absolutely essential that we furnish certain personal information.
Proposition 11 does not mean that we will no longer have to furnish
it and provides no protection as to the use of the information that the
Legislature cannot give if it so desires.
What Proposition 11 can and will do is to make far more difficult
what is already difficult enough under present law, investigating and
finding out whether persons receiving aid from various government
programs truly are needy or merely using welfare to augment their
income.
Proposition 11 can only be an open invitation to welfare fraud and
tax evasion and for this reason should be defeated.
JAMES E. WHETMORE
State Senator, 35th District
Argument Against Proposition11
Proposition 11, which adds the word "privacy" to a list of "inalienable rights" already enumerated in the Constitution, should be defeated for several reasons.
To begin with, the present Constitution states that there are certain inalienable rights "among which are those" that it lists. Thus,
our Constitution does not attempt to list all of the inalienable rights
nor as a practical matter, could it do so. It has always been recognized by the law and the courts that privacy is one of the rights we
have, particularly in the enjoyment of home and personal activities.
So, in the first place, the amendment is completely unnecessary.
For many years it has been agreed by scholars and attorneys that it
would be advantageous to remove much unnecessary wordage from
the Constitution, and at present we are spending a great deal of
money to finance a Constitution Revision Commission which is working to do this. Its work presently is incomplete and we should not
begin to lengthen our Constitution and to amend it piecemeal until at
least the Commission has had a chance to finish its work.
The most important reason why this amendment should be de-
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feated, however, lies in an area where possibly privacy should not be
completely guaranteed. Most government welfare programs are an
attempt by California's more fortunate citizens to assist those who
are less fortunate; thus, today, millions of persons are the beneficiaries of government programs, based on the need of the recipient,
which in turn can only be judged by his revealing his income, assets
and general ability to provide for himself.
If a person on welfare has his privacy protected to the point where
he need not reveal his assets and outside income, for example, how
could it be determined whether he should be given welfare at all?
Suppose a person owned a house worth $100,000 and earned $50,000
a year from the operation of a business, but had his privacy protected
to the point that he did not have to reveal any of this, and thus qualified for and received welfare payments. Would this be fair either to
the taxpayers -who pay for welfare or the truly needy who would be
deprived of part of their grant because of what the wealthy person
was receiving?
Our government is helping many people who really need and deserve the help. Making privacy an inalienable right could only bring
chaos to all government benefit programs, thus depriving all of us, including those who need the help most.
And so because it is unnecessary, interferes with the work presently being done by the Constitution Revision Commission and would
emasculate all government programs based on recipient need, I urge
a "no" vote on Proposition 11.
JAMES E. WHETMORE
State Senator, 35th District
Rebuttal to Argument Against Proposition11
The right to privacy is much more than "unnecessary wordage." It
is fundamental in any free society. Privacy is not now guaranteed by
our State Constitution. This simple amendment will extend various
court decisions on privacy to insure protection of our basic rights.
The work of the Constitution Revision Commission cannot be destroyed by adding two words to the State Constitution. The Legislature actually followed the Commission's guidelines in drafting
Proposition 11 by keeping the change simple and to the point. Of all
the proposed constitutional amendments before you, this is the simplest, the most understandable, and one of the most important.
The right to privacy will not destroy welfare nor undermine any

important government program. It is limited by "compelling public
necessity" and the public's need to know. Proposition 11 will not prevent the government from collecting any information it legitimately
needs. It will only prevent misuse of this information for unauthorized purposes and preclude the collection of extraneous or frivolous
information.
KENNETH CORY
Assemblyman, 69th District

